Rural Development in South Africa

A Case-Study of the Amatola Basin in the Ciskei



Edited by Chris de Wet and Simon Bekker

Occasional Paper
Number Thirty

Rural Development in South Africa

A Case-Study of the
Amatola Basin
in the Ciskei

Edited by
Chris de Wet
Simon Bekker

Shuter & Shooter
in association with

Institute of Social and Economic Research
RHODES UNIVERSITY

Shuter & Shooter (Pty) Ltd
Gray's Inn, 230 Church Street
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa 3201

in association with

Institute of Social and Economic Research,
Rhodes University,
Grahamstown, 6140
South Africa

ISBN 0 86985 848 6

Printed by The Natal Witness (Pty) Ltd, Pietermaritzburg
8877L

Preface

The editors wish to express their sincere thanks to the following people and institutions for their assistance, advice and support in the preparation of this volume.

The Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute of the University of Fort Hare, Alice, for supplying the initial grant of R6 000 for the socio-economic survey out of which this volume has subsequently developed. David Tapson and Philip Burger provided co-operation and access to ARDRI documentation, Pumla Goduka and Caroline Kibblewhite were members of the original team which undertook the socio-economic survey, and Jonathan Trollip and Japie Williams also provided assistance.

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, for ongoing administrative and secretarial services during both the research and the manuscript phases in the preparation of this volume. Jeff Opland, the former Director of the ISER, and Peter Vale, the current Director, provided advice and encouragement. Anne Palmer served as editorial assistant, seeing the text through into an advanced state, at which stage she left for overseas. Chris de Wet with Margaret Shepherd as editorial assistant then took over, preparing the text in its final form. Debbie Carr and Margaret Shepherd typed and retyped the various drafts.

Gavin Williams of St Peter's College, Oxford University, and Michael Whisson and Nancy Charton of Rhodes University read and commented on various chapters in draft form.

The people of the Amatola Basin have accommodated the various researchers who worked there with hospitality, patience and the necessary information to make this volume possible. It is to them that this volume is dedicated in gratitude, and in the hope that its findings and recommendations may be of some practical value.

Preface

The editors wish to express their sincere thanks to the following people and institutions for their assistance, advice and support in the preparation of this volume.

The Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute of the University of Fort Hare, Alice, for supplying the initial grant of R6 000 for the socio-economic survey out of which this volume has subsequently developed. David Tapson and Philip Burger provided co-operation and access to ARDRI documentation, Pumla Goduka and Caroline Kibblewhite were members of the original team which undertook the socio-economic survey, and Jonathan Trollip and Japie Williams also provided assistance.

The Institute of Social and Economic Research, at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, for ongoing administrative and secretarial services during both the research and the manuscript phases in the preparation of this volume. Jeff Opland, the former Director of the ISER, and Peter Vale, the current Director, provided advice and encouragement. Anne Palmer served as editorial assistant, seeing the text through into an advanced state, at which stage she left for overseas. Chris de Wet with Margaret Shepherd as editorial assistant then took over, preparing the text in its final form. Debbie Carr and Margaret Shepherd typed and retyped the various drafts.

Gavin Williams of St Peter's College, Oxford University, and Michael Whisson and Nancy Charton of Rhodes University read and commented on various chapters in draft form.

The people of the Amatola Basin have accommodated the various researchers who worked there with hospitality, patience and the necessary information to make this volume possible. It is to them that this volume is dedicated in gratitude, and in the hope that its findings and recommendations may be of some practical value.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Maps

Introduction

The relative economic, infrastructural and administrative poverty of many rural communities in the black homelands[1] of South Africa reflects their position of political and economic dependency in relation to their wider setting - the South African state and economy. Unable to influence the political machinery of either their homeland governments or that of South Africa, and unable to establish economic independence, they have little control over the conditions of their everyday life and subsistence. Their situation is aggravated by the fact that the homeland governments, to whom they look for services and assistance, are themselves dependent upon the South African Government for a substantial portion of their budgets, as well as for much of their administrative capacity. The poverty of these communities is thus duplicated at the level of their governments. In most of these homeland rural communities constraints on their chances of improving their circumstances far outweigh opportunities.

This monograph considers the circumstances of a rural Ciskei community, and the prospects for their improvement. It results from a co-operative research venture between the Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute (ARDRI) at the University of Fort Hare and the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Rhodes University. In 1981 ARDRI approached ISER and asked it to undertake a socio-economic survey in the Amatola Basin area of Ciskei near Alice. ARDRI was involved in the planning and implementation of a rural development programme in the Amatola Basin, and the socio-economic survey was to form part of the initial information-gathering process of the overall project.

As a result of the socio-economic survey conducted in mid-1981, it became clear that further research would be necessary.

> Problems and practices relating to cultivation would have to be investigated as the Amatola Basin community was unable to feed itself, and because agricultural improvement was a key objective of the overall ARDRI project. Unless the constraints operating in agriculture were understood and counteracted, the ARDRI project could not succeed in its stated objective.
>
> The prominence of children in the demographic profile of the Amatolá Basin required a focus on two major avenues for the

improvement of children's life-chances in both the short- and long-term, viz., the provision of health services and education.

As the improvement of people's circumstances depends upon the efficient management and delivery of services, it was necessary to examine the organization and quality of local government institutions.

The researchers' involvement in the Amatola Basin flowed directly from the ARDRI project. This project was an intervention in the life of the Amatola Basin. As such, it could constitute either a valuable opportunity or a serious constraint upon the inhabitants' attempts to improve their situation. It was felt that the ARDRI initiative should accordingly be examined in that light.

The present socio-economic situation in the Amatola Basin could not be understood without taking account of the way in which it had developed and of the community's relationship to the wider South African society. This suggested the importance of making a study of the community's history.

Further field research was conducted in 1981 and 1982.

The overall organization of this monograph is thus based on two sets of interrelated assumptions, viz.

that the Amatola Basin's relationship of dependency on the wider South African society is largely responsible for both the low level of opportunity and the wide range of effective constraints on the development of a stronger local economy and infrastructure, and of effective administration. This relationship of dependency is part of an on-going historical process and appears to have been cumulative; and

that the fields selected for more detailed study, viz. education, health, cultivation, local government and externally-initiated development projects constitute perhaps the key areas in which people's chances of improvement historically have been and are currently being held back.

With these two assumptions operating as broad guidelines, the authors have each pursued their own research, having freedom to cast their findings in comparative and interpretative contexts of their own choice. While ideas and data have been shared, the authors each accept responsibility for the content of their own chapters.

After this introduction, the setting of the study is given in a chapter on the physical location of the Amatola Basin, its infrastructure and the socio-economic status of its inhabitants. The development of this setting is then placed in historical context in a chapter tracing the history of the Amatola Basin community from its establishment in the 1850s. Four thematic studies follow, considering the areas of education, local government, cultivation and the state of health and delivery of health services. The implementation of the ARDRI development project and its impact upon the above aspects of life in the Amatola Basin are then analyzed.

The conclusion, written jointly by the editors, assesses problems of and prospects for rural development in the black homelands of South Africa by analyzing issues raised in previous chapters.

Footnote

1 The term "homeland" is used throughout this monograph to refer to the ten political and geographical units created by the South African Government with the expressed intention of catering for the political rights and aspirations of black people in South Africa, in terms of the policy known as "separate development". The Ciskei is one such homeland. These political and geographical units have also been referred to by people of various political persuasions as "so-called homelands", "Bantustans", "Self-Governing States", "Native Reserves", "Labour Reserves" and "National and Independent States". Each term carries its own ideological load, and the legal, political and moral status of these units is a matter of much heated argument. The use of the term "homeland" in this monograph should not be taken to imply **ipso facto** support of the policy of separate development, in terms of which homeland units were brought into being. In Chapter Two, the terms "reserves" and "reserve areas" have been used, as that chapter deals with the period up to 1950, during which time those terms were in current usage.

1 The Amatola Basin: Its Location and its Residents — *S.B. Bekker*

1 The Ciskei

The Ciskei is one of the ten homelands created by the South African Government. It is the fourth to accept independence from that government (in 1981). As a result of this recent and controversial political birth, both its area of jurisdiction and its community of citizens remain contentious concepts.[1] In this book, the Ciskei is understood to refer to the region that includes both the territory presently under the jurisdiction of the Ciskei Government as well as the South African Government's land consolidation proposals as described in the 1980 Ciskei Commission Report.[2] This region is one single block of land covering some 800 000 hectares.

Ciskeian citizens, who are all Xhosa-speakers, include a majority who live permanently outside this region. For the purposes of this book, only those resident in the Ciskei will be considered. In 1980, resident Ciskeians amounted to some 660 000 souls.[3]

Situated on the south-eastern seaboard of Southern Africa, the Ciskei stretches from a 60km coastal strip for some 160km inland. From the coastal plain, the surface rises to the Amatola mountain range north of Alice, and then descends in the direction of the Black Kei River. Penetrating deep into the interior, the Ciskei is drained by this river in the north-west and by the Buffalo and Great Fish Rivers which effectively form its south-eastern and south-western boundaries, respectively. The greater part of its surface, south of the Amatola mountains, is drained by the Keiskamma River, the water of which is one of the most important natural resources of a country which lacks any exploitable minerals.

The whole of the Ciskei falls into the summer rainfall region of South Africa and precipitation is characterised by sharp heavy showers and high variability. This, together with widely differing types of soils and vegetation, has led commentators to conclude that two per cent of the land can be placed under irrigation, fifteen per cent under (rain-fed) cultivation, and sixty-six per cent under grazing.[4] The

Map 1: The Amatola Basin in the Ciskei



agricultural potential of this land, poor though it is, is deemed to be higher than that of land across the border in South Africa.[5]

The resident Ciskeian population has increased dramatically. For the 1970-1980 decade, one estimate puts the increase at seventy-six per cent.[6] Three main reasons for this massive increase are apparent. The first is the high birth rate of resident Ciskeians. In the second place, a series of land incorporations and excisions have substantially changed the territory now known as the Ciskei, and thus its population base. Finally, as a result of the implementation of the South African Government's policy of population relocation, coupled with a strategy of rapid urbanisation in the Mdantsane/Zwelitsha region of the Ciskei, there has been continuous migration over the last decade of blacks from urban and rural areas in the Border and the Eastern Cape into this territory.

As a result of this recent increase in population, a growing number of resident Ciskeians are settled in villages which enjoy access to neither arable and grazing land nor to services provided by an urban local authority. These closer settlements which have developed, particularly in the north-west and close to the conurbation of Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, comprise an estimated ten per cent of the total population.[7] By employing this type of village as a separate category, the resident Ciskeian population can be classified as thirty-six per cent urban, fifty-four per cent rural, and ten per cent resident in closer settlements.[8]

With a national budget of R100m in 1980/81[9] and a gross national product two-thirds of which is earned outside its borders,[10] Ciskei is demonstrably poor in comparison with, and heavily dependent upon, its rich and powerful neighbour, South Africa. Situated as it is, moreover, on the periphery of the Southern African space economy,[11] its future economic prospects do seem to be linked to the new Southern African Regional Development Plan which aims to relocate some industrial and allied economic activities from major metropolitan areas in South Africa to peripheral regions in the space economy. Any strategy to improve its economic viability does seem to require the Ciskei to remain squarely integrated into the wider South African economy.

2 **The Amatola Basin**

a) Geography

As its name implies, the Amatola Basin is bounded by high ground in

Map 2: The Amatola Basin



the north, east and west. Elongated along its north-south axis and a little less than 7 000 ha in extent, the surface is steeply sloped, descending some 500m from the rim of the Basin to the river bed.[12] The Amatola River which flows into the Keiskamma River south of the Basin, drains the surface with the help of some twenty streams, all of which have been given names by Amatola residents.[13] These tributaries of the Amatola River flow intermittently, and most strongly during the wet summer months.

Annual rainfall varies within the 750 - 1 000mm range. It is greatest over the high pine plantations in the northern corner and over the Dohne sourveld in the North Valley. In the central region and South Valley, the rainfall drops substantially and the vegetation changes to that of False Thornveld on a markedly eroded surface.[14] Situated high on the eastern and western slopes, there remain a few large areas covered by indigenous mature forest. Soils in the Basin are considered more fertile than in most other Ciskei regions.[15]

Located as it is, immediately south of the Amatola mountain range, the Basin is accessible by road from the south, and is some twenty kilometres from Middledrift, its magisterial centre, and by way of an eastern pass, at the same distance from the town of Alice. Railheads closest to the Basin are situated in these two towns. A third gravel road which winds up the steep north-western reaches of the Basin, leads to Hogsback. Apart from these three main roads which lead to the central village of Komkhulu ("The Great Place"), a number of by-roads have been created through constant use by motor vehicles. These amount to tracks that are difficult to negotiate at the best of times and which deteriorate considerably during wet weather. The only form of public transportation in 1981 was a bus service available once a week.

The thirteen villages in the Basin form three clusters which meet in the central village. The three villages of the North Valley and five of the six in the South Valley are low-lying and within reasonable reach of each other. Residents in these villages are within walking distance of the Amatola River, the major source of clean water and of the central village of Komkhulu from which almost all social services available in the Basin are delivered. Located high on the Basin slopes, the village of Ndlovura in the South Valley and the three villages of the Highlands find access to clean water and to social services much more difficult; access to dead wood from the indigenous forests, on the other hand, is easier.

The clinic, the only high school and two of the four trading stores are situated in Komkhulu which is also the seat of the Gaika-Mbo Tribal Authority. In addition, the central village in which both Chief

Mhlambiso and the agricultural extension officer live, possesses the only telephone link and generator in the Basin. For the most it remains a small village of some sixty homesteads and is remarkably similar to the other twelve Basin villages.

These villages comprise between forty and one hundred homesteads. A homestead is made up of a number of residential units, a garden and, most often, a cattle kraal. Residences, which are either rondavels or rectangular in shape, are built from wattle and daub and have either thatched or, increasingly, corrugated-iron roofs. Gardens and kraals are close to these residential units and are usually fenced off with branches, small sticks and wooden stakes. Homestead sites are registered under leasehold tenure at the Middledrift magistracy. Villagers use pit latrines which are often shared by residents from a number of homesteads. Eight villages (including Komkhulu) possess a primary school, six a church, and all have land set aside for exclusive use as a cemetery. Half of the households in the Basin hold arable land on a quitrent basis. Their lands typically lie closer to their villages than does the communal grazing land to which they have access.

b) The Community of the Amatola Basin [16]

The Mhlambiso hereditary leaders and their followers have been living in the Amatola Basin for over one hundred years. After the grant, during the nineteenth century, of some 400 quitrent land deeds to male heads of households who were followers of the then Chief Mhlambiso, few outsiders seem to have succeeded in settling in the Basin by obtaining land rights or, for that matter, residential rights. Today, those who consider the Amatola Basin their home, or at least their rural home, are overwhelmingly the progeny of the families that settled in the Basin five generations back. Only thirteen households (out of a total of some eight hundred) are known to have settled in the Basin in living memory.

The stability of this community which is implied by such continuity, needs qualification. In the first place, the natural increase in population - and, within a patrilineal community, in male population in particular - led to the emergence and proliferation of landless homesteads since it was the custom for young men to establish separate homesteads for themselves and their new families. As a result, diminishing access to land and overstocking of cattle became major reasons for impoverishment and deterioration in household agricultural production. The second major qualification to this picture of a stable community arises from this agricultural deterioration as well as factors rooted in the rapidly industrialising wider political economy of South Africa. Quite simply it is the extra-

ordinarily high incidence of adult migration to South African mines, cities, and white-owned farms. Though many of the migrants who today spend the larger part of their adult lives living and working elsewhere, still consider the Amatola Basin their rural home and attest to this by remitting a part of their earnings to their families back home, others leave this home permanently, thereby cutting their ties with the community in which they were born and bred. In 1981, one homestead in ten stood empty in the Basin, pointing to whole families that had migrated, many probably never to return.

Based on a comprehensive survey undertaken in 1981, the total population of the Amatola Basin is in the region of 5 600 souls. This figure includes residents as well as migrants whom residents consider to belong to their households. These migrants prove their ties with home through regular visits and by remittances in cash and in kind. As shown in Table 1, demographic growth - of the total population - has been uniform over the last eighty years. The number of households has doubled, a proportion which correlates accurately with the present incidence of landlessness which stands at fifty-three per cent. The present resident population of little less than four thousand persons suggests, moreover, that the increase in people living permanently in the Basin has probably been substantially less than changes in total population figures indicate. In all probability, there were proportionately many fewer migrants at the turn of the century and those who did migrate were less likely to do so as regularly and over as long periods as is the case today.[17]

Table 1: Demographic Changes in the Amatola Basin[18]

Date	Number of Households	Total Population	Resident Population
1981	757 (occupied)	5597	3830
1959	647	4514	
1937		3439	
1925		3050	
1901	399	3048	

The people of the Amatola Basin perceive themselves as Amahlubi, a Mfengu grouping paying allegiance to Chief Mhlambiso. They also perceive themselves as Xhosa-speakers living in the Ciskei, and as black people in South Africa. These different social identities impinge upon them in important, albeit different ways.

Continuity of descent from the original landed settlers in the Basin remains important, particularly with regard to the use of land. By patrilineal custom transformed into legal regulation, residential sites and arable land are inherited by direct male descendants. Households of this community, moreover, have access to communal grazing land and, if landless, can gain access to arable land through co-operative arrangements with kin and neighbours.

This continuity of descent does not imply an unchanged social structure. Households in the Basin are increasingly mother-oriented: over half the households are effectively headed by women, and the masculinity rate (males to a hundred females) for adult residents between the ages of 20 and 60 is forty-nine. Since many adult women migrate with their husbands in search of cash-earning work elsewhere, two-thirds of Basin residents are under twenty years of age and fully one-half are attending schools in the Basin. Household-heads, therefore, tend to be elderly, and households themselves three-generational rather than two-generational. More than half the female heads are widows.

The fundamental need for an external cash source is shown by the typical income and consumption patterns of Amatola households. Only fifteen per cent of incoming cash derives from farming and other entrepeneurial activities. The rest flows in from migrant remittances (33%), pensions (26%), and wages earned by residents (26%). Since almost all remunerated jobs within the Basin are civil service jobs, these latter items of income derive either directly or indirectly from external sources. The kinds of food consumed by a household, including mealiemeal and vegetables, moreover, are more often bought as processed commodities from local trading stores than produced by households themselves. Little meat is eaten.

There are three major causes for the structural changes evident in the community. The first is the dramatic deterioration over the last century in the productive agricultural capacity of the Amatola Basin. The second is found in the introduction through missions, and the subsequent spread, of the Christian religion. The third, the spread from mining and urban areas, and the ultimate domination of, the money economy. The consequent need to earn cash in order to survive, obliges most adult residents to seek jobs in the Republican area - the economic common area - in which access is temporary and advancement limited.

Virtually every adult in the Basin claims to be a Christian. The two largest denominations, Presbyterian and Methodist, both have active churches in the community as do four other Protestant denominations. Though cohabitation is frequent, no example of a polygynous

marriage was identified during the 1981 survey, a finding in line with the Christian insistence on monogamy. Not only is the church's influence on the early educational system evident, but the growth of a series of village- and Basin- based voluntary associations owe their origin to the same source. The most common voluntary associations are burial societies and savings clubs formed along formal organisational lines. These, together with a number of other more general social societies, are formed and run by women who emphasize the Christian institutional basis of these associations. [17]

When they reach the age of 16, all boys and many girls begin to turn their minds to leaving the Amatola Basin. Through their parents and other returning migrants, through the radio and their schools, they have a fair idea of life and employment opportunities in the cities of South Africa. Most will try their luck in these cities before the age of 20 as in the Basin itself, there are few cash-earning jobs: teachers, foresters, clinic staff and agricultural officers virtually complete the list. The few remunerated positions in the Tribal Authority are filled by elderly men who have returned after years as migrants. There are less than 200 paid positions in the community as a whole.

Since the Amatola Basin is far from the closest cities of East London and Port Elizabeth, job-seekers cannot find jobs that allow them to commute between home and work. They need then to obtain not only suitable work but accommodation as well. Given the housing backlog and regulations governing the control of the black population in South African cities, it is no surprise that all do not succeed. Those that do, tend to have substantially higher educational qualifications than those that fail. Two-thirds of successful migrants live and work in the Eastern Cape, the majority in its two cities, others as farm hands on white-owned farms. The rest have found work in Cape Town or in the metropolitan region of the Southern Transvaal. One male migrant in six works as a miner.

Though identification with the Amahlubi community in the Amatola Basin serves, along with family, as a primary local tie, particularly with regard to cattle and land, it is the Ciskei Government that decides matters of education, health care, pension payments, and access to the limited number of jobs near home or in the commuter cities of Zwelitsha and Mdantsane. Farther afield, with promises of opportunities and wealth, and threats of violence, disruption and prosecution, lie the urban black townships, the economy, and the government of South Africa. To the adults of the Amatola Basin, this picture is a tested view of the world: to their children it is the foundation of their hopes and their fears. Insofar

as it is a realistic view of their world, it does not suggest that the residents of the Basin form a peasantry: people who earn their livelihoods through marketing the product of their labour as cultivators or stockfarmers. This perhaps is the fundamental reason why few newcomers have settled in the isolation of the Amatola Basin during the past twenty years.

3 Footnotes

1 Daniel J.B. McI. (1981); Ciskei Commission Report (1980), Chapters 8 & 9
2 Ciskei Commission Report (1980) p.54f
3 Ibid, p.15
4 Ibid, p.72
5 Ibid, p.73
6 Bekker S.B. et al (1982) p.4
7 Ibid, p.6
8 Ibid, p.6
9 Ciskei Commission Report (1980) p.82
10 Bekker S.B. et al (1982) p.8
11 Daniel (1981)
12 Steyn G.J. (1982) p.30
13 Trollip J. (1981)
14 Steyn G.J. (1981), p.4; Mentis M.T. and Trollope W.S.W. (1981) p.8ff.
15 Du Preez C.C. and Botha F.J.P. (1981), p.1
16 Unless otherwise specified, all data used in this section were obtained from the following three sources:
Bekker, S.B. et al (1981a); Bekker, S.B. et al (1981b); Bekker, S.B. & de Wet, C.J. (1982)
17 Wilson M. and Thompson L. (eds. 1971), Chapter 2
18 Derived from data presented in Chapter 2 infra; Dept. of Native Affairs, Union of South Africa 1959; and sources quoted in footnote 16 (above)

2 History of the Amatola Basin — *J. Bowen*

1 Introduction

The years 1850-1950 were momentous ones in South African history. During the early period, the last independent African chiefdoms were brought under European control and South African industrialisation began with the discovery of diamonds in 1867, accelerating rapidly with the discovery of gold in the 1880's. For black people, this period saw the progressive loss of land, the breakdown of traditional social, economic and political structures and the introduction of the migrant labour system. Over the years, successive governments (after initial deliberate attempts to destroy the traditional chieftaincy and land tenure systems) introduced legislation designed to perpetuate, or recreate, these traditional systems as a means of ruling the vast (black) African population of South Africa. From the 1930's in particular, attempts were made to regenerate the reserve areas, threatened with collapse due to soil erosion, overstocking, overpopulation and a shortage of male labour for agricultural purposes.

These historical facts are well-known. This chapter is an attempt to trace the course of events from 1850 to 1950 as they affected one community - the Mhlambiso Mfengu of the Amatola Basin, bearing in mind the broader South African context in which they took place. There are gaps in the archival material, gaps which would need to be filled through the collecting of oral history in particular. For example, it is known that females for many years, in the absence of males who labour in the urban areas, have taken an increasingly important role in organising agricultural activities as well as general social activities. The written records are silent on this fact. Oral evidence would also be extremely valuable in throwing light on written evidence which is tantalisingly brief: e.g. regarding feuds over the headmanship. It would also be crucial in offering a different perspective, that of the inhabitants of the Basin themselves, rather than that of the white officials who administered government policy. One further factor in relation to the source material needs to be mentioned. The large number of files relating to Middledrift which have been destroyed is both regrettable and disturbing. Most of these relate to the period from 1940.

It is partly as a result of these constraints, which the source material has imposed, that this chapter is handled thematically and not as a chronological narrative. It will become clear, however, that some themes - such as agricultural decline and migrant labour, are closely interlinked and that the divisions between them are somewhat artificial and have been adopted merely for the purpose of exposition. Despite the gaps in the evidence, it has been possible to reconstruct an historical picture of life in the Basin from the 1850's, a history in which various themes are clearly traceable, within the limitations of the available source material. The picture which results, reflects in microcosm what was happening in various other rural reserve areas in South Africa. Although this is an historical case study of the Mhlambiso Mfengu of the Amatola Basin it is also, to some extent, a history of black people in South Africa.

2 Setting and Early History

In the late 1840's the region of the Amatola mountains was described as having "some of the richest and most desirable pasture land (that) exists. . ."[1] It was into this vicinity that Mhlambiso and his people were moved in 1853.

If we consider that in 1855, Mhlambiso had 182 followers, or sixty-four heads of families with him, then it is clear that the Basin offered them a secure and good living, providing both grazing for their cattle, good fields in which to grow food and sufficient water for both. By 1937 the size of the Basin had been reduced to just over 8 000 morgen.[2] So in 1866, each family would have had access to at least 125 morgen - enough to provide a secure livelihood far preferable to that which they had previously had and this must have been seen as equitable reward for the loyalty they had shown to the British government.

Oral history relates that in about 1820 Mhlambiso, the third son of the Great House of the Hlubi chief Mtimkulu, fled with his followers from the attacks of Shaka in Natal. They moved to the Transkei where they were welcomed by Hintsa. During the 1835 Frontier War they, along with other Mfengu groups, were brought to the Peddie area by the Rev. John Ayliff and they then removed themselves to the Wittebergen Native Reserve in the Albert (now Herschel) district. In 1853, Mhlambiso received permission from Lieutenant-General Cathcart to move with his followers into the Amatola Basin (part of the area from which the Ngqikas were removed by the Colonial government following the 1853 Mlanjeni War), in reward for their loyalty to Britain during this war.[3] The

British established a large area as a Royal (or Crown) Reserve, and the newly-placed groups were to serve as a buffer between the Cape Colony and the Xhosa peoples now pushed back beyond the Kei. [4]

The original recommendation by James Ayliff, the then Superintendent of the Crown Reserve, was to settle Europeans in the more fertile areas of the Basin, leaving the rugged slopes for the new black immigrants. [5] Ultimately, however, while in the neighbouring Keiskammahoek district European settlers were interspersed amongst black people, Middledrift district - of which the Amatola Basin became a part - was almost wholly black. The Mfengu were all clustered in four locations: Zibi's, Zali's, Quma's and the Basin (the latter location was, in area, larger than the other three put together: 8 000 morgen as opposed to 5 500 morgen). [6] The remainder of the district consisted largely of people of Kama's Gqunukwebe who submitted to the British, with a few white traders, missionaries and farmers dispersed amongst them.

The Mfengu in the Basin have remained a fairly homogeneous group (in spite of the early establishment of mission and recruitment links) with no large-scale movement of people into the Basin since the first settlement.[7]

3 Administration

a) External (European)

In 1853 black people in the Crown Reserve were placed under a Superintendent subordinate to the Chief Commissioner of British Kaffraria. A yearly quitrent of 10s was levied on each hut. [8]

Shortly afterwards (1854), Sir George Grey was appointed Governor of the Cape and in 1855 he introduced the appointment of magistrates who would get together with the chiefs in the administration of justice. [9]

Traditional chieftainship was thus undermined through the introduction of chiefs and headmen as paid appointees of the government. In addition to their judicial duties, magistrates were to "take an interest in the welfare of the inhabitants of their districts, encourage industry and agriculture and promote civilisation". [10]
Civil cases were adjudicated by "native custom", while the Special Magistrate was to try criminal cases according to European law. In 1883, however, most magistrates admitted that although it was by this time illegal, they continued to administer "native law".[11]

In 1855 three divisions were established for the administration of the Mfengu in the Crown Reserve, with a Commissioner at Keiskammahoek and two subordinate superintendents in the other divisions. Mfengu headmen were appointed at a stipend of £20 per annum (this stipend was progressively reduced over the years. For example, by 1890 they were receiving £9). Among other things they were required to assist in the collection of hut tax.[12]

The magisterial system continued after the Cape accepted responsibility for British Kaffraria in 1865, and after Union in 1910 the establishment of Native Affairs Commissioners did not initially change the administration on the ground as it affected the day-to-day running of the locations. In fact, the recommendation from Middledrift in 1927 was that apart from a change in name from Magistrates to Native Commissioners, no further action was necessary.[13] The Native Affairs Act of 1920 introduced the first real changes in administration at the local level. In terms of this Act, Local Councils were established. Middledrift Local Council was established in 1927 and the Amatola Basin headmen sat on this Council. However, the Local Council was under the Chairmanship of the European Native Commissioner and the local inhabitants were by this time firmly dependent on the whims of the white government. They could petition higher authorities, but all important decision and policy-making were out of their hands and would be imposed from above. Revenue was collected by means of a local tax, and when the Ciskeian General Council was set up, a percentage of the Local Council's funds was paid to this General Council.[14] The records show that the activities of the Council were generally concerned with municipal-type government: the construction and maintenance of water furrows, bridges and dams, as well as having responsibility for hospitals, clinics, agricultural schools and for general education. In 1956 the General Council was abolished by proclamation and replaced by the various Tribal Authorities.[15]

In 1927, under the Native Administration Act (No. 38 of 1927), magistrates with jurisdiction over blacks, were transferred from the Department of Justice to the Native Affairs Department.[16] Magistrates were to receive instructions from the Chief Native Commissioners and were to "extend close observation to, and to report fully upon, the development of the outlook, activities and needs of the native population and to exhibit a considerate and painstaking understanding of Native ways of thought and methods of business."[17]

Until the promulgation of the Black Authorities Act in 1951, with the consequent official reinstatement of the chieftaincy, the main instrument of government remained the headman. It was through the headmen's co-operation that the state maintained control over

black people and ensured South Africa's cheap labour supply.[18]

b) The Mhlambiso Headmen

The British Government recognised Mhlambiso as the most senior Mfengu chief under colonial rule and today the present Mhlambiso Chief maintains that he is recognised as the most senior Mfengu chief in Ciskei, owing allegiance only to Ntatazeli in Natal. Nevertheless, for most of the period covered by this study, the various governments recognised the Mhlambisos only in their capacities as headmen.[19]

As headmen, they

> "were in some respects to act as policemen in apprehending offenders and bringing them to justice . . . they were to keep a general supervision over the people. . . they were to be utilized by the magistrates as advisors in all native matters."[20]

For example, in 1875 the Clerk-in-Charge at Middledrift cited the following responsibilities of headmen:

> "Every headman is responsible for every act committed at his village on pain of being dismissed. He has to see that all stock coming to or removing from his village, is reported to the Magistrate - to see that every man pay his Hut Tax, and that no person is allowed to leave the village without having previously done so . . . Also that all Breaches of Peace be immediately reported and the offenders brought before the magistrate . . . Every headman is to be properly dressed and set a proper example to the people of his village. He is to use every means to discourage drunkeness. . . discourage heathenish practises. . . to endeavour in every way to encourage the people to send their children to school. To assist persons wishing to hold divine service. . . ."[21]

Generally, headmen also allotted land in their locations - a practice which gave them considerable power, although this allotment theoretically was subject to the sanction of the Special Magistrate. In 1890 the Secretary of Native Affairs ordered a halt to this allotment of land by headmen.[22] (Nevertheless it appears that they continued to do so as Government officials argued that it would be impossible to do this task themselves.)[23]

Both the Civil Commissioner in King William's Town and the Clerk-in-Charge at Middledrift in 1886 were of the opinion that a reduction in the number of headmen by the Government was not

Figure 1: Succession of Headmen and Chiefs in Amatola Basin



*** Alfred Mabuto
(unrelated to Mhlambiso:
Headman 1917-1929)

possible, not only because the "people of one location would not recognise the authority of the headman of another", but also because of their usefulness in governing the locations peacefully, their settling of "garden disputes" and their loyalty to government, without which control over the "natives" would not have been possible.[24] The consequence of headmen being government-salaried and appointed officials, especially where decisions were often dependent on the personality and attitudes of Special Magistrates, was that differences and divisions could occur between inhabitants, depending on personal allegiances. Thus, on the death of the original Chief Mhlambiso in 1867, Jacob - a relative of the deceased - assumed authority "over the whole tribe", but the extent of his support is not clear. Subsequently, "the clan wishing to have the eldest son of their old chief as headman", Ebenezer was appointed. Jacob's followers (about one-third of the group) refused to accept Ebenezer and so two headmen were recognised. In 1882 it was decided that Ebenezer should be headman over a portion of the location until Jacob's retirement or death, when he would take over the headmanship of the whole location. Jacob's salary of £18 per annum was to be split between them.[25] Jacob and his people then refused survey of their lands when Ebenezer accepted survey - possibly as a means of asserting their independence.

The dependence of headmen on the government for their position - and, in particular, on maintaining cordial relations with Magistrates whose word was virtually law - is extremely clear from the records.

Reports of both Ebenezer Mhlambiso and his father were glowing and give only two instances of clashes between Ebenezer and the government.

The first was in connection with Ebenezer's desire to move to Pondoland. (Unfortunately, the records are sparse and do not give any reasons for this proposed move.) His first application to the government was made in August 1887. The reply from Cape Town was that permission would only be granted on the understanding that the land vacated would immediately revert to government. (Ebenezer wished to retain his rights in the Basin.) He then asked permission for himself and seven families to leave, adding that he was determined to move. The government, however, still insisted that permission would only be granted if **all** the inhabitants left. After the great majority refused to leave, the Civil Commissioner recommended that Ebenezer and the seven families be allowed to go, provided they did so within a specified period and that they gave a written guarantee that none would ever return to the Basin or the District. It appears that Ebenezer never left although it

seems that his son Llewellyn did go to Pondoland since sources indicate that he later returned from there in anticipation of taking up the headmanship in about 1916.[26]

The second instance was Ebenezer's protests to the government over Hlubi land losses in the Basin (which will be dealt with later). Apart from these two incidents, relations with government officials were extremely good. The Mhlambiso headmen ensured that stock theft and squatting by outsiders was practically non-existent in their location; they were "trustworthy", "tractable", "vigilant" and extremely useful to a government who, without their active collaboration, would have faced extreme difficulties in governing so large a district with so few officials.[27] When Ebenezer requested retirement (for unknown reasons) it was "regretfully" accepted. Badi, his son, was elected temporarily in 1914 at a stipend of £6 per annum. However, when Badi Mhlambiso died in 1916, problems arose over the succession. Jonathan, the heir, had gone to America and Alfred Mabuto was appointed for two years as acting headman in 1917 until Jonathan could be contacted. If this failed, Llewellyn Mhlambiso was to take over the headmanship. The Assistant Magistrate supported Mabuto, who realizing his dependance on government, had wholeheartedly thrown himself into the tasks required of him. The enthusiasm with which Mabuto supported the government with dipping and other measures[28] was probably a factor in the demand for the installation of Llewellyn Mhlambiso as headman of the Basin in the years following 1917. Llewellyn, whom the magistrate admitted he did not know, was nevertheless reported by him to be insolent and disrespectful and too much under the influence of his father who now, it was said, had been forced to retire for insubordination and had "adopted a manner of superiority" towards Whitfield, the Superintendent of Natives. The Mhlambiso line was now described as never having produced suitable headmen and consequently Mabuto was appointed permanent headman in 1920, despite a vote for Llewellyn at a meeting held to determine who should gain the position. Inhabitants of the Basin in 1924 were still sending lawyers' letters and petitioning higher authority (up to the Secretary for Native Affairs). This, however, was unsuccessful. Mabuto remained headman until about 1929. Ninus Mhlambiso then took over the headmanship. (Mabuto appears to have suffered from ill-health for several years. He died in 1932.)[29] In 1966, when the new Tribal Authority system became effective in the Amatola Basin, Ninus retired and was succeeded by his nephew Cyrus Mqweli Mhlambiso, who then assumed the status of Chief.

The dilemmas faced by headmen are clearly demonstrated in this example: the need to have the support of one's people and, on the other hand, the dependence on government for one's position,

although this position required the carrying out of measures unpopular with the people. As Moll put it, headmen "had a thin path to tread between the disfavour of the state and the hatred of the people".[30] That dilemma has remained unsolved.

c) Headmen or Chiefs?

The division between chief and headman is a somewhat arbitrary one, especially for the Mfengu, whom James Ayliff in 1859 reported were "in most cases under the control of their legitimate chiefs as headmen under Government".[31] Hence, despite the position of the headman being that of a government-salaried and -appointed leader, the chiefly Mhlambiso line continued as leaders of the Mfengu in the Basin for over a century.

Sir George Grey's system of subsidizing the chiefs and appointing paid headmen responsible to Special Magistrates seems thus to have been slightly differently applied to Mfengu. Du Toit, in the **Archives Year Book for 1954**, describes Mfengu headmen as "in a position analagous to that of Xhosa Counsellors".[32] Probably, the process of destroying the power of the Xhosa Chiefs was not seen as necessary in the case of the Mfengu who had already proven their "loyalty" to Britain. From letters it is obvious that Mhlambiso's people still recognised him as a chief of royal blood. In 1890 the surveyors Murray and Gerhardi in their report on the Basin stated that the inhabitants' "recognition of a sort of hereditary chieftainship amongst them will have a tendency to retard any civilising influences that the magistrate or missionaries may bring to bear upon them".[33]

Moll has documented this overlap between chief and headman in the Transkei, noting that the headmanship became hereditary, subject to government veto. He quotes Mears, who in 1947 asserted:

> "So deeply ingrained is the love of the people for their own traditional system of government that the 'headmen' . . . are commonly regarded as their rulers. The office of headman has thus come to be regarded as hereditary."[34]

Moyer, in his thesis on the Mfengu, wrote:

> "so long as the chiefs followed government directions, aided in protecting colonial borders, apprehended cattle thieves, and pass law violaters . . . (etc.) they retained their offices and were permitted some independent authority. However, if any chief asserted his office too forcefully, articulated the needs and grievances of his followers too vociferously, appeared to be

urging the continuation of "unacceptable" traditional customs, or conveyed the impression that he encouraged disaffection and discontent, the government was prepared to act against him and, if necessary, deprive him of his office. Co-operative and submissive chiefs were rewarded, while others saw the government undermine their authority by reducing the size of their land or following. Further, the government created or supported rival leaders whom they thought would counteract the influence of "problem" chiefs. Once this was done, the traditional chiefs frequently abandoned their former posture and became more co-operative. The frustration engendered by government policy caused some chiefs to contemplate rebellion or removal from the colony, but the lack of support they received from the Mfengu caused them to abandon plans for such action."[35]

In the light of this, the installation of Jacob Mdlankomo and Alfred Mabuto, and Ebenezer's fracas with the government over moving to Pondoland become clearer. However, evidence from the Basin suggests that Moyer does overstate his case when he asserts that traditional chiefs had already before 1865 lost their authority over their people, just as Mears' assertion of abstract "love" for hereditary leaders in 1947 must be questioned. On the one hand, the government, through the installation of traditional chiefs as headmen, certainly perpetuated tribal authority and so gave them considerable power (e.g. in land allocation), which otherwise was being progressively eroded. On the other hand, European ambivalence towards traditional structures prior to 1951 did place headmen/chiefs in a somewhat precarious position in that dissatisfied black people could appeal to a higher authority against the decision of the headman.

The appeals for the installation of Llewellyn Mhlambiso as headman probably had as much to do with his opposition to government officials as with the fact that he was a Mhlambiso.

Certainly, by the time of the promulgation of the Black Authorities Act in 1951 (the Gaiko-Mbo Tribal Authority under which the Amatola Basin falls was established in 1966), the "chiefly ideal" had been totally undermined in the Basin and surrounding areas. As Manona states:

"The peoples' social universe had expanded during the long period of close association with the colony and the new efforts aimed at reconstructing the old patriarchal social structure were no longer consistent with the situation that had emerged."[136]

d) Land Tenure

In the early days of settlement Mhlambiso's people were relatively few and land was plentiful.[37] Within a few years the Imperial Government was forging ahead with plans for the survey of land into individual allotments - part of Grey's plan to break the power of the Chiefs and to promote "civilisation".[38] It was also argued that survey would result in better control over black people- taxation would be easier and close settlement would be of advantage in security matters.

Du Toit quotes from a letter written by Rev. Impey to Sir Harry Smith in 1850 which "anticipated the work done by Grey and Maclean". This passage is worth quoting in full as it so clearly sets out what happened after the Mlanjeni War, despite Rev. Calderwoods's objection that Grey's plan was impracticable because it was "inconsistent with the pastoral habits of the people". Impey wrote:

> "There are multitudes of localities where at present within a radius of 2 miles, or even less, there are numerous kraals consisting of from six to eight houses each: the whole of which could be collected to a central position from which the cattle might graze over the very same pasturage, the people obtain the same supply of water, and cultivate the same lands as they do at present, whilst they would be living in a village or Township of 100 families, get-atable for the purposes of instruction, and placed under the immediate government of a headman or local magistrate, who would be responsible to the Commissioner of the District. The hold which the Government would thus, from the concentration of persons and property, have over the population would be vastly increased; the way for the introduction of municipal and fiscal regulations would be opened up. The people thus concentrated would soon acquire an interest in the soil and have a much greater stake in the peace and welfare of the country at large, and sedition could be more easily at once be nipped in the bud."[39]

Grey's point of view was clearly set out in a speech to Parliament in 1855: "We should try to make them (i.e. black people) a part of ourselves, useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue; in short, a source of strength and welfare for this Colony, such as Providence designed them to be".[40] The mould for future white-black relationships in the area was thus set out in those earliest years, as Grey's comment shows.

Sir George Grey's motives for the introduction of individual tenure as set out by Colonel Maclean to the Chiefs and Headmen of the

Crown Reserve thus should not be taken at face value. Maclean told them that Grey had "determined to allow you to hold your lands on the same terms on which land is held in the Colony by the white man. . . You will thus be placed on equal terms with the white man. . ."[41]

Certainly, within twenty years Government officials were far more explicit with regard to the reasons for the introduction of individual tenure.[42] For example, the Civil Commissioner's Report for the Blue Book of 1876 stated that:

> "The gradual introduction of individual tenure of land among the native. . . will, no doubt, deprive numbers of natives of the means of leading a lazy lounging life, at the expense of their more industrious fellows."[43]

In 1891 in a report to the Under Secretary of Native Affairs, the Civil Commissioner expressed the opinion "that the issue of individual title to natives occupying crown lands would materially assist in supplying the labour market with cheap labour". The issue of titles would also "weaken the influence of the headmen to a great extent".[44]

The Civil Commissioner recapitulated an earlier letter where he had set out his aims more clearly:

> ". . . It may be urged that under this system (individual tenure) the locations will not carry as large a population as under tribal tenure and as the native population goes on increasing from year to year and no fresh ground is available. . . this outgrowing of the available land by the population may prove to be an advantage and when a father finds that his land is not large enough for the support of himself, and his increasing family, that he will force those of his children who are able to work to leave in search of employment and thus the labour market of the colony will be supplied from time to time with cheap labour."[45]

Sir George Grey set out his plans for the survey of individual title in the Crown Reserve as follows:

> "In taking steps for the preparation of Title in lots as proposed the following is worthy of attention:
> 1) To select lots from some portion of the location to be dealt with as being more likely to meet the wishes of the occupant.
> 2) Extent of lot for agricultural or garden purposes say 2

acres.
3) . . .
4) Every payer of Hut Tax as shown by return to be (document indecipherable) by Superintendant of Crown Reserve to receive in his name a separate title. . .
5) The land to be held on Quit Rent Tenure.
6) Land not to be alienated except with the consent of government.
7) Penalty of forfeiture for disloyalty - and occupation in any portion of the Reserve to be prohibited.
8) Grazing ground, i.e. land not held on title to be common within districts here - after assigned . . .
9) The erven to be arranged, as far as practicable, in village form in groups of not less than 25 erven, the object being to prevent natives from scattering themselves over the whole Reserve. . . [146]

In July 1856, Commissioner Maclean met with the chiefs and headmen of the Reserve to persuade them to accept the new system. The chiefs saw quite clearly the aims behind this move - to destroy the chieftainship. They also objected to being tied to one plot of land - a practice contrary to their "conventional mode of agriculture".[47] They were sceptical that two acres would be sufficient and were extremely suspicious of government motives, recognizing too the threat individual tenure posed to polygyny. It is noteworthy that only Mhlambiso did not object: "I have been longer under the Government than others in the colony and I never heard of any thing of this kind before but I am under the Government and I will do as they wish". Nevertheless, his support was grudging.[48]

Mhlambiso appears to have been a shrewd man. He must have forseen that resistance would not alter the Government's intention. By agreeing to the survey he could, perhaps, strengthen his position vis-à-vis the government. Furthermore, he probably did not envisage any loss of land for his people as thus far loyalty to the Imperial government had paid dividends in that they were well-treated and had been given suitable land to live on.

A month later, on 21 August 1856, government officials reported that Mhlambiso had applied to have his location surveyed and divided into erven before the sowing season commenced. This was agreed to by Ayliff, Superintendent of the Crown Reserve, who felt that survey would serve as a practical illustration which would remove many of the objections to individual title expressed by other (Mfengu) groups.[49] Mhlambiso had paced off three acres which he felt would be sufficient for a man with one wife,[50] and by 1858 the Basin had been surveyed and divided into eight villages.[51] It was

found after survey that Mhlambiso had enough people to fill only seven of the villages and so it was decided by government to move some of Zibi's people into the area as they belonged to the same "tribe".[52] (From the few remaining records it appears that just over 400 buildings and roughly the same number of garden lots were surveyed.)[53]

In April 1859, P. Campbell, Superintendent of the Crown Reserve, reported to Colonel Maclean that "UMhlambiso and his people are settling down in their villages on their allotments. . . ", adding "I am not aware of the Chief having shown any opposition to the people settling on their allotments. . . in fact. . . he has appeared anxious that they should get on with their buildings."[54] It is not clear what degree of movement was involved. It is clear, however, that passive resistance defeated the introduction of individual tenure. Campbell stated that "the people have generally made the excuse that thatch was scarce"[55] (for not taking up allotments) and in 1863 the people of Matole village asked for an exchange of lands, arguing that the land surveyed and allotted to them was "not good, it is poor and not fit to produce food enough for us in these dry and trying seasons. . . ".[56] Thirty years later it was necessary to resurvey the location as "nothing appears to have been done beyond the completion of survey toward carrying out this intention" (i.e. the introduction of individual tenure),[57] for the agricultural and building lots surveyed by Dumbleton in 1858 "were never taken up by the natives".[58]

In December 1889, Ebenezer Mhlambiso approached the Civil Commissioner's office:

> "I write to inform you that it seems to me and the rest of the people of my location here at the Amatola Basin that the time is come when this land of ours should be resurveyed according to the government regulations and conditions.
>
> We are so desirous that it should be done or commenced next June I have already told the people to prepare for the matter.
>
> Hoping that you will soon comply with our request. . .
>
> (signed Ebenezer Mhlambiso and the rest of the Amahlubi".)[59]

Ebenezer's motives are not clear. Possibly he saw in acceding to obvious government plans a way of getting back into favour with the government after his dispute regarding his proposed move to Pondoland. Once again, however, a large portion of the Basin's people were in opposition to this move and under Jacob Mdlankomo

about one-third of the inhabitants refused to accept individual tenure. A letter written on behalf of Jacob stated that he was the senior headman and that the wishes of himself and his people must be given consideration and that neither his people nor those under Ebenezer could afford survey costs. Further he argued that he and his people did not see why they should pay to have lands surveyed which they had lived on since the settlement of the Basin and that the present system of occupation was adequate. The letter concluded by insisting that survey should not be instituted unless it was the unanimous wish of the people.[60] Neither Ebenezer Mhlambiso nor Jacob could, had they so desired, have held out against individual tenure, as with the promulgation of the Glen Grey Act in 1894, the Government was free to proclaim individual tenure in any district.[61] However, resurvey was to prove costly for the inhabitants of the Basin and would result in an ongoing protest to Government from Mhlambiso over the loss of land for many years.

Survey was made between 1878 and 1890 and about 400 building and 400 garden lots were laid out (the maximum which the surveyors thought was possible if undue crowding was to be avoided).[62] Individual title was granted to 187 applicants in 1901 and a further thirty-eight in 1907 under Act 40 of 1879[63] - and not under the Glen Grey Act. However, clauses incorporated into the titles ensured that there was so little difference between the two that later officials would refer to the Basin as being under the Glen Grey Act.[64]

Already in 1890 problems were encountered as a large portion of the commonage had been proclaimed forest land under the conservancy of the Eastern Forest Department and now formed part of the Schwastenwald forest. The Conservator of Forests refused to follow the surveyor's suggestion of allowing the forest to revert back to commonage.[65] The surveyors, Murray and Gerhardi, had assumed 10 000 acres of commonage, giving 400 families twenty-five acres each. However, this demarcated forest, forming part of the commonage, consisted of 4 000 acres. Thus, the remaining 6 000 acres would give 400 families only fifteen acres each. In any event, there were 255 applicants for survey for individual title under Ebenezer, while Jacob's followers, apparently about one-third of the total group, refused survey.[66] These figures, supplied by the surveyors, with their talk of 255 applicants for 400 plots and all of Jacob's followers refusing survey, only obscure what survey and the issue of individual title really meant for the inhabitants of the Basin. The fact that there were only 255 applicants out of 399 household heads under Ebenezer shows that there was considerable resistance to the introduction of individual tenure among both groups in the Basin. Nevertheless, there was no option available. The surveyors' report stated that Jacob and his people's refusal to accept individual title would not stop survey of their lands.[67]

Furthermore, the Middledrift Report for the Blue Book of 1901 (the year in which title was issued) gives the following census figures for the Basin:[68]

Table 1: Amatola Basin Census Figures : (1901)

	Huts*	Male Adults	People	Churches	Schools	Trading Stations
Jacob's Location	109	109	+-545	1	1	1
Ebenezer's Location	399	399	1 995	2	2	1
	508	508	2 540	3	3	2

* (i.e. Homesteads)

From: Blue Book (Middledrift Report) 1901

The above figures show explicitly the position the people found themselves to be in. The issue of individual title meant that 108 families would be left without land and there would be no room for expansion. The surplus would be forced to become labourers in the South African economy in order to survive. This would be done through the principle of one man - one lot, which meant that the younger males in each family had no legal access to land in the Basin, while other male inhabitants (some of them later arrivals) were not provided with allotments in the first place and found themselves in the same position.[69]

Ebenezer Mhlambiso insisted that the original boundary beacons included other Crown land and land in the Wolf River Valley[70] as well as the forest now lost. In 1915, the government argued that "it is extremely unlikely that so long ago as 1858, that is, before the location had become congested, that the question of boundaries had arisen".[71] Applications to the Beaumont Commission, petitions to the Prince of Wales and lawyers'[72] letters protesting about land loss, were unsuccessful.

By the turn of the century land was increasingly short and some of the inhabitants of the Middledrift district sought other means of surviving on the land. For many years people had been moving to Pondoland in the Transkei and now Zibi, headman over the Mfengu in the location neighbouring the Basin, bought land in the Transvaal to which several families moved, at least one of them from the Basin.[73] By the 1920's land shortage and overstocking were acute problems.[74] Agricultural demonstrators, reported the magistrate, had

for some years been busy trying "to induce improvements in cultivation".[75] By 1928 the government was considering a resurvey as encroachment on commonages in many locations was so severe: and worst in the Basin where - "encroachment (by the inhabitants) in some cases equals if not exceeds the garden lot".[76]

4 Agricultural Decline

Black agriculture thus faced increasing difficulties through the years. Furthermore, the South African state supported the development of commercial and capitalist farming amongst whites, at the expense of blacks.

By 1867 commercial farming was well established in South Africa.[77] Black peasants soon began responding to market opportunities providing, with their lower labour costs among other things, competition for white farmers and freeing themselves from the need to labour as migrants. Bundy's **Rise and Fall of a South African Peasantry** has documented this phenomenon as well as the consequent decline of black peasant farming.[78] Bundy argues that Middledrift was an important centre of successful Mfengu peasant farming. One would therefore expect the Amatola Basin, with its favourable rainfall, to have been an important part of this. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess this due to a lack of records. It does, however, appear that the introduction of the plough, so crucial to the peasant farmer, appeared comparatively late in the Basin, partly as a result of the lack of a mission station there.[79] It is therefore impossible to assess the extent to which the Mhlambiso Mfengu produced for the market. Nevertheless, they did suffer from the negative effects produced by state policy - land shortage being one of these.

Wilson argues that had black people had the land and the State support which whites enjoyed, they could have undercut white farmers. State assistance and financial credit to white farmers was available through the Land Bank (established in 1912). The Pact government passed legislation aimed at encouraging better organisation of agriculture for export purposes. Co-operatives were established and expanded rapidly. In addition, through the establishment of Boards, the white agricultural sector was protected from fluctuations in the market price and from outside competition.[80] All this was done at the expense of the black farmers, as can be seen in the disparities in allocation of land, funding, education, services and legal protection, particularly since 1910, which has continued to the present.[81]

It is clear that adherence to traditional ways is not solely to blame

for agricultural decline as has been argued, by Sadie for example, who asserts that:

> "the economic conditions of the underdeveloped community is fundamentally a function of its socio-cultural customs and institutions, in consequence of which the generation of the economic development of a people by themselves is neither more nor less than a socio-psychological process".[82]

It is clear, however, that the decline of the reserves is to a large extent the result of their position in the wider South African economy. This decline accelerated from the 1920's.

In the mid-twenties the total population of Middledrift was reported to be 30 200 people on 119 875 morgen (including forest land), broken down as follows:

Table 2: Ratio of People to Land in Middledrift District[83]
(mid-1920s)

	Rural Locations	Native-owned land (none of which was in the Basin)
Adult Males	7 000	400
Morgen	116 225	3 650

The male adult population of the Basin - 747 - was roughly ten per cent of that of the total adult male population of the whole district - 7 400. The total female population of the district was recorded as 8 000 and there were 14 800 children. (Unfortunately, there is no breakdown to sub-district level for these latter figures.)

Stock figures were reported as follows:

Table 3: Stock Figures for Middledrift District and Amatola Basin[83]
(mid-1920s)

	Amatola Basin	Total: Middledrift
Equines	204	2 953
Bovines	1 835	14 320
Wooled Sheep	5 348	53 516
Other Sheep and Goats	3 542	36 039

All expenditure was met by cash earnings from Johannesburg and other labour centres. Although staple crops were mealies and sorghum, the magistrate reported that "the purchasing power of the native is above his income every time. . .[84] The food supply comes from the cultivated land but the greater amount out of the Traders' Stores. They do not really raise enough for their own needs".[85]

Stock was rarely sold for food or taxes[86] (tax payments being met by cash earnings).[87] It was no wonder that the magistrate reported that with annual expenditure per family at about £25-0-0 plus £3-0-0 "annual contribution" (in indirect taxation) it was "imperative that they (i.e. black people) go to work in European areas",[88] and that "natives would die out if not allowed to go to industrial areas".[89]

Overstocking was seen by government as one of the greatest problems facing inhabitants of Middledrift during this time. Grazing areas were reported to be shrinking, owing partly to the growth of noxious weeds (especially jointed cactus) which were difficult to eradicate. Stock losses were heavy as a result of land shortage and "as much as seventy-five per cent of the cattle (have) died in a drought year". Stock losses were reported as usually resulting from drought rather than disease.[90] The thirties saw the area suffering from such severe droughts that relief measures had to be instituted. From the earliest years, these measures were initially resisted by government officials at both the local and the central level, who felt that as long as black people resisted recruitment for labour purposes, a little starvation would "promote industry".[91] Blacks, for their part, also resisted migrant labour for as long as they could.

During this period reports from Middledrift exclude the Basin to a large extent, as, comparatively speaking, the area was better off owing to the numerous forests which produced more moisture, and the soils which were not easily erodable. Officials concentrated on what they considered to be the worst areas, such as Cildara and Regu.[92] However, this is not to say that the position of the Basin was any less acute in other ways. If the whole district was dangerously overstocked and overpopulated as a result of land shortage, the Basin was no less so. In 1937, Norton, the Senior Agricultural Officer at Fort Cox, reported that although the official scheduled area of Middledrift was 116 000 morgen, the actual area measured by planimeter was only 77 000.[93] The area of the Basin equalled 8 625 morgen or 8,9 per cent of the total actual area, while the Basin's population of 3 439 was 8,9 per cent of the total population of 30 717. Furthermore, it must be remembered, a considerable percentage of the commonage (4 000 acres) was reserved forest land where no cultivation was permitted. Stock numbers in the Basin were established by Norton to be as follows:

Table 4: Stock Figures for Amatola Basin (1937)

	Amatola Basin	District
Cattle	1 406	15 384
Sheep	4 251	70 548
Goats	2 798	31 390
Small stock per morgen	1,6	1,9
Morgen per taxpayer	9,3	10,8

Norton found that, on a basis of 95 000 morgen, the district could carry 9 500 large and 57 000 small stock, showing an existing surplus of about 5 900 large and 45 000 small stock. (Cattle and small stock in the district were in a ratio of 1:6.) The average holding per taxpayer was four cattle units or twenty small stock units. Three thousand large stock, 22 500 small stock and 1 875 owners would have to be removed if over-stocking was not to result in deterioration of the land. However, he also pointed out a problem which would face numerous development projects: "At present many lands remain unworked for lack of draught - yet the same number of lands will have to be worked by fewer draught if culling takes place". Culling would result in less milk in an area where malnutrition "was a problem". He also pointed to a shortage of labour.

Norton's report concluded:

> "To sum up the natives are living at a sub-economic level; there is a downward trend in the value of their land and their stock and in their physical well-being. Any adverse movement in any economic factor brings about conditions of want, sometimes requiring State intervention to prevent serious distress. There is no safety margin."[94]

In the late twenties, but particularly in the thirties and forties, the government decided to promote agricultural education through the example of government agricultural officers and through the establishment of agricultural schools such as that at Fort Cox (opened in 1930).[95] Anti-soil erosion measures were adopted and the government attempted to introduce more efficient agricultural methods by the hiring out of government tractors for ploughing purposes.[96] (Most locations could not, however, afford this.) Inducements were provided by means of agricultural shows and prizes.[97] Parallel "development" was to take place in the pastoral

field by the culling of stock, the introduction of dipping tanks to eradicate diseases such as scab in sheep and the provision of good quality bulls to improve stock strains.[98] Local government officials would argue that headmen and their people unanimously accepted such propositions in most cases. The breaking down of fences, the setting of fire to commonage, and the loss of support for headmen who supported such moves, as well as other hostile acts would show that such reports were biased and over-optimistic.[99] In the Basin, for example, twelve months after one of the dipping tanks was so damaged as to be unusable, the inhabitants steadfastly refused to repair it.[100]

In July 1959, the Basin was declared a Betterment area under Government Notice No 1009.[101] The Reclamation and Settlement Report, giving the results of investigation in the Basin and making recommendations for the implementation of Betterment, reported that the vote at the meeting accepting the betterment scheme was unanimous and the people were co-operative (a point disputed by inhabitants today). The report gave the impression that the Basin was actually in a relatively good position: rainfall was good, the soil deep, not easily erodable and "still in good heart and productive". Over ninety per cent of the lands were reported to be in a good condition, neither exhausted nor badly eroded. The stock was "good foundation stock" and their condition "even at the end of winter was good". Any necessary stock culling could "not prove an excessive hardship to the land-owners" (although 135 stock owners had no land).[102] The avowed intention of Betterment was to make "peasant" farming possible. As such, land and stock improvement were of importance.

However, Betterment could only succeed if there was sufficient labour free of the necessity to leave the area for part of the year in order to earn money in industrial areas. Any development plan would also require sufficient land per population unit to provide food and some income for taxes, education, improvements and so on. The optimistic bent of the report, which ignored past records, also ignored the two crucial factors in any development project: the shortage of manpower due to migrant labour, and the total dependence of the inhabitants on the income generated by this labour. The vicious circle in which the Basin inhabitants found themselves as a result of their participation in the South African economy, and the neglect of this by the Ad Hoc Committee, did not bode well for the "betterment" of the Amatola Basin.

5 Migrant Labour

The increasing crucial dependence on migrant labour which has

already been mentioned, had a long history and was an important factor in the underdevelopment of the area. This dependence was to prove disastrous for African agriculture,[103] especially in an area like the Basin where steep slopes and poor roads militated against mechanisation (even if this could be afforded). Furthermore, loss of land and the introduction of the one man-one lot principle ensured that males, often against their will, left the rural areas as migrant labourers.

In the Eastern Cape in particular, pass laws were extensively applied in order to recruit and control labour for white farmers.[104] As early as 1859 it was reported that numerous Mfengu were applying for passes "to proceed to the colony to cut corn and shear sheep".[105] In 1877 5 046 passes were issued and 1 261 endorsed in the Middledrift district. By 1892 this number had increased to 8 000 new passes issued[106] (and during this period a portion of Middledrift district was attached to Victoria East).

Reports repeatedly stated that black people resisted migrant labour for as long as possible and were selective about the type of work they did.

For example, in 1891 it was reported that no black people

> "left under engagement - they prefer to engage themselves in the locality selected and the employer they prefer rather than engage themselves to agents sent to look for labourers."[107]

From the early years, government was continually seeking means of increasing the labour supply. Local officials recommended better wages, treatment and food. Vigne, the Magistrate at Keiskammahoek, for example, insisted that what was necessary was "to increase the wants of the natives by inducing them to acquire civilised and Christian habits and they must work".[108] The Special Magistrate of Middledrift in 1873 suggested

> "that each unmarried man pay annually for occupying and cultivating Government land the sum of 5 shillings. This might induce some fine healthy young men to seek employment and to further induce (original indecipherable) to seek service. I would insist on all the natives wearing at least a pair of Trowsers and shirts and to purchase these articles they must work. The want of clothes would create a desire for employment."[109]

Migrant labour and the resultant incomes were crucial to the Cape, and later the Union economy. In 1884 the Civil Commissioner reported that direct taxation in the King William's Town district

(with 60 000 people) had raised £9 236. However, black people also "contributed greatly indirectly through buying articles of European manufacture" and, he added "it is well known that it is native trade which is the commercial mainstay of this part of the colony".[110]

It is impossible to find exact figures of migrancy for the Basin as all reports were compiled at the district or sub-district level and magistrates conceded that they were unable to assess the number of people leaving for work who did not apply for passes.[111] (In fact local officials frequently recommended the scrapping of pass laws, arguing that they were useless and merely perpetrated "great injustice"[112] (such as police harassment). However, it is clear from magistrates' reports that as congestion on the land increased and black people became more susceptible to natural disasters such as droughts, locusts, etc., and to animal diseases, so the need to labour in industrial centres became greater.[113] For example, in 1882 Middledrift experienced drought conditions which sent men out to work and the magistrate anticipated

> "that few but old men, women and children will remain at the villages and be supported by their absent relatives".[114]

On the other hand, the Middledrift Annual Report for 1877 tells of an abundant harvest - the best in many years of successive droughts and threats of famine. As a result people were "indifferent" to work and farmers and "others" were experiencing labour problems.[115]

The main source of employment was initially found on the railways and diamond fields, although the Rand later attracted many workers, as did the mines of South West Africa. The Report of the Inspector of Native Locations (Middledrift) for 1898 gave the following breakdown: 2 000 passes issued, with pass-bearers proceeding to the following locations:

Graaff-Reinet	91	Grahamstown	62	Jagersfontein	22
Johannesburg	196	Fish River	31	Bedford	37
Kimberley	65	Cradock	26	Llewellyn	33
Cape Town	437	Uitenhage	27	Mafeking	25
Port Elizabeth	137	Somerset East	36	Other towns	222[116]

A large number of black people were also reported to be working on the local railway line (about 6 000 men in 1898).[117] However, complaints about conditions on the Railways were frequent (in particular, workers reported that they were ill-treated) and if

possible, labourers resisted working on the railways.[118] For instance, in 1884 the Aliwal North Railways sought 600 men from Middledrift to work for three shillings "per diem" plus rough housing. Only one dozen men responded (Diamond Field Agents were also unsuccessful).[119] The following year (1885), despite reports of severe drought, black people refused recruitment offers to the Railways because the remittances offered were too low. They also argued that they objected to practices on the Railways whereby they were forced to buy goods at high prices from shops on the railways belonging to contractors. In this case, the wages offered were 2/6 to 3/- per day.[120]

In 1891 various rates of employment were given as:

Railways	Average from 2/6 to 3/- per diem
Diamond Mines	Average from 4/- to 5/- per diem
Shearing	Average from 6/- to 7/- per 100 sheep
Reaping	Average from +-2/- per diem with food

It was also reported that black people were avoiding agricultural labour as far as possible as the rates of pay were too low.[121] For example, in 1892 Western Province farmers attempted to recruit labourers on half-year contracts. No black people were willing to take up this employment offer.[122]

Nevertheless, the option of remaining at home and working the land became increasingly unattractive: the proportion of adult male tax-payers who worked as migrants had risen to 71,7 per cent in Middledrift during the period 1928/29.[123] However, the trend of wherever possible resisting badly-paid employment, continued. For instance, in 1935 Ninus Mhlambiso, headman of the Basin, reported that the inhabitants of the Basin refused to accept relief work on anti-soil erosion measures in Middledrift as the rates of pay were too low. (The other headmen of the district reported the same.)[124] The pay ratios for relief work - which involved working on anti-soil erosion measures, bush clearing and so on - were, in 1945, reported to be 1/6 per man per day and 1/- per women per day.[125] These attempts by black people to control the conditions of their employment had some success: in the Middledrift Local Council Minutes for January 1947, it was reported that the Native Recruiting Corporation Representatives were intending to close down the local recruitment office as, despite lowered quotas, recruits could not be found.[126]

Lacey has noted, that the State claimed that migrant work was beneficial for Africans in the reserves because it:

"saved the African from starvation. It relieved population pressure on the land. It enabled the African to maximise his income. And furthermore, it cushioned the impact of western civilisation by enabling the tribal African to preserve his traditional way of life".

She argues that, in actual fact, it was a crucial component of the process of dissolution of the reserves. Declining yields, overstocking and overcrowding produced "a rising spiral of rural poverty" which put pressure on black people to "offer their services as labourers". Labour migration became the only practicable way in which they could meet their cash needs.[127]

6 Health

Conditions of overcrowding and drought which sent males out to labour must have had adverse effects on the general health of the population. Throughout the hundred years covered by this essay, magistrates' annual reports repeatedly insisted that the health of the population was generally good. However, interspersed among these reports are those mentioning the ravages of "European" diseases. Small-pox made its appearance at the "mouth" of the Amatola near Fort Cox in 1859 and five days later several cases were reported in Mhlambiso's location. A month later Campbell, the Superintendent of the Crown Reserve, reported that "the small-pox is still very bad in the Amatola Basin. . . and ten deaths have been reported. . . " Medicines and vaccines were initially sent out, but in October it was decided that no medical aid could be sent on account of the distance. Campbell also reported that the people rejected further medication, saying "that my (Campbell's) medicine was not good, that all who had taken it had died". Reports of small-pox outbreaks throughout the area continued for some years.[128] As migrancy increased, so did the prevalence of tuberculosis along with diseases such as venereal disease. Typhus was also mentioned frequently in reports.[129]

Shortage of land, and the labour necessary to work it, also suggest a general decline in health, as they must have had an effect on the quantity and quality of food produced. These effects are made clear in some official reports. In 1908, an unusual mortality rate was reported in the Basin, supposedly from some sort of fever. The district surgeon found the death rate to be unusually high among children, especially babies - that portion of the population most susceptible to illness aggravated by poor nutrition. The precise nature and cause of the illness was not ascertained.[130]

By the 1940's, it was necessary to introduce pre-school feeding

schemes to stave off starvation during drought periods. In four months 21 750 lbs of food went to the Basin to feed a daily average of 750 children.[131] However, several years prior to this, the need to supplement nutritional requirements had been recognised.[132] In 1937, it was proposed to supply the Basin schools with cows from the Tribal Trust herd; however, in 1939, despite the acknowledgement of the problem of malnutrition and a serious shortage of milk due to land pressure, an application from the Mdlankomo Methodist school for milk for school children was turned down by government officials as the Trust herd was not yet large enough.[133]

The drought conditions which prevailed in the thirties and forties throughout the Ciskei meant that the inhabitants of the Basin - seemingly less vociferous in their complaints and geographically better-off (the Basin formed the watershed of the Amatolas and had a higher rainfall than the rest of the district), were ignored for as long as possible.[134] The general position could not, however, have been good. The Interim Smit Report on Nutrition and Health Education in 1945 found that the school feeding schemes instituted throughout the Ciskei (400 of them) had "little educative value" and the vegetable gardens were a failure.[135] It was further reported that in 1947 in Middledrift about 6 000 bags of grain were harvested from 20 000 morgen (under one-sixth bag per acre). This was under a quarter of a bag per head of population, or 2,5 bags under the government-estimated needs of each unit (head) of population. The Report also said that Traders had reported that the purchasing powers of black people had diminished considerably, and all children that had been examined by the Committee were found to have symptoms associated with dietary deficiency.[136]

The Government attitude to relief measures was to withhold them while labour on farms, mines or industry was short, unless actual famine was facing the population.[137] The justification for the withholding of relief and ending it as soon as possible was that "there is (was) every danger that the continuation of relief measures will, by undermining the admirable Native trait of communal self-help and lowering the self-respect of the people, result in their general pauperisation".[138] In 1946, the Chief Native Commissioner told the Ciskeian General Council that it had come to his attention that in some areas parents were informing their children that as they received a meal at school, they must forego one at home. This was to be stopped immediately as it was "not intended to relieve parents of the duty to feed their children". He also stated that it was not intended to delay the rehabilitation of the "native reserves".

"This is not a matter in which the Department desires to act

> without the full co-operation of the African people . . . if this is not to be the case, then my Department will have to take such steps as are necessary to protect your land, your stock and your water supplies. These things are not your own. They form a heritage which must be handed on to your descendants. . . There is nothing behind the scheme to rehabilitate the reserves. . . nothing but the desire to improve your living conditions, to see a happy and contented African nation; agriculturally and industriously inclined."[139]

To this end "Educative" measures in the agricultural and pastoral spheres had been, not very successfully, introduced.

7 Education

The type and quality of education available to black people reflected the position the Government deemed suitable for them to have within the South African society. Most schools only went to Standard IV and inspectors' reports concentrated on the quality of drilling, singing and needlework. The other branch of education offered post-Union was agricultural education "by example", and to this end agricultural extension officers were sent to black districts - part of the Government's plan to "rehabilitate" the reserves to ensure a partial subsistence base for migrants and their families.

Western-type education had come early to the Basin as a result of missionary endeavour. Even if unwittingly, missionary education - with its emphasis on acquiring the "civilised" habits of Europeans - must have played an important role alongside government in ensuring that the Africans joined the South African economy as labourers.

In 1859, the Surveyor-General reported that a number of Mhlambiso's people were members of the Wesleyan Church, and although dependant on the ministers at Burnshill and Middledrift for religious instruction, their children were taught by a native teacher employed by the Wesleyans. At that stage, a full-time missionary was not considered necessary by the government as the population of the Basin was too small to warrant this.[140]

The Wesleyans, the Church of England (Anglicans) and the Free Church of Scotland soon all had schools in the Basin, and reports of favouritism toward the Wesleyans by Mhlambiso (a nominal Wesleyan) were frequent.[141] The local inhabitants contributed towards the upkeep of teachers financially, and also by means of board and/or lodging.[142] By the turn of the century government grants constituted a considerable percentage of teachers' salaries; for example, in 1911 at the three schools in the Basin there were

seven teachers. Grants at these schools ranged from £40 to £16 per teacher, whilst teachers at other schools received £3 and board and lodging.[143] Subjects taught were Translations ("Kafir" to English, and vice-versa), Geography, Arithmetic, Writing, Singing, Sewing and Drill. Teachers were not highly qualified - inspectors' reports continually exhorted teachers to get suitable qualifications. Teacher-pupil ratios were inadequate - a random sample of pupil-teacher ratios taken from reports gives an average of thirty-two pupils per teacher.[144] It must also be remembered that teachers were responsible for more than one class at a time. School buildings were variously reported as being too small, dark, lacking in equipment, and rat-infested. Discipline was lax,[145] perhaps not surprisingly, and it was reported that children were frequently absent as they had to remain at home to herd cattle.[146]

A further problem was inadequate funding. In 1916 the Assistant Resident Magistrate in Middledrift complained of the unsatisfactory condition of educational matters in the district:

> "Apart from the matter of attendance, the work is terribly handicapped by the difficulty of collecting school fees. Committees in the various locations have no legal status".[147]

He argued that as teachers were underpaid, quality of staff suffered and recommended that 25/6d be collected from all Hut Tax and Quit Rent Payers - to improve the efficiency of schools and to induce parents to send children to school as they would be compulsorily contributing money to schooling anyway. After some doubt and a month's deliberation, the headmen approved the scheme.[148]

Apart from the fact that younger children had other duties to carry out such as herding and household duties, many young men must have left school early in order to earn money as migrants. The necessity of leaving the Basin in order to complete schooling at high school level - and the added expense this involved, would have ensured that only a small minority of inhabitants would achieve any higher standard of education. These constraints on achieving a decent level of education, as well as the quality of that education available in the Basin itself, meant that in this sphere as well, the large majority of inhabitants within the Basin would find it difficult to achieve any better standard of living or any greater choice in the field of work available to them.

8 Conclusion

Despite the paucity of records for certain periods, the overall pattern of the underdevelopment of Amatola Basin is clear. Through

the years, Mfengu from the Basin increasingly suffered from land shortage and a dependence on migrant labour. Today the Basin forms part of the impoverished Ciskei.

In this concluding section, it is instructive to compare the experience of the Amatola Basin Mfengu with observations made by other writers on the South African reserves, particularly the Transkei.

Wolpe has argued that the South African reserves underpin the South African capitalist system. He identified one of the problems faced by the South African capitalist state as the necessity to maintain production in the reserves at a level which, while sufficient to contribute to the reproduction of migrant workers as a class, is yet not high enough to remove the economic imperatives of migration.[149] As Legassick has described it, it was from the reserves

> "that migrant labour was to come to the towns. . . It was in these areas that the families of migrants were supposed to earn that subsistence that was not paid to the migrants on the mines. It was in these areas that children were to be raised, the sick and disabled were to be nursed, and old men were to die. Thus the white-controlled State of South Africa was to be spared, in large measure, the welfare costs of housing, pensions, social facilities and amenities for the non-white majority of the work-force."[150]

The consequences of this policy - agricultural decline coupled with overpopulation in the black rural areas - threatened what these writers see as the "historical function" of the reserves: the reproduction and maintenance of a cheap labour force for South African industry. This threat provoked state intervention in the reserve areas in the form of betterment schemes which were an attempt to prop up the reserve economy and prevent permanent migration to urban areas.

Whereas Wolpe identified state intervention with the policies of the National Party after 1948, Moll has recently argued that the reserves faced a crisis of underproduction as early as the 1930's.[151] He sees the crisis of the thirties as decisively affecting food and stock production and soil erosion. It resulted from the enforced change-over from shifting cultivation to a rural existence based on fixed residence and reasonably permanent allocation of arable land, which broke down with increased population.[152] Conditions in the Transkei - susceptibility to drought, the dependence on migrant labour for survival, opposition to cattle-culling and dipping measures, soil erosion, stock thefts, the administrative system – are all

paralleled to a remarkable extent with what was happening in the Ciskei.

As we have seen, in the earliest years of Hlubi residence in the Basin, land was plentiful. The area was well-watered with good soil, while indigenous forests provided fuel and building material. Through the years the preservation of forest land, the introduction of individual tenure and the necessity to find work outside the Basin - first to pay taxes, later to supplement declining agriculture - brought about conditions of want and a decline in the ability of the inhabitants to achieve a living solely off the land. The quality of education available to inhabitants did not offer many chances of an improvement in this position. At the same time, traditional political structures were first weakened by contact with Europeans, and then artificially maintained through incorporation with the European-imposed government. Through these various mechanisms the inhabitants of the Basin lost control over their own lives.

Such was the decline in living standards, that active intervention by the white government was required to prevent the collapse of the economy in the rural areas. Although officially Betterment was only introduced to the Basin in 1959, it is clear that intervention began much earlier, through agricultural schools and demonstrators, soil erosion works, the hiring of tractors and through feeding schemes to stave off malnutrition - these schemes often being reluctantly introduced.

Indeed the history of the Amatola Basin substantiates Lacey's (1981) contention that a deliberate policy was pursued for almost a century to create a pool of labour in the black rural areas with which to feed the South African economy at minimal cost.

9 List of Abbreviations

A.B.	:	Amatola Basin
Ass R.M.	:	Assistant Resident Magistrate
C.C.	:	Civil Commissioner
Chief N.C.	:	Chief Native Commissioner
K.K.H.	:	Keiskammahoek
KWT	:	King William's Town
M-drift	:	Middledrift
M.R.	:	Magistrate's Report
N.A.	:	Native Affairs
N.C.	:	Native Commissioner
R.M.	:	Resident Magistrate
S.A.	:	South Africa
Sp.Mag.	:	Special Magistrate

10 Footnotes

1 BK22: "Occupation of Farms in the Crown Reserve." (Undated) Colonel Maclean. Also BK24: J. Ayliff to Col. Maclean, 11 July 1856

2 BK24: "Return of Native Population in the Crown Reserve" 1855. Also BAC 17: Report by Norton, Senior Agricultural Officer, Fort Cox Agricultural School, for 1937

3 De Beer, N.J. (1977). Also BK24: Report by Surveyor-General on the Crown Reserve, 10 June 1859. In 1884 Ayliff recalled that they were moved into the Amatola Basin on instructions from Colonel Maclean (LND 1/618, 5 May 1884)

4 BK23: Letter from Colonel Maclean dated August 1856: It was Cathcart's idea to fill up the Amatolas to form a barrier between the Xhosas and the Colony. The Amatola area was considered important to prevent blacks from getting a stronghold and to keep open free communications into "the heart of kaffirland". Also BK24: C. C.'s Memorandum 17 August 1856 and Du Toit, A: **Archives Year Book for 1954** p.71 (hereafter referred to as Du Toit (1954)

5 BK24: J. Ayliff to Col. Maclean, 11 July 1856. Also BK22: and Du Toit (1954) p.79

6 1/MDT 1: Ass. R.M. M-drift to R.M. KWT, 17 January 1914 for purposes of Natives Land Commission. The breakdown was Zibi's 3 700 morgen, Quma's and Zali's 1 400 morgen each, Amatola Basin 8 000 morgen

7 For example, the great majority of people appear to have been descendents of the original Hlubi followers of Mhlambiso: only 27 of the 255 applicants for survey purposes in the 1890's were not Hlubis. (LND 1/618: 12 September 1890; "List of approved applicants for land survey.") Furthermore, unlike other areas of the Ciskei, the Amatola Basin has not had any large-scale resettlement programmes in the Post-Union period (personal communication C.J. de Wet)

8 Du Toit (1954) p.78
9 Ibid p.91
10 Ibid p.95
11 e.g. NA173 M.R. 1875. Also Brookes, E.H. (1974) pp.28-29
12 Du Toit, (1954) p.98.
13 1/MDT 7: Magistrates letter, 8 August 1927
14 BAC9: Minutes of Local Council 1927-1937. Also BAC14: Annual Report for 1935
15 BAC9: Minutes of Local Council 1927-1937. Also in BAC24 and 25 (1937) and Wilson, M. and Thompson, L. (eds. 1971), p.89
16 1/MDT 4: Folio 17/5/5 Undated
17 1/MDT 7: Magistrates Circular No. 60. Accordingly, the Chief N.C. as the local representative of the Secretary for N.A. was empowered to direct and supervise the administration of N.A. and as such to issue instructions to Magistrates
18 BAC9: Minutes of Local Council, 14 January 1937. Ogilvie, the N.C. reminded the Council from the Chair of the dependence of the district on money generated by migrant labour and urged members to do all that was possible to induce the young to go and work
19 For example, in official correspondence the Mhlambisos were referred to as headmen although occasional references to them as chiefs do appear
20 NA207: C.C. to Under-Secretary for N.A., 15 October 1886
21 NA173: 9 July 1875, Clerk-in-Charge at Middledrift to C.C.
22 NA207: Sp. Mag. office, KWT 27 September 1890
In reply the Magistrate said it would be impossible not to allow headmen to allot land but assumed that what was meant by the directive was "to prevent the assumption of functions by Headmen . . . of matters which would practically give them the control of their people without reference to government or its offices and also to check the exercise of arbitary powers "
23 NA207: "Return of Headmen," M-drift, 20 August 1886
24 NA207: Clerk-in-Charge M-drift to C.C., 28 September 1866. C.C. to Under-Secretary for N.A., 18 October 1884
25 LND 1/618: "Report on Amatola Basin Native Location", 12 September 1890. Also NA190
26 NA206: C.C. KWT to Under-Secretary of N.A. Also 1/MDT5: Folio no. N/1/1/5/1. This contains numerous reports and letters over the disputed headmanship
27 NA206: Annual Report, 2 Jan 1877. Also NA207. See various Magistrate's Reports titled "Analysis of Headmen" and "Allotment of land by Native Headmen" (Sp. Mag. KWT, 27 September 1890)
28 1/MDT5: Magistrates letter, 21 September 1920
29 1/MDT6: N.C. to Ninus Mhlambiso, 21 April 1932
30 Moll, T.C. (1983) p.30
31 BK24: Crown Reserve Report of Ayliff to Col. Maclean, 16 June 1856.
32 Du Toit (1954), p.98
33 LND 1/618: "Report on the Amatola Basin Native Location", 12 September 1890

34 Moll, T.C. (1983) p.18

35 Moyer, R. pp.175-176

36 Manona, C. (ch. 4 infra, p.71)

37 For e.g. it was found during the initial survey of 1858 that there were not enough people to fill the surveyed villages. (Campbell to Maclean 19 April 1859, BK25.) Also BK24 (No. 27): Campbell to Maclean, 1858. Mhlambiso in 1866 was reported as having 64 heads of families under him (89 huts) with a total population of 182. (BK24: "Return of Native Population in the Crown Reserve" 1866.) By 1886 there were 179 huts (NA207, 26 August 1886)

38 The C.C. of KWT in a letter to the Under-Secretary for N.A., dated 15 October 1886, described this plan: "The system of subsidizing the chiefs, appointing paid Headmen. . . was introduced by Sir George Grey in . . . British Kaffraria and under the Imperial Government. That country was at the time inhabited by the then strong and warlike tribes of the Gaikas, the Slambies and the Amagunokwebe . . . and the object of Sir George Grey's system was to break down the great power of the chiefs by the instrumentability of the Councillors under the guidance and management of the Special Magistrates; and the Councillors were to be styled "Headmen" . . . they were to be used as the machinery to win the people from the chiefs to Magistrates, and thereby in time bring them entirely under the control of the Government. . . Through them (i.e. Headmen) a revolution was quietly but surely to be effected in the future government and management of the natives. . . It is still through the instrumentability of the Headmen and will be so for a long time to come, that we shall retain a proper hold over the native population and exercise the right supervision over them "

39 Du Toit (1954) p.105 and 106. It is instructive to compare this passage with the final paragraph of the "Minutes of an Interview between the Chief Native Commissioner and the Chiefs and Headmen of the Crown Reserve." Also Davenport T.R.H. and Hunt K.S. (eds. 1974) p.36. Calderwood, formerly a missionary for the London Missionary Society, also served as Civil Commissioner for the District of Victoria which was part of the Crown Reserve

40 Quoted in Du Toit (1954) p.88

41 Davenport T.R.H. and Hunt K.S. (eds. 1974), extract from "Minutes of an Interview between the Chief Commissioner and the chiefs and headmen of the Crown Reserve." p.36

42 The question of the motives behind the implementation of the reserve (later homeland) system and the introduction of individual tenure has provoked considerable debate in S.A. historiography. Writers such as H. Wolpe, M. Legassick and M. Lacey of the "revisionist" school have criticised those writers who espouse what has come to be termed the "conventional wisdom". Lacey, for example, argues that people such as Ballinger, Brookes, Hoernle, Walker and Lewson, among others, "who dwell on the failure of the Cape liberal tradition in the period after Union, and deplore Cape African rights being sacrificed on the altar of an Afrikaner facist ideology from the old Boer republics, have failed to see

the crucial economic function the Reserves always had as a reservoir of cheap labour for the mines. Further, she asserts that conventional writers have tended to "reflect both the superiority of Imperial institutions and ideals and the policies of British officials and settlers. " Lacey, M. (1981), p.15 and footnote 14 pp.314-5. For a summary of the debate between revisionist and liberal historians see also Davenport, T.R.H. (1980) Chapter 20.

43 CCP 1/2/1/29 (G8). Also quoted in Bundy C. (1979) p.79.

44 NA211: C.C. to Under-Secretary of N.A. 30 December 1891. The practice amongst the Mfengu of appointing chiefs as headmen meant that in practice they wielded influence which on paper they did not possess

45 Ibid

46 BK24: Sir George Grey, "Settlement of Fingo Claims", 29 August 1856

47 They did not wish to be tied to one plot of ground as they were used to shifting cultivation. BK24 "Minutes of interview between Maclean and the Chiefs and Headmen of the Crown Reserve", 14 July 1856

48 Ibid

49 BK24: letter from Ayliff, August 1856.

50 BK24: Ayliff to Maclean, 5 August 1856

51 BK23: Campbell to Maclean, 27 July 1858.

52 BK27: Campbell to Maclean, 31 July 1858. It is not clear whether this was ever done.

53 LND1/618: Surveyor-General, 31 October 1899.

54 BK25: 19 April 1859, Campbell to Maclean

55 Ibid.

56 BK92: February 1863. Unfortunately, the records do not state whether this request was granted or not. It is also not clear whether this was merely an objection to poor lands or whether it was also an objection to title. In view of the fact that the inhabitants had been living in the area for ten years and that survey supposedly took place along existing lines of occupation it seems likely that the complaint was a protest against title itself - and the consequent restriction on movement within the Basin. It also appears that a three acre plot was agreed upon as being suitable for a man with **one** wife. Unfortunately there were no records on the extent of polygyny and the effects of individual title on such households.

57 LND 1/618: 3 February 1890, C.C's Office

58 1/MDT5: Letter to Secretary for N.A., 26 November 1915.

59 LND 1/618: 17 December 1889, Ebenezer Mhlambiso to C.C.

60 LND 1/618: "Report on the Amatola Basin Native Location" 12 September 1890. Letter from Jacob Mdlankomo, 1 October 1890

61 See Lacey, M. (1981) pp.14-18, and Bundy C. (1979) pp.133 and 135-6.

62 LND 1/618: "Report on the Amatola Basin, 12 September 1890

63 See QRR 133: (Folios 5096-5283), QRR 134 (Folios 5683 and 5688-5724), QRR 135 and 136

64 BAC23: Return of Ciskeian Individual Tenure holdings.

65 LND 1/618: 15 September 1891, Letter to C.C.'s office

66 LND 1/618: "Report on the Amatola Basin. . . "Jacob Mdlankomo had been headman for a while after the death of the first Mhlambiso

67 Ibid. The Report stated: "We are under the impression that they (i.e. Jacob and his people) will bow to the inevitable as soon as they find their land is being surveyed, and will all give in their names, at present they believe that by opposing the work they will put a stop to the survey altogether." (12 September 1890)

68 NA266: Report for the Blue Book of 1901

69 See CCP: Annexure 4/1/2/2/5 (Lagden Commission) for a comparison between Act 40 of 1879 and Glen Grey. Also Lacey, M. (1981) pp.14-18

70 1/MDT5: Letter to Secretary for N.A. 26 November 1915, also C08764

71 1/MDT 5 27 November 1915. Reports of congestion began as early as the 1870's; however statistics are lacking. One report, of widows cultivating in the demarcated forest land - which it was claimed had originally belonged to them, and their determination to fight eviction through lawyers - certainly demonstrates this land loss. Also NA255, 1899. And NA203: 1895, Report for King William's Town

72 E.g. SRP 1/2/11: Annexure 9, p.10. Also 1/MDT3. An address of welcome to the Prince of Wales. SRP 1/2/53 App II pp.2 and 3.

73 1/MDT9: Letter from Chief N.C. 28 October 1924. Chief N.C. to all Magistrates, 17 October, 1925. M-drift R.M. to Chief N.C. 6 November 1928

74 1/MDT7: Undated rough copy of magistrates report. Also BAC15 where the Blue Book Report for 1926 tersely stated: "All locations full and overstocked "

75 1/MDT7: M.R. for 1927

76 BAC12: Gladwin, Superintendent of Natives, M-drift, to M-drift Magistrate, 21 May 1928.

77 Wilson, F. in Wilson M and Thompson L. (eds. 1971), p.107

78 Bundy, C. (1979)

79 Personal communication, C. Manona

80 Wilson, F. in Wilson M. and Thompson L. (eds. 1971), p.131, pp.136-143

81 For example see Ciskei Commission (1980) ch.11

82 Sadie, J.L. (1960) p.294.

83 1/MDT7: Undated copy of M.R. which includes figures for period 1922-26

84 1/MDT7: (N1/15/6) Undated (as above)

85 Ibid

86 Ibid

87 Taxes varied. "For many years every adult male was liable to hut tax. Post-Union the additional main taxes were: local tax, general tax, and quitrent. In addition at times other taxes were imposed: dog tax, horse tax etc. The M.R. for M-drift in the Blue Book for 1910 also mentioned road rates payable to the Divisional council and concluded: "Contribution to indirect taxation is made principally through the goods purchased, chief of which are blankets, European clothing, coffee, sugar, tea, lamp oil, beads and candles" (SRP1/2/11/196.)

88 1/MDT7: M.R. (N1/15/6) Undated

89 Ibid

90 Ibid

91 For e.g. NA176: Fielding to Rose-Innes, 27 June 1877. Also BAC40: Secretary for N.A. to Chief N.C., February 1942

92 BAC9, Report on Soil Erosion, M-drift, 1935

93 BAC17: Report by Norton, Senior Agricultural Officer, Fort Cox Agricultural School, 1937

94 Ibid. Unfortunately, no yield figures were provided by Norton and throughout the period studied yield figures are almost non-existent.

95 BAC25, 30: For example in 1937 a decision was taken in principle to force reductions and improvements "when persuasion is inadequate". However, as far as possible these measures were to be carried out by example: demonstrators were to grow winter feed, look after and milk cows, etc.

96 BAC25: N.C.'s Report reported that only Peuleni Betterment Area could afford to engage tractors

97 1/MDT5: 15 November 1935, N.C.

98 BAC24: e.g., Draft Proclamation No. 198 of 1934. Also BAC26

99 Unfortunately, as most of these events took place post 1950, it is impossible to document them as the records are not readily available in terms of the Archives Act. However, field workers have found that local inhabitants argue that they did not accept the Government Betterment Schemes as they were instituted (personal communication, C.J. de Wet)

100 1/MDT9: Stock Inspector, M-drift to N.C., 29 November 1934. In December 1934 the Government repaired the tank. No reasons were given for the inhabitants' refusal but the inference which may be drawn is that they opposed its introduction

101 Union of South Africa, Department of Native Affairs (1959)

102 Ibid, especially pp.2, 3, 4, 7. See Steyn, J.G. (1982) pp.34, 64, 66 for an alternate viewpoint

103 For example, in 1948 the Chief N.C. stated that "all persons **must** get permission from the Native Commissioner to plough lands of Natives who are away at work and **must** produce consent of owner" (1/MDT6, 11 March 1948.) Many lands must thus have remained un- or under-worked

104 Wilson, F. in Wilson, M. and Thompson, L. (eds. 1971), p.117

105 BK25: Vigne, Letter dated 27 October 1859

106 NA206: M-drift Annual Report, 2 January 1877. Also NA207: Annual Report, 7 January 1892

107 NA211: Sp. Mag. M-drift, 18 November 1891

108 NA211: Also NA172, 18 November 1891, Magistrate, M-drift. Sp. M. Fielding to C.C., 11 November 1873

109 NA172: Fielding to C.C., 11 November 1873

110 NA198: Report from Acting C.C. to Under-Secretary for N.A., 24 January 1884

111 NA211: Replies to Circular No. 12, 1 October 1891, on Native Labour

112 NA203: 1884 Report by King, Clerk-in-Charge at M-drift. Also NA198: General Report from C.C. to Under-Secretary, 24 January 1884 stated that in his district police did not harass unnecessarily but there was nevertheless great injustice perpetrated through the system of passes

113 NA211: Sp. Mag. KWT 1891: "A good harvest generally tends to a tightened labour supply while a poor or scanty harvest drives hundreds into employment". Also BAC 14: Annual Report 1935. The Magistrate reported that the

labour supply would continue to fall short of demand - unless a succession of bad droughts were to commence.

114 NA190: Annual Report for M-drift, 1882

115 NA206: Annual Report for 1877.

116 NA248: Report of Ballantyne, Inspector of Native Locations to M-drift, 1898.

117 Ibid.

118 NA211: M-drift M.R., 18 November 1891

119 NA203: M-drift M.R. for 1884

120 NA203: Annual Report KWT, 1885

121 NA211: M-drift M.R., 18 November 1891

122 NA211: Verity, Magistrate at KKH, 18 November 1891

123 Economic Commission p.173 quoted by Wilson, M. in Wilson, M. and Thompson, L. (eds. 1971), p.65

124 1/MDT5: N.C. M-drift, 15 November 1935

125 BAC40: Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief N.C., February 1942

126 BAC9: Minutes of Local Council, 14 January 1937

127 Lacey, M. (1981) p.41

128 BK25: Campbell to Vigne, 5 October 1859. Also BK26, 27 and MOH204. On 10 August 1859 Campbell reported the deaths of eight people who all died within a short time, adding that their deaths were believed by the locals to have been a result of bewitching

129 SRP1: February 1949 pp.43, 77, 83. Also BAC14,15. In the M-drift Report of 1884 the Clerk-in-Charge reported "a good number of deaths from typhus: induced no doubt by want of proper food." (NA203, also 1/MDT5 1915 and MOH204, 30 July 1908.)

130 MOH204: 30 January 1908, Registrar General of Statistics

131 1/MDT6: Agricultural Officer, M-drift, 2 July 1946

132 BAC15: Annual Report, M-drift for 1930

133 BAC22: 3 February 1939. In 1938 a serious shortage of milk due to land pressure and other factors was noted - as well as the implications for malnutrition. Also BAC15: As early as 1929 the annual report noted a shortage of milk for children. The tribal trust herd was established under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act which heralded in the era of European "trusteeship" of Black South Africans

134 Steyn, G.J. (1982) p.35 gives the following rainfall figures for the Basin:
500mm in the West
650mm in the East and
990mm in the high mountains
He also states that conditions could vary considerably in the different areas

135 1/MDT6: Chief N.C. M-drift, 11 March 1948

136 1/MDT6: Chief M.C. M-drift, 11 March 1948. It is obvious that all 20 000 morgen - roughly the total, could not have been under cultivation. Nevertheless, crop porduction could not feed the population. It is not clear why the purchasing power of Africans had diminished since the war

137 BAC40: In addition, where relief work was offered, instructions from the secretary for Native Affairs was that employment was not to be given to men "fit for work on the mines and in other industries". Secretary for N.A. to Chief N.C., Feburay 1942
138 Ibid.
139 BAC33: Chief N.C. to Ciskeian General Council, October 1946.
140 BK24: "Report of the Surveyor-General, of Crown Reserve" 10 June 1859
141 LND1/723 Report of the Surveyor-General 21 November 1898.
142 SGE 2/203, 2/676, 2/407, 2/122, 2/277, 2/670, 1/MDT1. The Report for the Blue Book for 1910 stated: "Natives contribute largely towards support of the schools, especially by way of gratis labour on school buildings (SRP1/2/1 p.301)
143 Ibid
144 Ibid. (For example V. Mqingwana gives the average teacher-pupil ratios for 1980 as follows: Whites 1:19 Coloured 1:29 Asians 1:26. Black pupil-teacher ratios however, have degenerated to 1:46, Cf. ch. 3 infra., p.60)
145 Ibid
146 BAC15: Annual Report M-drift, 1930
147 1/MDT1: Ass. R.M. M-drift to R.M. KWT, 11 January 1916
148 Ibid. Also NA175: On 28 October 1871, a similar suggestion was made by the Sp. M. at KWT. The amount charged for school fees is not known
149 Wolpe, H. 1 (1972) p.437
150 Legassick, M. (1977) pp.181-2
151 Moll, T.C. (1983)
152 Ibid

3 Education — *V. Mqingwana*

1 Introduction

Education is the cornerstone of the development of any society, be it traditional or modern, capitalist or socialist. Basically, education should serve three purposes: communication, liberation and development. As a vehicle for communication, it builds bridges between people who have not had equal access to opportunities and resources. It plays a emancipatory role when it frees the individual from the shackles of tradition, prejudice, ignorance and superstition; when it makes him self-reliant and encourages intellectual independence and individual initiative. On the developmental level, education should lead to an improvement in the quality of life of the individual and society, and an increase in the level of control that the individual or society has over the environment. Education, therefore, should be the medium through which man acquires and maintains freedom.

Pre-colonial black education was characterised by its relevance to the lives of the people. Much of it was informal as it was acquired by the young from their peers or from observing the behaviour and deeds of the elders. Formal education took place during traditional ceremonies and rituals. Walter Rodney maintains that what distinguished pre-colonial education was "its close links with social life, both in the material and spiritual sense; its collective nature; its many-sidedness; and its progressive development in conformity with the successive stages of physical, emotional, mental development of the child".[1]

It has been argued that there should be a relationship between the technological level of a society and the kind of education it pursues. This emanates from the contention that educational development and economic development are complementary. Although one may not argue strongly for a differentiated education between rural and urban areas, it cannot be gainsaid that there is a need to teach "people to improve their environment rather than use their superior education to escape from it in favour of what is perceived to be a better one".[2] The chronic problem of rural-urban migration which faces all developing countries could partly be solved by the provision of an education that is relevant to the pupils' environment.

According to Malherbe[3] the development, control and financing of black education in South Africa can be divided into four historical stages:

1 The 19th century, during which virtually all educational progress was due to missionary endeavour;

2 The period between 1904 and 1954, when control was exercised jointly by the churches and provincial education departments, although the central government gradually bore part of the financial burden through aid to the churches;

3 The period between 1954 and 1968, when it was highly centralised under one central state department in Pretoria;

4 From 1968 decentralisation took place according to regions and homelands although close liaison and co-ordination were maintained. Such liaison and co-ordination should be seen against the background of the homelands' dependence on South Africa for about seventy-five per cent of their budgets.

Thus, when the Ciskei established its own Education Department in 1968, education in the territory had developed along the same lines as in the Republic of South Africa. The high proportion of school-age children, the inadequate education budget, and the perennial shortage of schools and qualified teachers made it impossible for the Ciskei to embark on a compulsory education policy. Even in 1974 when the Ciskei Legislature passed the Ciskei Education Act which vested control and administration of education directly in the Ciskei Government, compulsory education still remained a cherished dream. In 1981 the Ciskei Minister of Education declared: "All modern advanced nations have free compulsory education. This is the goal of my Department, but we have not been able to realise it because of lack of funds. Our goal is an education in which attendance at school is compulsory for all pupils up to the age of 16, for all classes from Sub A to Std 10, and such education to be totally free".[4] According to the 1970 census, about half of Ciskei's population over 10 years of age was able to read and write.[5]

Although the Ciskei has the oldest black university in South Africa (the University of Fort Hare was established as the South African Native College in 1916), and a number of teacher training colleges and high schools, it is only very recently that an attempt has been made to provide training in commercial and technical skills. Zwelethemba Trade School in Zwelitsha, the Buchule High School, the Gcisa Commercial High School, the Mveliso Industrial School and

the Mdantsane Textile School - all in Mdantsane, have been in existence for an average of less than ten years. The urban bias in the establishment of these schools is a striking example of conventional planning.[6] The lack of facilities in this important field is the legacy of the apartheid policy whereby white labour was protected at the expense of the training of blacks. At both primary and secondary levels, education in the Ciskei still remains largely academic. School-leavers still find themselves misfits in an economic, social and political structure that is discriminatory, and tends to favour the élite.

2 Profile of the Adults

During the early days of missionary education, some parents were less willing to send their children to school because education was perceived as being detrimental to the continued existence of a social structure based on tradition. Moreover, relative economic independence did not induce people to look for opportunities outside their villages. However, people gradually accepted Christianity and began to become Westernized. Those families that paved the way in sending their children to school, probably wanted to maintain their status as "progressives". Thus, it could be expected that the majority of the children in the schools would come from the Christian families rather than the traditional ones, and that children from the former group would remain at school longer, while the drop-out rate would be higher among the latter group.

Nowadays, while some parents may not send their children to school or may withdraw them because, inter alia, they require their labour in domestic activities, there is no doubt that they value education. According to a survey conducted in 1981,[7] the Amatola Basin was home for about 5 600 people, thirty-two per cent of whom lived and worked outside the Basin. More than sixty per cent of the adults in and outside the Basin had had more than four years of schooling.[8] Women had higher qualifications than men. About two out of every three women (61%) living outside the Basin and almost one out of every three (31%) in the Basin, had Standard Six or higher qualifications; whereas the figures for men were thirty-one per cent and twenty-four per cent, respectively.

During interviews with members of the community and school principals, it became clear that there was a great demand for education in the area. The fact that parents were not contributing well enough towards the erection of additional classrooms, was due mainly to poor financial circumstances, rather than lack of concern for the welfare of their children. The fact that older residents had lesser qualifications than the younger ones, may be indicative of this

demand, but at the same time note should be taken of the fact that educational facilities were less accessible twenty years ago than they are now.[9]

3 Location of Schools

From earliest times there was great variation in the provision not only of school facilities but also of health and other services in the Colonies. Areas situated next to towns and mission stations usually received priority treatment. The establishment of schools in the rural areas (usually through the financial contributions of the local residents) was generally regarded as proof that the evangelization efforts had begun or were succeeding. In the Eastern Cape, rural schools provided basic education for the lower standards, while missionary institutions like Lovedale (Presbyterian), Healdtown (Methodist), and St Matthew's(Anglican), to name only a few, were the centres of secondary education and teacher-training. The missionary aim was to achieve literacy so that the converts could read the Bible and the Catechism, and act as agents of evangelization. It was also important that the teachers themselves should be committed Christians, and, more often than not, denominational affiliation was a major criterion for appointment to teaching posts. When the Cape Government started subsidising education in the 1850s, producing junior clerks and messengers for the Colonial administration also became an important aim.

Until the mid-1950s there were few black schools in the rural areas. Usually there was one lower primary school (going up to either Std 2 or Std 4) serving two or more villages, and one higher primary school (going up to Std 6) serving four or more villages. The surrounding lower primary schools acted as feeder schools for the upper classes of the higher primary schools. If they wanted to continue with their education, children who had passed Std 6 had to leave their villages for the missionary institutions, or to board with relatives or other people near the secondary schools. The scarcity of secondary schools is manifested by the fact that, up to the 1970s, at least two districts in the Ciskei, Peddie and Middledrift (with about twenty higher primary schools each, and according to the 1970 census with 42 604 and 65 465 residents, respectively) were each served by one secondary school. The mushrooming of schools in the rural areas is a post-1970 phenomenon. The Government's aim became the establishment of at least one primary school for each village, and one secondary school for each cluster of schools.

There was a slight increase in the number of schools in the 1950s when the control of education was transferred from the mission societies and provincial governments to the central government.

Better funding, though inadequate, made it possible for communities to establish schools on the Rand-for-Rand system of subsidisation. Had it not been for the R13m expenditure ceiling placed on black education, more schools would probably have been built during the first fifteen years of state control. Differential treatment of black education (where the per capita expenditure on black pupils was one-tenth of that of whites) was a retarding factor. The fact that the government did not introduce compulsory education, affected not only the number of children at school but also the provision of buildings and the training of teachers.

Rural areas were further disadvantaged by the anomalous policy in terms of which rural schools could be established on a Rand-for-Rand basis (which meant that the community had to tax itself), whilst schools in the urban areas (whether in the homelands or in white South Africa) had the capital costs borne by the South African Development Trust.[10] As funds for the Trust were derived from either direct taxation or were voted by Parliament, the rural areas were therefore subsidising the urban areas.

The Amatola Basin is a typical rural area which was affected by these developments in education. The first primary school was established by the Methodists in the 1860s, and was an outstation of the Burnshill Mission Station. By 1959 there were seven schools: four offering classes up to Std 6, while three only went as far as Std 3.[11] Until the 1970s when Mhlambiso Secondary School (named after the local chief) was established, local children had to leave the Basin for Std 6 classes. Although not very many could have been affected by the lack of high school facilities in the Basin, those who did leave the Basin, were not only placed beyond parental control at an early age, but also represented labour lost by their parents and the community.

In 1981, of the thirteen villages comprising the Basin, eight had schooling facilities. Four of the schools provided classes up to Std 5; two up to Std 4; one up to Std 2; and one up to Std 1. Some children who were attending primary schools in other villages or the high school in Komkhulu, had to cover between eight and ten kilometres to and fro. Such a situation would not only discourage children from going to school, but also from proceeding beyond the standards available in their own villages. In most black communities parents tend to think that their children are educated when they have passed the highest standard available locally; on the other hand, the level of education rises with the upgrading of local schools. Travelling long distances has educational implications because by the time children reach school they may be hungry and tired.[12] It is not surprising, therefore, that teachers ranked lack of

punctuality and irregular attendance as the third highest problem facing their schools. Few schools, distance from school, laziness and starvation were also perceived as contributing to pupils dropping out at an early age. In 1981 the distribution of schools was as follows:

Table 1: Distribution of Schools (1981)

Name of School	Village	Highest Standard
Amatola Basin	Komkhulu	5
Dish	Mkhobeni	5
Machibini	Machibini	4
Mdlankomo	Mdlankomo	5
Mhlambiso	Komkhulu	9
Ndlovura	Ndlovura	2
Ngwangwane	Ngwangwane	4
Roloshiramba	Dish	1
Zixinene	Matinise	5

The central village, with the Great Place for the chief of the Basin, has the only high school in the area which was built as a result of the levies imposed on the whole Basin. Siphingweni, Mqhayisa, Mkhuthukeni, Mdeni and Chamama have no school facilities: children from these villages attend school in the neighbouring villages. Whilst all the villages contributed towards the building of the high school, the area is divided into zones for the purpose of the primary schools. Thus, the residents of Mdeni and Chamama joined those of Komkhulu in the Amatola Basin Primary School; Matinise, Mqhayisa and Ndlovura were responsible for Zixinene; Siphingweni joined Machibini; Mkhuthukeni joined Ngwangwane; Dish and Mkhobeni pooled their resources for Dish Primary School; and Mdlankomo was reponsible for its own school. It should be borne in mind that villages like Dish and Ndlovura also had to be responsible for their own primary schools. Thus, residents of these villages would be taxed thrice: for the local lower primary, for the zonal higher primary, and for the high school. The topography in the Basin determined where schools would be built. Villages like Ndlovura and Dish, that experienced difficulties in reaching the nearest school, preferred to erect their own lower primary schools to cater for the young. This partly accounts for the fact that Mkhuthukeni, with eighty homesteads, does not have its own school while Ndlovura and Dish, with sixty-nine and forty-seven homesteads respectively, each have a lower primary school. As the Basin is bisected by a river and is

also hilly, the high school is not easily accessible. This would possibly account for the fact that sixty-two per cent of the children studying outside the Basin were at the secondary school level.[13] Education in the Basin, therefore, remains not easily accessible in terms of both the number and the location of schools.

4 School Accommodation

As already stated, rural areas are treated differently from urban areas. Until the 1960s when the then Department of Bantu Education in South Africa laid down specifications regarding the nature and size of classrooms, communities could decide, depending on financial constraints, what kind of buildings they would erect. As a result, communities used to put up structures ranging from rectangular buildings to thatched- or corrugated iron-roofed rondavels. The Rand-for-Rand system of subsidisation on capital expenditure retarded the development of education. Not only was it difficult for the community to tax itself, but there were also problems encountered in the collection of funds. Those who were entrusted with the task of collecting funds incurred the disfavour of some members of the community. On the other hand, accusations of embezzlement were not uncommon. A zealous principal who employed carrot and stick tactics achieved better results than the one who threatened the community with resignation if they did not erect additional or better classrooms. The Zixinene school, which has modern buildings and is the biggest in the Basin, is an example of the untiring efforts of the principal and the chairman of the school committee. To ensure that no liable resident defaulted, they enlisted the services of the Tribal Authority. Defaulters had their stock impounded, but it appears that no stock was sold, as people paid the levy once their stock had been impounded.[14]

Problems faced by the communities were further compounded by the policy whereby the Department of Education of the Ciskei would pay out the subsidy only when its inspector had confirmed that the building had been completed and that it fulfilled certain specifications. This late payment of the subsidy sometimes had beneficial results because a better organised or an education-conscious community would use its own financial resources to complete the building, and the subsidy would form the foundation for another classroom or two. The vast difference between Zixinene and other schools is rooted mainly in this fact.[15]

The ability and willingness of the communities to pay for the erection of classrooms should be seen against the background of other school commitments that black parents have; for, unlike their white counterparts, education for their children is not free. It was

only in the early 1970s that the Ciskei Government started supplying black children with textbooks, but because exercise books and setbooks were not supplied, the cost of keeping a child at school was reduced by less than half. The fact that almost all the children in the Basin were in full uniform, reflects the financial burden the parents had to bear. Parents also had to pay school fees which averaged about 40c per year in the lower primary classes; R1,20 per annum in the higher primary classes and R4,00 in the high school. Although the fees are designated as voluntary contributions by the Ciskei Department of Education, principals (in order to ensure equal treatment of all pupils and also because of the need for funds to meet other financial commitments of the school) demanded payment as though the fees were compulsory. Children had to pay sports fees which varied from school to school; but for out-going sports trips alone, pupils could spend as much as R20 per annum.

In 1981, it was estimated that the Ciskei had an accommodation backlog of 1 000 classrooms.[16] This meant that out of the estimated 225 000 pupils (if a conservative estimate of forty pupils to a classroom is accepted), 40 000 either had very poor accommodation or none at all. Lack of funds was always given as the cause of poor accommodation.[17]

The accommodation situation in the Basin must have been amongst the worst in the Ciskei. Both the number and the quality of the classrooms left much to be desired. Of the six schools visited, four made use of church buildings. In one extreme case at Roloshiramba, two classes (Sub Std B and Std 1) were accommodated in an old one-roomed church building. Without the aid of a physical partition, pupils from each class sat back to back, facing their respective teachers. Four schools could not accommodate the children on the school premises and sought accommodation in privately-owned rondavels in the village. Not only were pupils cut off from the rest of the school, but the principal could not supervise the teachers properly. During the period when this research was done, it was not uncommon to observe the teacher leaving the school premises and wending her way to her "school" about 600 metres away.

With the exception of Zixinene, which had seven classrooms, three other schools had two modern classrooms each, and one had "prefabs" on loan from the Ciskei Department of Education. A striking feature of the struggle to provide better accommodation was revealed by the fact that two schools had uncompleted classrooms that had been under construction for at least two years; while in another school, bricks were breaking up after lying in the school yard for about four years. Informants pointed out that their efforts at raising funds were being frustrated by the Department of

Education which had undertaken four years previously to assume responsibility for the erection of buildings. They claimed that circulars and statements from Government officials had created so much confusion that they did not know what the official policy was. In his 1980 Policy Speech, the Minister of Education said: "In rural areas, communities are finding it more and more difficult to raise their share of the cost of erection of schools. I am happy to announce to this House that the Cabinet has agreed that the Government will bear the full cost for erecting school buildings in the rural areas as from the 1981/82 financial year".[18] Meanwhile, people withheld payment in the hope that the day would come when the Government would build the schools; or that their local leaders would so endear themselves to the Government that they would also receive the favours which they saw other communities enjoying when they had schools built at no cost to themselves.

Another aspect which merits attention is overcrowding. The standard classroom is supposed to cater for forty pupils; but in the Basin the average number of pupils in the six schools was forty-seven per classroom. Such a figure is, of course, misleading unless it is taken into consideration that some of the buildings did not qualify to be regarded as classrooms. Moreover, fifty-two per cent of the teachers had between forty-six and sixty-eight pupils in a class. In some schools the situation was aggravated by a shortage of furniture, with the result that available desks seated double their capacity, and sometimes the children had to use benches or squat on the floor.

Sports facilities were almost non-existent. More often than not the school had to improvise a rugby or a netball field. A stadium, which could have greatly alleviated the problem of sports facilities in the Basin, lies uncompleted. Informants stated that when the Government built it, it neither consulted the community nor did it indicate for whom it was building it.

5 Profile of the Teachers

During the earliest days of missionary education, teachers' qualifications were either non-existent or very low. It was not until 1901, 1912 and 1929 that in the Cape, Natal and the Transvaal, respectively, the entrance qualification for teacher- training was raised to Std 6.[19] By 1950, two certificates were being offered: the Native Primary Lower Certificate (NPLC), that is, Std 6 plus three years' training, the first of which involved academic work; and the Native Primary Higher Certificate (NPHC), that is, Std 8 plus two years' professional training. By the beginning of the 1960s, it was generally accepted that the NLPC was not an adequate qualification even at the lower levels of the primary school. This course was

gradually phased out so that by the end of the decade it had disappeared completely. However, underqualified teachers continue to be the bane of black education. Std 10 is the entrance qualification for other population groups, and the authorities soon realised that Std 8 was not a suitable entrance qualification either. Thus, in 1981 the entrance qualification for black student-teachers was raised to Std 10. The vicious circle in black education is perhaps illustrated by the fact that, according to 1979 statistics, only eighty-six per cent of the teachers in the secondary schools had professional training; and of these, only thirty-six per cent were qualified to teach at secondary level.[20] This vicious circle of underqualified teachers who had been taught by other underqualified teachers needs to be taken into consideration when the quality of education is assessed.

All the primary teachers had professional certificates and, except for one female teacher (51 years old), had passed Std 8. Table 2 indicates the academic qualifications of these teachers:

Table 2: Primary School Teachers : Highest Academic Qualifications (1981)

Full Matric (Std 10)	4
4 Matric credits	1
3 Matric credits	2
2 Matric credits	5
1 Matric credit	3
Std 8	11
Std 6	1
TOTAL	27

Teachers expressed keenness to improve their qualifications. An attempt at starting an adult education centre in 1981 had the backing of the Department of Education, but aborted when the Department indicated that it would only subsidise the centre once it had become fully operational. In practice, this meant that tutors would not be paid for their services, and the Department would not provide the necessary teaching aids. According to informants, besides the transport problems which affected attendance, the Department's belief that teachers should offer a voluntary service was the knell that saw the attempt survive solely for a couple of weeks. On the other hand, Ciskeian urban areas like Mdantsane, Zwelitsha, Sada and Dimbaza had principals appointed on a full-time basis to organise adult education.[21]

The comparatively low salary scale of teachers without Matriculation, together with the South African Government's reluctance to effect parity with whites at the lower levels, probably accounts for the eagerness to improve qualifications. Moreover, with Ciskeian independence, Matric probably was seen as the key to occupational

mobility and promotion. Tables 3 and 4 depict the position in the high school:

Table 3: High School Teachers : Academic Qualifications (1982)

Degree	2
Incomplete Degree	1
Matriculation	9
TOTAL	12

Table 4: High School Teachers : Teaching Qualifications (1982)

University Education Diploma	2
Senior Secondary Teachers' Diploma	1
Junior Secondary Teachers' Diploma	1
Primary Teachers' Certificate	7
No Professional Certificate	1
TOTAL	12

The staff position in the high school was probably representative of the position in Ciskei schools. Of the twelve teachers, only four were qualified to teach at the secondary school level. Five teachers with a Matric certificate taught classes up to Std 9. It should be borne in mind that these teachers had not been trained for the secondary level; all had acquired Matric through private study - which in itself has its limitations. Besides being underqualified, some of them, because of the shortage of teachers, were compelled to teach subjects they would normally avoid,[22] not being trained to teach them.

Almost half of the primary teachers (48%) had a teaching experience of between one and five years; nineteen per cent had less than a year; whilst a third had more than six years' experience. Most of the teachers (89%) had been born in a rural area, which would suggest that, on the whole, the Basin would not be that much different from the areas where they had been brought up.

Seventy-eight per cent of the teachers were below 30 years of age, while the rest were above 36 years. Two-thirds were unmarried,

while ten of the unmarried female teachers each had an average of two children. As the Department of Education penalises unmarried mothers or suspends them for absconding during confinement, some of the teachers had had their careers disrupted. Three mentioned that their presence in the Basin was a direct result of such suspension.

The educational qualifications of the parents of the teachers indicated that they came from families with a tradition of education. Seven out of ten had one parent with Std 6 or higher qualifications, while twenty-two per cent had one parent with a professional certificate, mainly a teaching qualification. None had siblings who had left school without at least four years of schooling. Eleven teachers had between then sixteen siblings with a teaching, and four with a nursing, qualification. More than half of the respondents (56%) did not want their children to become teachers. Nursing, followed by medicine, law and agriculture were the most preferred vocations.

Of a sample of twenty female and seven male teachers, there were twenty-one assistants, four principals, and two (one male and one female) Heads of Division. In 1980, the Ciskei Minister of Education declared: "The Ciskei Department of Education is ahead of its sister departments in other Black States in the creation of promotion posts of Deputy Principals and Heads of Division, with commensurate salary scales, for all grades of school".[23] Although this policy seems to have been pursued with vigour in the secondary schools, the primary schools seem to be lagging behind. Yet one of the ways in which teachers could be attracted to or retained in places like the Basin, is by creating promotion posts. It is not surprising that one of the male matriculants who was an assistant teacher with seven years' experience, expressed dissatisfaction with promotion opportunities.

One of the manifestations of differential expenditure on education appears in the teacher-pupil ratio. In 1980 average ratios for the various population groups were as follows: whites 1:19, coloureds 1:29, Asians 1:26 and blacks 1:46.[24] Table 5 indicates the ratio in the six schools surveyed in the Basin.

Although the average teacher-pupil ratio may appear lower than the national average, and the Ciskei average (1:44 in 1978)[25], it should be noted that more than half of the teachers taught forty-six or more pupils. Table 6 illustrates the incidence of pupils among a group of teachers:

Table 5: Teacher-pupil Ratio in the Primary Schools (1982)

Schools	No. of teachers	No. of pupils	T-P Ratio
Amatola Basin	6	253	1 : 42
Dish	5	213	1 : 43
Machibini	4	178	1 : 45
Ngwangwane	6	223	1 : 37
Roloshiramba	3	114	1 : 38
Zixinene	10	428	1 : 43
TOTAL	34	1 409	1 : 41

Table 6: Incidence of Pupils (1982)

No. of pupils per teacher	Frequency	%
20 - 30	4	14,8
31 - 40	4	14,8
41 - 45	5	18,5
46 - 50	6	22,2
51+	8	29,6

Effective teaching can only take place where the teacher has not only adequate teaching aids, but also has a small class in order to cater for the above- and below- average pupil. Eighty-five percent of the teachers thought that twenty to thirty pupils was an ideal number for effective teaching.

6 Profile of the Pupils

As already indicated, education in the Basin was brought by the missionaries. The denominational links of the eight primary schools are as follows: Amatola Basin (Methodist), Dish and Roloshiramba (Reformed Church of Africa), Machibini (Free Church of Scotland), Mdlankomo (Methodist), Ngwangwane (Anglican), and Zixinene (Presbyterian). Some of these schools are still situated on church property and use church buildings.

There is no compulsory education in the Amatola Basin, or indeed in the whole of the Ciskei. It was not possible to establish accurately the incidence of non-schooling in the school-age population. Parents send their children to a local school or a school in a nearby village. Proximity is not the only criterion as shown by the fact that some parents in Mkhuthukeni preferred the Methodist school in Komkhulu

(Amatola Basin) to the nearer Anglican school in Ngwangwane.

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of children among the various classes in the six primary schools and the high school. The general drop-out trend in black schools is illustrated by the fact that the number of Std 5 pupils comprises about half that of the Sub-Std A pupils, while the Std 9 roll is 2,1 per cent of the total enrolment.[26]

Figure 1: Number and Percentage of Pupils in Six Primary Schools and One High School (1981)



Figures obtained from the schools indicated an average drop-out of about eight per cent in 1981. The drop-out rate was higher in Std 4 (19%); Std 1 (14%), and Std 5 (13%). These must be treated with caution, as the teachers apparently did not withdraw from the registers all children who had left the school. If anything, the drop-out rate could be even higher. When teachers were asked to explain the high drop-out rate, they gave a variety of reasons, including the following: financial difficulties regarding purchase of clothes, books and fees; parents who are uneducated and did not appreciate the value of education or are not interested in education; starvation and corporal punishment.

Teachers thought that the drop-out rate could be reduced if: there was compulsory and free education; interesting activities were provided at school; the government provided free books and bursaries; there was a feeding scheme; parents were educated so that they could value education; and if parents could be provided

with jobs so that they could finance the education of their children.

What is significant about the teachers' perceptions is their high level of awareness of both the internal and external factors influencing the drop-out rate. This is, however, qualified by the fact that none mentioned factors relating to the actual teaching situation, viz., their qualifications, the size of the classes, and the provision of facilities such as laboratories and libraries.

As regards the attendance rates, the same problem that was experienced with the drop-out rate emerged. The teachers' registers were completely unreliable for such an assessment. Interviews with the teachers gave the impression that the attendance rate could be about ninety per cent in the primary schools, dropping to about eighty per cent in the high schools. In the primary school, boys had a poorer attendance than girls as they had herding and ploughing duties to perform. In the high school the reverse situation applied - a trend ascribed to the fact that girls took greater advantage of the fact of diminished parental control, since many high school pupils leave home to take up rented accommodation in Komkhulu. Teachers also mentioned that when rains fell and children who stayed across the river could not attend, those not affected took advantage of the situation by also absenting themselves.

Data on the age distribution of the children was collected from six schools (one high school; two schools with Std 5; two schools with Std 4, one with Std 1. Figures for another higher primary school could not be obtained). Table 7 illustrates the age-distribution.

This age-distribution is probably truly representative of the position in the Ciskei. It should be noted that the Ciskei has not yet introduced the age restrictions applied by the Department of Education and Training of the Republic of South Africa. These restrictions, operative from 1982, are that no child who is over 16 years may remain in the primary school (SSA to Std 5) without Ministerial approval; the cut-off age for Stds 6-8 is 18 years; and 20 years for Stds 9-10.[27] Homeland governments, aware of the problems faced by blacks in education, may find it difficult to adopt these restrictions.

The Republic of South Africa has dropped the admission age to six years, with effect from 1982. Although this has been adopted by the Ciskei, we may assume that most of the children in the Basin entered school at the age of seven years. That being the case, children in Std 9 should be 17 years old. As is clear from Table 7, many pupils do not succeed in maintaining this rate of progress.

There are many reasons why children could be above their class-age, among which are that they might have started school late; there might be a significant number of repeaters; they might have dropped out and returned later; and, particularly in the high school, the riots of the previous years might have affected them.

Table 7: Age Distribution of Pupils (1982)

Age	Standard												
	A	B	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	TOT	%
6-7	88*	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	95	7,1
7-8	118*	19	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	138	10,4
8-9	25	127*	18	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	174	13,1
9-10	-	47	44*	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	108	8,1
10-11	-	13	61*	37	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	8,6
11-12	-	3	23	26*	20	3	-	-	-	-	-	75*	5,6
12-13	-	2	13	15	34*	27	3	2	1	-	-	97	7,3
13-14	-	1	7	6	21	31*	30	20	4	1	-	121	9,1
14-15	-	1	4	-	10	25	19*	29	7	2	-	97	7,3
15-16	-	-	-	-	-	8	15	23*	19	9	-	74	5,6
16-17	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	21	30*	24	5	85	6,4
17-18	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	18	12	25*	7	63	4,7
18-19	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	6	12	17*	9	45	3,4
19-20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	10*	3	16	1,2
20+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	12*	12	28	2,1
TOT	231	220	171	105	89	97	71	120	91	100	36	1331	100
%	17,4	16,5	12,8	7,9	6,7	7,3	5,3	9,0	6,8	7,5	2,7	-	99,9

NOTE: * figures contain the median.

Of the 1 614 pupils who wrote exams in 1981, 1 247 (77%) passed, and the overall class average pass was seventy-two per cent. The highest pass was in SSB (88%) and the lowest in Std 8 (39%). It should be noted that SSB writes an internal examination while Std 8 writes an external examination. In 1980 the riot toll was very heavy in the high school where, of the 261 students registered at the beginning of the year for Stds 6 to 8, 256 sat for the examinations and only thirty-seven passed.

In a study conducted by Nyikana[28] in 1981, a number of probable causes of repetition of classes in the Ciskei, were identified. These are regarded as being relevant here because it is mainly those pupils who do not pass who repeat classes. He divided the causes into internal and external. The internal causes were: teachers' qualifications, experience and lesson preparation; the curriculum content; teaching methods; the policy of promotion; transition between school phases; lack of textbooks and equipment; and examinations and standards. The external causes were: poverty; language difficulties; home problems (farming problems); behaviour patterns of the parents and community; attitudes towards and interest in education; motivation of pupils towards education, and illiterate parents. Although most of these causes have not been researched here, they are all important for understanding the education situation in the Basin.

7 Conclusion

Any attempt to assess the nature and quality of education is fraught with many difficulties. One such difficulty relates to the fact that there may be no relationship between the quantity and the quality of the education a pupil receives. In this study, no attempt has been made to assess and comment on the aims, nature and content of the school syllabi, or on the social consciousness of the teachers and the community. The prevailing conditions in the Basin are a manifestation of social, economic and political disparities between urban and rural areas. Educational inequalities, therefore, extend beyond the parameters of education. As Turner puts it: "The problems of our schools are the problems of our society, and education cannot be turned into a liberating experience until our society makes room for free people".[29] Education should not be divorced from the community for which it is supposed to be preparing children. Turner further makes the point that, all other considerations notwithstanding, the homelands, freed from colonialist control, have an innovative potential which would manifest itself as a result of the introduction of relevant education. Education can play an important role in reducing dependence and poverty as educated people have better occupational prospects and potential for

individual initiative.

If education is to be made more effectively available to people in rural areas, there is a need for affirmative action; that is, positive discrimination in favour of these areas. Rural people, usually having a lower per capita income, should be provided with schools by the Government, teachers should be provided with accommodation, and there should be other incentives which would make it worthwhile for teachers to sacrifice the relative comfort of the urban areas in the interest of providing reasonable opportunities for all segments of the population. Additional and better classrooms, libraries, science laboratories and equipment will undoubtedly result in improved standards of education. Teaching efficiency and, therefore, learning ability should be improved. A case must be made for compulsory education. The acquisition of education which contributes to the development and prosperity of a nation, should not depend on the parents' ability to pay fees and maintain their children at school.

The Ciskei authorities seem to be aware of the importance of education for national development. A major constraint is the availability of funds - a problem that is not unique to the Ciskei. Proper planning with proper priorities could result in a better utilisation of funds.

Education, particularly adult education, could raise the level of communication between the authorities and communities in rural areas. Problems of agriculture, health, local government, and indeed of education itself, could be tackled better once these communities have acquired a certain degree of literacy. Adult education should not aim simply at the acquisition of literacy, but at broadening the scope of the individual and enabling him to advance and to make his contribution to the general development of the society of which he is a member.

8 Footnotes

1 Rodney W. (1981) p.262
2 Benso (1981) p.76
3 Malherbe E.G. (1977) p.558
4 Ciskei Legislative Assembly (CLA) Debates, vol 16 1981, p.363
5 Benso (1981) p.73. Ciskei Department of Foreign Affairs, (1981) p.87
6 Members of the Ciskei Legislature have always expressed concern at this urban bias, and the Minister, although expressing the need to establish technical facilities next to industries for practical training, has consistently replied: ". . . you have to start somewhere." (CLA Debates, vol 13, 1980, p.173); ". . . to allay the fears of some

members who think that these innovations are only for Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, let me tell them that we had to start somewhere." (CLA Debates, vol 16, 1981, p.365)

7 Bekker S.B. et al (1981a) p.11

8 This contrasts with the position at Tsweletswele, a community which has recently migrated into the Ciskei from white farms in the Border, where eighty per cent of the respondents over forty years of age reported that they had received no school education at all (S.B. Bekker et al (1983) p.67)

9 In 1954 there were 5 700 schools for Africans compared to the 11 000 in 1978. (South African Institute of Race Relations (1981) p.464)

10 Ciskei Commission Report (1980) p.29

11 Department of Native Affairs, Union of South Africa (1959)

12 Commenting on these conditions, A.M. Tapa, MP observed: "Indeed, the children from rural areas suffer the most in getting education. They sometimes have to travel long distances to school. They come to school with very little food in their stomachs, they have to sit in an overcrowed classroom with inadequate lighting and poor ventilation. They use uncomfortable, hard desks." (CLA Debates, vol 13, 1980, p.155

13 Bekker S.B. et al (1981a) p.18

14 See Manona C. infra, p.86

15 Comparative statistics on income, land rights, and possession of stock do not reflect that Zixinene was in any way economically better off than the other villages in the Basin (See Bekker et al (1981a), Appendix D)

16 Benso (1981) p.75

17 CLA Debates vol 16, 1981, p.371; vol 2, 1982, p.131

18 CLA Debates, vol 13, 1980, p.144. The Ciskei Education Budget has risen from R23m in 1980 to R31m in 1981 and R41m in 1982.
In 1980 the Minister announced that eighty-five per cent of the budget was for salaries; and in 1982 R450 000 was budgeted as compensation for erection of school buildings. During the three financial years 1980/83, the only funds earmarked for the erection of buildings by the Education Department were for a school hostel and special schools

19 Horrell M. (1963) p.26

20 Hartshone K. (1981)

21 CLA Debates, vol 13, 1980, p.148

22 Ciskei Commission Report (1980) states: "The problem at secondary level is not that the teachers are not professionally qualified, but that one-third are teaching beyond the limits for which they were trained or for which they have subsequently qualified themselves academically." (p.26)

23 CLA Debates, vol 13, 1980, pp.144-5

24 South African Institute of Race Relations (1981) p.460

25 Ciskei Commission Report (1980) p.28

26 These figures compare favourably with those compiled by the Research Unit for Education System Planning of the University of the Orange Free State for the Republic of South Africa where SSA comprised 19,8 per cent

and Std 9 1,9 per cent of the total number of black Students in South Africa. (University of the Orange Free State, 1981)

27 Proclamation No R2600, South African Government Gazette, 19 December 1980

28 Nyikana H.K. (1982)

29 Turner R. (1972) p.73

4 Local Government — *C. W. Manona*

1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the constraints and possibilities local government provides for rural development in the Ciskei. With regard to the Amatola Basin the focus is on the so-called Tribal Authority which is officially recognised as a decision-making body that links this community with the central government in the Ciskei. This is the institution that provides the framework of local government. The passing of the Black Authorities Act in 1951 effected a radical change in the structure of local government in the Ciskei. Up to this time the policy of the white administration had been to rule blacks through government-appointed headmen who were placed in charge of demarcated "locations" serving as basic administrative units. Although these headmen were directly under the control of magistrates, they settled minor cases locally and discharged certain duties which were delegated to them. Other local government responsibilities were undertaken by District Councils (also under the control of magistrates), which in turn were affiliated to the Ciskeian General Council which was constituted in 1934. Although the District Councils were empowered to advise magistrates on a wide variety of matters affecting the people they represented, they achieved little, mainly because they had limited financial resources. However, in contrast with what was to happen after 1951, the District Councils had no traditional roots and tended to attract the better educated people in the various districts.[1] On the other hand, the Act abolished the Council system, shifting the administrative focus from the headmen and providing for the establishment of Tribal Authorities which were associated with the chiefdoms which once existed in the area. The Tribal Authorities were headed by chiefs who were to be assisted by councillors under a system which sought to revive traditional leadership. This implied chiefly rule and rule through elders. The system of local government in the rural areas of the Ciskei was thus changed from direct rule to rule through traditional leaders.

2 Local Government

In the literature on local government institutions, attention has recently been given to the related problems of competence and legitimacy of such institutions. Robertson[2], who gave the lead in

this regard, stresses that statutory bodies like the Tribal Authority can function effectively only if they have recognised rights and duties which they are also able to execute (competence), as well as the authority to make decisions for the people they serve (legitimacy). The competence of an institution of this type is certainly not only related to the formal or statutory definition of its duties, but also closely linked with what the body can actually do. Its legitimacy, on the other hand, derives both from its relationship with the public it serves, as well as with the wider political system of which it forms a part. These concepts provide the general framework in which the local government system in the Amatola Basin will be discussed.

In many of the emerging countries local governments are unable to function properly, largely because they lack local decision-making autonomy and, apart from this, derive little support and guidance from central authorities. Although it is not easy to generalise on recent political developments in Africa, Picard describes the growing tendency towards centralization of authority in African states in terms that seem relevant for the understanding of our case. He notes: "There has been a fairly standard flirtation in Africa between new states and an apparently attractive type of local government. District councils have usually been hastily instituted during the last stages of colonial rule; important functions are transferred to them after independence, and there is great faith in their ability to act as autonomous links between the centre and the periphery. This initial period of optimism, however, quickly dissipates and is replaced by growing disappointment with the ability of the councils to handle various problems. A recentralization of authority in the captial city then becomes almost inevitable."[13] Picard further notes that the major problem which contributes to the centralization of government functions, is the fact that local governments commonly experience severe financial difficulties and have to depend on the central government for funds. The position of these local government bodies is further undermined by a shortage of trained administrative personnel, inefficiency of its councils and the problem brought about by the need to neutralise these local institutions so that they do not develop into forums for political opposition.

Yet there is increasing evidence to the effect that devolution of political authority, coupled with financial and administrative support from central authorities, are measures that contribute much to the improvement of local administration and development. In Malawi, for example, the work of District Development Committees is greatly stimulated both by the substantial financial assistance these committees have been receiving from the central government since 1966, as well as by the decentralized structure of local government

in that country. These committees have been able to increase their competence largely by encouraging local residents to participate in the affairs of their own communities.[4] Local autonomy, therefore, promotes popular participation and increases the capacity of local government bodies to carry out their responsibilities. Similarly, any kind of political centralization has grave disadvantages in that in such a political structure "the central government is called upon to answer for all the sins of its agencies in the hierarchy; the resentment of the people can then be directed only at the apex, at the central government itself".[5]

We also need to note that the attempt to revive traditional authority locally was incompatible with political developments taking place in many African states, particularly in a period during which the process of decolonization was at its climax. In most of the newly independent states, chiefs were associated with the colonial regimes which were being overthrown and their political functions were reduced drastically. Commonly, on the local level, greater powers were conferred on District Councils, which were dominated by the new (educated) élites who clearly identified with the new states rather than with the traditional rulers.[6] In Botswana, for example, chiefs were relegated to a powerless "Upper House" of Parliament and their responsibilities were transferred to District Councils over which they had no influence.[7] While in much of Africa power was shifting from traditional to elected authorities, contemporary developments in the South African black-occupied rural areas were to the contrary. In the sense that the Black Authorities Act brought chiefs out of relative obscurity and gave them increased powers in these rural areas, the new policy ignored the fact that much change had taken place in areas like the Ciskei. The incorporation of the Ciskei into the colonial system as early as the mid-19th century effectively undermined the chiefly ideal in many Ciskei communities. This was the case in the district of Keiskammahoek where colonial rule was established immediately after the 1850-53 war between the Xhosa and the British. Since then the chiefs' authority was undermined in these districts to the extent that in the early 1950s chiefly traditions were no longer of any significance to the people living in the Keiskammahoek district.[8] The Amatola Basin seems to have been in a similar situation when the Black Authorities Act was introduced.

The people's social universe had expanded during the long period of close association with the colony, and the new efforts aimed at reconstructing the old patriarchal social structure were no longer consistent with the situation that had emerged. It was a similar development which suddenly brought adverse publicity to Zimbabwe (the then Rhodesia) in 1965, when those in power in that country

claimed that African chiefs were the true representatives of blacks living there and, to that effect, conferred greater powers on them.[9] This is one of the problems that needs to be borne in mind when assessing the relevance of traditional leadership in the present situation.

Before turning to local government in the Amatola Basin, a brief consideration of the central Ciskei Government structure is necessary (see Figure 1). The Ciskei National Assembly is a unicameral legislature headed by a State President with executive powers. In 1980, this legislature included fifty-seven members consisting of twenty-nine elected members and twenty-eight chiefs. At present, the forty-two Tribal Authorities that have been created constitute the local administrative units of this government. The ruling party is the Ciskei National Independence Party (C.N.I.P.) which was formed in 1973, more or less at the same time as the now defunct opposition Ciskei National Party. After its formation the latter party gradually lost its parliamentary representatives to the ruling party and was eventually rendered virtually powerless by the landslide victory of the ruling party in the 1978 general election, when this party won every seat. When the election results were announced in July 1978, out of a total of fifty-five members of parliament, only six chiefs could continue to represent the opposition in the Legislature. Three of them joined the ruling party before the next parliamentary session which was held in August of the same year. Although the remaining chiefs occupied the opposition benches during this session, they too, subsequently, crossed over to the governing party. These developments made the Ciskei a **de facto** one-party state that is presently characterised by an increasing measure of authoritarianism.

3 Local Government in the Amatola Basin

The main questions with which we are concerned here are: What is a Tribal Authority? What tasks does it perform? How does it perform those tasks? What is its relationship with the people it serves, as well as with the external political environment? The Tribal Authority in the Basin was established in 1966 and is officially known as the Gaika-Mbo Tribal Authority. Chief Cyrus Mqweli Mhlambiso is the head of this body which constitutes part of a Regional Authority which in turn is linked to the Ciskei Legislature. The magistrate's office in Middledrift is the link between this Tribal Authority and the Ciskei Government in Zwelitsha. The head of the Tribal Authority is a member of the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party which he joined in 1978 after having been a member of the opposition Ciskei National Party since 1973. Although the factors that explain his change of political

Figure 1 : Administrative Structure of the Ciskei (1981)



affiliation are noted later in this chapter, it may be mentioned here that by 1978 he had hardly any option but to support the governing party. In the Ciskei National Assembly, the Amatola Basin residents have two representatives: their elected member who lives outside the Basin (in Middledrift) and represents the Middledrift constituency in the Ciskei Parliament, and the chief who is an ex-officio Member of Parliament. The Tribal Authority functions alongside the local organization of the ruling party which constitutes a sub-region of the C.N.I.P. and with which it technically shares its authority over the community.

The authority comprises the chief (who is the head of this council), two salaried headmen and nineteen councillors who receive no remuneration for their services. Candidates for headmanship are chosen by the people and require the approval of the Ciskei Government. No formal elections are held when a headman is to be chosen: nominations are made at a meeting of the Tribal Authority and usually several such meetings are held before a final decision is made on the matter. On the other hand, the councillors who represent their villages on this Tribal Authority are recruited to their positions in a somewhat informal manner: they are nominated by the Tribal Authority itself without prior consultation with the local communities they represent on this council. An investigation into the manner in which the present councillors became members of this body, shows that the men concerned were asked to become councillors while they were attending a routine meeting of the Tribal Authority, and others were nominated in their absence. Most said they were selected because they were interested in the affairs of the Tribal Authority. At the same time, individuals do not compete for this position: it is merely conferred on them. The members tend to regard nomination to councillorship as an honour in more or less the same way that councillorship in the past was a respectable position. It seems that some of the difficulties which emerge later in this chapter with regard to the present role of councillors partly reflect the fact that members of this community do not compete for councillorship.

Although the sub-headmen of the various villages are not fully-fledged members of this council, they are expected to attend all the council meetings. Their positions, which are not salaried, closely associate sub-headmen with the Tribal Authority in that they function as the main links between the Authority and the residents. Moreover, the bulk of the responsibilities of the council is discharged by the sub-headmen. They are elected by the residents of their villages. Although such appointments require the approval of the Tribal Authority, the council seldom interferes in this matter.

All the councillors are men and participants at the meetings are overwhelmingly men. Women usually attend these meetings only when they are involved in the court cases handled by this body. There are, however, special occasions on which they have to attend these meetings. For instance, in July 1981 a special meeting of this council was addressed by a representative of a meat producing company in the Transvaal. The women who were at this meeting had accompanied some of the young boys who were seeking employment. On the whole, however, women's role in this Authority is minimal. At village level this situation is different. Previously, village councils (**iinkundla**) were constituted by initiated adult males. Largely due to the fact that men are frequently away from their homes, women do attend and participate in these village meetings at present.

Other people associated with the council are the urban representatives of the chief - one based in Port Elizabeth and another one in Cape Town - who keep Amatola Basin residents working in town informed about developments at home. They are chosen by the local residents who work in town and do not receive payment for this service. Occasionally, they collect funds which they remit home for some of the projects undertaken in the Basin, e.g. the erection of the local high school and the teachers' quarters. Otherwise, they do not have any specific powers of authority vis-à-vis the Tribal Authority.

Council meetings usually take place monthly, on week days, and it is the duty of the Secretary of the Tribal Authority to send out written notices to the members when such a meeting is due. Since some members have to travel long distances (more than ten kilometres in some cases) to get to the village of Komkhulu where the meetings are held, attendance is sometimes poor. Two of the councillors are appointed by the Tribal Authority as chairman and vice-chairman. A prayer is said before and after the proceedings. The Tribal Authority is closely associated with the person of the chief and on arrival at meetings the members normally give the chief's salute. They do so even if he is absent from the meeting. As a sign of respect for the authority of the body, men leave their sticks outside the assembly hall.

The Tribal Authority court meets when required and deals with a varying number of cases per month. Although any adult man living in the Basin is free to attend and to participate in this court, in practice it is the members of the Tribal Authority who constitute this judicial body. Petty quarrels, minor assaults, local stock theft and damage claims arising from girls' pregnancies are typical cases which are brought before this court. Sentences are monetary fines which are sometimes enforced through the confiscation of property,

either stock or household property. This task is undertaken by one of the councillors who serves as a messenger of the court, (**umsila**). Later on in the discussion, however, we hope to make it clear that the extent to which this council can enforce its decisions, is extremely restricted. Sub-headmen also settle minor disputes in their villages and refer other matters to the Tribal Authority. Anyone not satisfied with a decision of a sub-headman can appeal to the Tribal Authority court. In like manner, defendants in the Amatola Basin can appeal to the Middledrift Magistrate's Court, where cases involving serious violence and theft are heard as a matter of course.

The comprehensive duties of this Tribal Authority include:

1 The maintenance of roads, dams and bridges.

2 The organization and promotion of agricultural activities, e.g. the control of grazing and arable land, the establishment of agricultural co-operatives as well as the purchasing of stud stock.

3 The promotion of education by means of erecting and maintaining school buildings, granting of bursaries and loans to scholars.

4 The improvement of the economic and social life of the people through measures like the organization of relief employment, the screening of applications for old age pensions and other social benefits and care for the aged and indigent.

5 The preservation of law and order, including powers for settling minor disputes. Major cases are heard in the Middledrift Magistrate's Court to which local defendants have the right to appeal on local decisions.

6 It also organises meetings at which labour recruiters contact workseekers living in the Basin.

The council has access to the services of a trained Agricultural Extension Officer who lives locally. He is employed and paid by the Ciskei Department of Agriculture. Although he is expected to establish a working relationship with the Tribal Authority and the community generally, he is directly responsible to the Ciskei Department of Agriculture. A full-time clerk in the employ of the Ciskei Government handles the routine affairs of the council, e.g. correspondence, the recording of minutes at meetings and the keeping of records relating to the employment of people in relief

work locally. Previously, the Tribal Authority had two secretaries and a wider scope of duties than at present. These included the registration of births and deaths and the administration of permits for workseekers. All these matters are now dealt with in Middledrift. The council also employs two rangers whose salaries are paid by the Ciskei Department of Agriculture which, together with the Tribal Authority, regulates their functions. They take care of fences, look for stock brought into the area without permits and give assistance when stock is brought in for dipping.

The first question we consider regarding the performance of the Tribal Authority concerns its personnel. The principles underlying the Tribal Authority system seek not only to reconstruct old customs and usages, but also to revive traditional leadership. It is, therefore, not surprising to note that this council tends to be a homogeneous body of men who are advanced in age: two councillors are aged eighty-three and eighty-two respectively, eight are in their seventies, ten in their sixties and only two are in their fifties. This gives an average age of 68 years for the councillors. Moreover, with the exception of the chief who is a qualified teacher and taught for many years before taking up his present position, the majority of the members of this council have only a few years of schooling. Seven passed either Sub B or Standard One, ten passed Standards Two or Three, one passed Standard Four and only three passed Standard Six. All have worked for longer or shorter periods as labourers outside the Basin and little of their work experience is relevant to their present positions.

These factors characterise the Tribal Authority as a conservative body which does not reflect the educational and occupational diversity of the community. As a result, the younger and better educated members of the community have virtually no influence over the affairs of the council. Although an entirely "élite" council would probably be equally unrepresentative, the point to note here is that most councillors lack the educational background which would enable them to deal more efficiently with administrative matters. Older and less educated people do not easily adapt to change and are not in a position to articulate the varied interests of a society undergoing rapid change. Yet we should realise that "a political structure can remain compatible with its socio-cultural environment by adapting to it or by adapting the environment itself".[10] In its present form the Tribal Authority is not in a position to make those adjustments. Moreover, this form of leadership may be described as oligarchical in the sense that roughly the same councillors serve on the Tribal Authority year after year. This is largely due to the fact that no specific period is prescribed for the members' tenure of office and councillors can serve on this body for as long as they like.

Similarly, the exclusion of women from membership of the Tribal Authority is no longer consistent with the present situation in which women play a more active role in many organizations than do men. Women serve on virtually all the committees that are associated with various organizations locally and they constitute a significant proportion of the members of the nine school committees in the Basin. Out of a total of seventy-one members of these committees, thirty-four (48%) are women. Apart from their active participation in a wide range of voluntary associations, their important role in the Project Management Committee of the Fort Hare development project in the Amatola Basin is widely acknowledged. Each village is represented by two men and two women on the committee. An even more remarkable change is the involvement of women in party politics. The local party branch of the C.N.I.P. has a committee of eight members, of whom three are women. In addition women are by far much more active than men in party political activities and they play a prominent role in the political rallies held from time to time outside the Basin. Yet, although the social status of women has changed and continues to change, this can hardly have much influence on the Tribal Authority since it is based on the traditional notion of male authority. The fact that earlier we designated this council as the "so-called Tribal Authority" is related to the questionable basis on which local decision-making in a community undergoing rapid social change can be based solely on traditional principles. The information presented later in this chapter will emphasize this lack of representativeness or relevance of the Tribal Authority. For the moment we consider the Tribal Authority's relation with the Ciskei political structure.

Although the Tribal Authority has a wide range of duties, the fact that it has limited budgetary powers and meagre financial resources has adverse effects on its performance. Initially, the finances of Tribal Authorities were handled by Regional Authorities, but in 1969 this function was transferred to the then Department of the Chief Minister and Finance.[11] The tendency towards the centralization of government functions is evident here. The bulk of its funds are voted by the central government, while the revenue it generates locally (mainly in the form of court and pound fees) constitutes only a small proportion of its annual income. During each year the council, in conjunction with the magistrate, makes recommendations for its estimates of income and expenditure for the following year and submits them for consideration by the central authorities who alone make final decisions on such matters. The Tribal Authority itself exercises no influence over this budget and its ineffectiveness locally stems largely from the fact that its annual grants are small. For example, apart from various amounts of money which the government made available for the administrative affairs of this

council, expenditure approved by head office in Zwelitsha for the financial year ending 31 March 1983, included R200 for the purchase of stud stock and R50 for economic improvement. Since these are only small amounts, it is not possible for the Tribal Authority to be the focal point of rural administration that can be responsible for the promotion of the general well-being and economic development of the community.

In particular, it is worth noting that although the council has the responsibility of erecting and maintaining school buildings, the budget made no provision for such an undertaking. Consequently, the council's functions in promoting education locally are extremely limited and the important task is almost entirely in the hands of school committees which operate largely independently of the Tribal Authority. It seems necessary, however, to mention that in the past few years, the council has managed to raise funds from the residents for the erection of two buildings which are used as teachers' quarters in the central village of Komkhulu, as well as making arrangements for the official opening of the local high school.

What we have said above has already suggested that the Tribal Authority has limited executive powers and on many issues it may not act independently (to any degree) of the central government. Instead it has to focus its attention mainly on the ways and means of carrying out instructions received from higher authorities. For instance, parliamentary matters hardly feature in the debates of the council: before the parliamentary sessions there are no resolutions made specifically for parliament and no report-back meetings are held. Similarly, a perusal of the council's records and observations made at those meetings attended during fieldwork, show that many of the issues discussed by the council are concerned mainly with matters emanating from outside the community, and almost invariably such matters necessitate the raising of funds.

The council's concern with its external relationships is illustrated by the fact that most of the levies raised are related to developments outside the Basin. Over a period of two years, between June 1979 and June 1981, the Tribal Authority authorized twenty-one levies for specific projects and of these only four were of direct local concern. Many levies are raised for projects which are either not directly related to the needs of the local residents, or are organised for social occasions involving other chiefs in Ciskei. For example, during the period mentioned, levies were raised for installation of chiefs, initiation and weddings of their sons, as well as occasions when other chiefs visit the Basin. In another instance, money was collected to enable the chief in the Basin and a few other councillors to visit the chief's representative in Port Elizabeth. In

addition, the council collects annual donations from all the households for "needy people" in the Ciskei. Just as with many other levies, many residents did not know how the funds would be distributed (as to whether the needy people in the Basin would benefit from this fund eventually) and merely made their contributions because they had to do so. "We are just told what to do. You must donate whether you want to or not." "There is nothing you can do about what has been decided." The authority thus finds itself in a situation in which it has to carry out obligations which it cannot always justify to the residents. Its image suffers as a result. Moreover, pressures from the external political environment divert the council's attention from matters of local concern. The four cases in which money was raised for local projects during the period mentioned above, included the official opening of the local high school, the building of additional teachers' quarters, the creation of a fund to maintain a truck which belongs to the Tribal Authority and the erection of a building for disabled people in the Basin. However, the council has not been able to maintain its truck and has no transport of its own at present. Likewise, it decided to abandon the idea of building a house for the disabled people. There is thus little the Tribal Authority has been able to achieve so far and few of its tasks spring from the real needs of the community. Similarly, the ever-present need to contribute money for projects and issues conceived outside this community is one of the most obvious manifestations of the pressures of the encapsulating political structure.

The weakened structural position of the Tribal Authority vis-à-vis the government within which it operates, is partly reflected in the political tensions which emerged here prior to the eclipse of the opposition party in the Ciskei in 1978. At that time the intense party political strife which was evident virtually everywhere in the Ciskei, was mirrored locally in a long-standing boycott of the Tribal Authority by a substantial proportion of the councillors. Largely on account of the fact that Chief Mhlambiso had been affiliated to the opposition Ciskei National Party since its inception in 1973, opposition to his political stand increased with the growing political strength of the ruling party. Those councillors who supported the latter party disassociated themselves from the Tribal Authority and stopped attending meetings for an appreciable length of time. This was the situation which virtually forced Chief Mhlambiso (together with two other chiefs) to join the ruling party soon after the 1978 general election when the official status of the opposition party in the Ciskei was seen to be not only irrelevant but also creating formidable problems for political leaders on the local level. This breaching of local autonomy, largely through pressure on Tribal Authorities to support the ruling party, has resulted in the

emergence of what Perry aptly describes as a "constricted society"[12] in the case where rural communities in Lesotho have experienced similar political changes recently.

Other problems which the council experiences stem from poor communication between it and higher offices. Most of the time it is isolated and pursues discussions on its own and instances where government officials attend Tribal Authority meetings are few and negligible. Consequently, urgent problems often remain unsolved. This was illustrated on the occasion when early in 1982 the roof of the assembly hall of the council was badly damaged by wind. Although the council made several appeals to the magistrate for assistance in this regard, by the end of the year the hall had not been repaired. The Tribal Authority eventually decided to levy a sum of R5,00 from every household in the Basin for this purpose. Similarly, in 1979 a fence around a mountain camp broke and created problems with regard to the herding of cattle. It was only after a number of letters had been written and delegations made to the Middledrift Development Office that this fence was mended. In other cases, the council sends representatives to the magistrate's office for some urgent business and these representatives return home having failed to meet the magistrate. Council minutes also reflect instances where the Tribal Authority fails to get replies to letters written to the magistrate's office. These are some of the problems which indicate the council's lack of co-ordination with higher authorities. This contrasts with the situation found in other parts of Southern Africa (e.g. Botswana) where local councils work closely with government officers (District Councillors) who have a special knowledge of the policies emanating from the capital and who have an influence there. This arrangement gives local councils a regular means of bringing local problems to the notice of relevant authorities, while it also makes it possible for such officers to gauge citizen reaction to government's policy initiatives.[13] In the Basin, however, councillors find themselves in an ambiguous position in which they have to carry out government instructions while they have neither adequate guidance from the government nor easy means to channel people's needs to the central government. The views of a senior member of this Tribal Authority give some indication of this feeling of frustration and powerlessness:

> "We are lagging behind other districts in the Ciskei. I do not know the reason for that. Since the time when I joined this council (in 1966), we have had little success in solving our problems here. Things are simply at a standstill. For years we have been pleading with the government to provide us with a bridge over that stream. Up to now nothing has been done."

A consideration of the relationship of this Tribal Authority with the people it serves raises other problems of trust and legitimacy. One of these is related to the fact that councillors are nominated by the Tribal Authority itself without prior consultation with the villages the men represent. That their authority is based on appointment from above rather than on the consent of the people raises major problems when one considers that the people have no direct sanctions they can apply over this council. In this sense, the councillors represent the Tribal Authority, not necessarily the people. Also, they are not directly answerable to the residents of their villages for the decisions they make in the Tribal Authority. At the village level, their positions are relatively secure in that it is not their duty to hold village meetings concerning the matters discussed by the Tribal Authority: this is done by the sub-headmen to whom people turn for many of their problems. Moreover, the fact that the residents know that the councillors themselves have no power of their own, means that it would be useless for the people to exert any pressure on the councillors who also have to respond to a situation which they can hardly control.

Sub-headmen are the main communication links between the Tribal Authority and the various villages and they also handle the bulk of the work done by the Tribal Authority. They thus deserve our attention here. Because they have many responsibilities, they are forced to sacrifice a great deal of their time in the performance of their duties. Apart from having to organise village meetings, they supervise the collection of the levies required by the Tribal Authority. In spite of this, they receive no salary and there is no indication that they commonly receive gifts from the people for the services they render. Moreover, at present, their powers are even more restricted than they were in the past; they can no longer impose any court fines because "the Tribal Authority needs the fines for its funds". They also have little influence since in this council many decisions are largely dependent on those councillors who have greater influence; they no longer draw up lists of people who qualify for relief employment since this duty has now been taken over by one of the (salaried) headmen. It is, therefore, not surprising to note that there are few candidates who accept sub-headmanship with complete willingness. In this regard, the explanation some gave was something like: "The men in the village forced me. I did not want to be a sub-headman". From the interviews conducted with all sub-headmen, it became clear that virtually all felt their positions were exceptionally unenviable as the following comments show:

> "Sub-headmanship is a difficult position. Things would be better if all the people were co-operative. I would be pleased

if I could be relieved of this duty. I cannot do so on my own because that would cause trouble for me."

"The work we are doing is bad. There is no reward for it. I do it because it is a duty the Tribal Authority gave to me. Yet we get nothing for all this. I have lost interest in it. Even if they were to start paying us, I would not be interested in sub-headmanship. I said it several times that I do not want to continue as a sub-headman but I cannot relinquish the position. I cannot attend to my own affairs because I spend much time attending to the affairs of this village."

"A sub-headman is always involved in argument. The work would be easy if people did what they had to do. It is difficult to get money from people and the Tribal Authority blames you when people do not pay their dues. I would be pleased if someone else could take this responsibility from me. I cannot work for my children because I have to do this work."

Some of the sub-headmen have found their positions so frustrating that they have either formally resigned or have just relinquished their duties. While we were in the field, the sub-headman of one of the villages was sacked by the Tribal Authority for not attending a series of meetings of the authority. The residents of this village elected another sub-headman and submitted his name to the Tribal Authority for its approval.

Another consideration of some importance here relates to the manner in which the Tribal Authority makes decisions, at least with regard to those matters for which it has such a mandate. Hammond-Tooke has already shown that an important feature of traditional government was the soliciting of public support for major issues at public meetings.[14] Besides, the chief's dependence on the support of his **amaphakathi**, his inner circle of advisers, guaranteed people's rights and ensured that no substantial body of opinion in the community could be ignored. Although the Tribal Authority is supposed to take on the appearance and character of the traditional political structure, there are many ways in which it fails to measure up to this ideal. Primarily, the change from a more consensual to a less consultative form of decision-making is indicated by the fact that the chief in the Basin (and possibly in many other places in the Ciskei) has **amaphakathi** only in a restricted sense: he manages the affairs of this community with the assistance of Tribal Authority members who are neither his close advisers nor acknowledged representatives of the people. This question impinges on one of the problems with which this chapter is

concerned, namely, the relationship of a political institution to derived power. The elimination of **amaphakathi** is a manifestation of the new political situation in which chiefs generally are no longer directly responsible to their people but are civil servants with specific obligations to the government. In the same sense, the Tribal Authority is an arm of the government and its decisions are made with that as its primary objective. Much of its authority comes from above, where once it was based in substantial measure on legitimacy bestowed from below. Consequently, it has come to be identified largely with the interest of the external political structure. At the same time these interests do not always relate to the needs of the people. It is upon that dilemma that the legitimacy and significance of the Tribal Authority turns.

Another great weakness of the Tribal Authority system is its lack of effective contact with the villages it serves. Reflecting the constraints of the wider political system which is based on a large measure of authoritarianism, e.g. the one-party system in the Ciskei, the Tribal Authority has failed to encourage participation at grass-roots level and the various villages have consequently lost much of their autonomy. Virtually all decisions on important local matters are made by the Tribal Authority and there are hardly any instances where issues to be decided are ever referred to the residents in their villages. As a result, most meetings in the villages are convened merely for the purpose of notifying the residents about routine administrative matters or for the passing of instructions from the Tribal Authority. In this situation the councillors tend to be out of touch with the residents' needs and aspirations and have to make decisions concerning a community they know less and less. Also, that this body operates solely in the central village of Komkhulu, and that its council and court are held there, results in a waning of its influence in the outlying villages. The greater part of the infra-structure that exists in the Basin is in Komkhulu and the villages further away from this centre experience great difficulties regarding school facilities, roads, shops, water supplies, clinics, etc.

The result of all this is a growing distance between the interests of this body and the residents - a development which is most clearly indicated by the fact that few people attend the meetings of the Tribal Authority. In essence, this body convenes as chief-in-council with negligible and often no involvement of the public. This is partly due to the fact that the Tribal Authority itself has done little to encourage people to attend its meetings. While village meetings are almost invariably held during weekends to enable the residents to attend, the Tribal Authority meetings take place during the week when many people are either away at work or are occupied with

their own affairs. At the same time, it seems many people do not attend these meetings because they see no point in doing so: there can hardly be much enthusiasm for a political structure which consistently fails to benefit the people it serves. Some residents suggested that the Tribal Authority has no meaning for them and others displayed little knowledge about what this body actually does.

The extent to which the Tribal Authority has become bureaucratised and formalised is evident in the limited scope for free expression of opinion in the Tribal Authority. With the weakening of the older forms of community debate and consensus, the council can no longer be regarded as a forum for the airing of grievances. For instance, many councillors do not play an active part in council debates and the initiative for raising or pursuing particular issues is almost invariably taken by the more influential members. The councillors, also, seldom oppose each other in these discussions and possible dissension is concealed largely by the formality the councillors must observe in this situation. Consequently, many conflicts remain unresolved and underlying contradictions emerge mainly in informal discussions outside the council. This contrasts with the situation in the villages where meetings are characterised by a large measure of free expression in which open clashes of opinion are regarded as normal.

There is also no doubt that the council's reliance on penalties and coercive measures to exert its authority is indicative of its own feelings of alienation and rejection. Throughout the minutes of this body one constantly comes across fines imposed on those residents who have failed to co-operate with the body, either by not paying their levies or by not responding when asked to appear before the Tribal Authority. These inflexible and formal procedures are reflected in the procedure of the Tribal Authority itself. For instance, the councillors are sometimes reprimanded (usually by the chairman) for lateness at meetings and in June 1979 the council decided on a fine of 25c for any member who either arrived late at a meeting or absented himself without good cause. The council also brings considerable pressure to bear on sub-headmen to attend its meetings and in 1979 it decided to introduce a R2,00 fine for any sub-headman who failed to attend these meetings. They also have to ensure that people pay towards the various funds raised locally. The council's records show, too, that sometimes some sub-headmen are fined for failing to present to the Tribal Authority the names of the people who do not co-operate in this regard.

A consideration of the council's sanctions is relevant here. Occasionally, to enforce some of its decisions the Tribal Authority

authorises the messenger of the court, who also happens to serve in the capacity of chairman of the Tribal Authority, to "attach" (i.e. impound) the stock or property belonging to people who have been fined. It is generally known, however, that such measures are adopted by the Tribal Authority in order to "threaten" the people who have failed to co-operate with the Tribal Authority, usually by failing to contribute towards the many levies imposed locally. Virtually all the stock "attached" when they are brought for dipping and later impounded, are handed over to their owners soon afterwards because most of the people do pay when their stock has been impounded. The point to note here, however, is that the fact that the Tribal Authority has to resort to compulsive measures to back up its decisions, points to its lack of legitimate authority.

It is necessary, on the other hand, to mention that the Tribal Authority is, to a large extent, serving a very necessary function with regard to the settlement of disputes locally. It is possibly for that reason that the councillors and the residents tend to see arbitration as the primary function of the Tribal Authority. However, even with regard to these judicial functions, the Tribal Authority encounters difficulties on certain occasions. The cases in which some of the residents dispute the decisions of the local court and appeal to the Magistrate's Court arise out of the dissatisfaction of some of the residents with the decisions of the local court. The impression gained from interviews suggests that the complicated interplay between the "traditional" and "modern" perceptions of law encourage some of the residents to seek definitive legal solutions outside the Basin. Although this does not seem to be a common occurrence, the fact that some of the sentences are set aside at the Magistrate's Court gives some idea of the complexity of the Tribal Authority's task.

We conclude by considering some of the new problems which complicate the Tribal Authority's task. As from 1980, the council has encountered difficulties relating to the general unrest among scholars in the country. On several occasions the students at the local high school boycotted classes and defied their teachers at school. The authority sent its representatives to address the students and for some time men from all the villages in the Basin had to take turns guarding the school at night. This was undoubtedly a novel situation which even people with a deeper insight into problems relating to black education generally, could not easily solve. In the case of this Tribal Authority the school boycott led to many complications. The records of the council show that subsequent to this incident some of the men in the Basin were prosecuted by the Tribal authority for failing to take their turns in guarding the school.

The following case shows other difficulties the Tribal Authority encounters with regard to the younger members of the community, as well as the isolation of the body from the greater proportion of the adults. During the last week of July 1981, a number of boys who live in the villages of Machibini and Mdeni went to Komkhulu and attacked school boys as they were leaving school. For several days sporadic fights occurred among the boys and the following week the Tribal Authority called a meeting to look into the matter. Although each boy was supposed to be accompanied by a parent at this meeting, some of the parents and boys did not attend the meeting. Some of the councillors strongly criticised the parents for failing to keep their children under control and on several occasions indicated that the police would be called if the fights continued. It was clear, however, that not all the parents attending this meeting shared the views of the councillors on this matter.

One of the few parents who spoke at this meeting said it was unfair for the councillors to blame the parents for what had happened because the parents themselves were trying all they could to discipline their children but were not succeeding. The implication behind these ideological differences between the people and the and the Tribal Authority is clear: that generally the council has no legitimacy in the eyes of the residents and as a result it often tries to maintain its position by giving people commands even in those critical moments where consensus and open discussion of issues are of paramount importance.

The recent advent of illegal liquor outlets in many, if not all, the villages has also been a social problem the Tribal Authority has not been able to solve. Although the council believes that violence will increase here if liquor is made freely available, all its attempts to close down the so-called shebeens, or to force some of the traders to stop selling liquor locally, have been to no avail. At the same time, the central authorities do seem to view this matter differently. Recently they suggested that the Tribal Authorities in the Ciskei should establish liquor stores in their areas of jurisdiction. To this effect, they requested the representatives of the various Tribal Authorities in the Ciskei to go to Mdantsane where they were shown how such concerns could be established in the rural areas. Subsequently, on several occasions, this suggestion was considered by the Tribal Authority in the Basin and was rejected. It is worth noting, however, that this Tribal Authority will undoubtedly have to reconsider their decision if higher authorities were to insist on the establishment of liquor stores in the Ciskei. In the meantime, the illegal sale of liquor in the Basin is most likely to continue. Such an issue, it seems, cannot be resolved without taking into account the changing attitudes of the community at large. This case also

highlights the clash between the traditional values emphasized by the Tribal Authority and the new influences flowing in from outside the Basin.

Although the Tribal Authority is, by virtue of its official definition, the focus of local government, there is a need to refer briefly to the significance and role of the ruling party locally. The Amatola Basin constitutes a sub-region of the Ciskei National Independence Party. This sub-region includes five branches which are further subdivided into cells. However, these structures hardly exist as channels through which local needs can be communicated to the Legislature. Instead, virtually all party activities are concerned with matters like the collection of party membership fees and donations for various government undertakings as well as attendance at political rallies and similar public gatherings. Consequently, local party leaders do not seem to have any clear idea of the competence of the sub-region of this party beyond the fact that "it represents the government". The role of the ruling party locally, is all the more problematic in the sense that the elected member of parliament lives outside the Basin and seldom visits the community. Moreover, the fact that before parliamentary sessions no resolutions are made specifically for parliamentary consideration, illustrates the political constraints under which this form of local government operates.

4 Conclusion

The subject we are discussing focuses attention on the theme of rural development as a relationship between a community and a government which enables that community to improve its circumstances. In the Amatola Basin there are a number of mutually reinforcing constraints which result in deficiencies in the functioning of local government. The centralized nature of government in the Ciskei can be seen most clearly in the limited powers and meagre financial resources of the Tribal Authority. Although one of the functions of a local authority is to assist in the delivery of state services, the Tribal Authority has neither the authority nor the material resources to enable it to perform this co-ordinating role efficiently. The corollary of this powerlessness is the lack of regular means of communication with the Ciskei central authorities. Coupled with the inefficient co-ordination of government services, these difficulties limit the means by which felt needs can be communicated up the bureaucratic hierarchy. To this effect, there are hardly any means by which the residents can freely articulate their aspirations and receive a satisfactory response, either from higher offices or from the Ciskei Legislature itself. Instead, the council finds itself in a situation where it has to focus its attention on the means of carrying out various directives from higher authorities.

This concern with external relationships diverts the attention of the Tribal Authority from matters of local interest. As a result, the council has not been able to achieve much, largely because few of its tasks are related directly to the perceived needs of the community. Similarly, the Tribal Authority's lack of effective communication with the people in the Basin is an indication of its pressured position which necessitates compliance with the demands of the encapsulating political order.

It is also evident that the Tribal Authority is unable to generate change locally, partly because it is not fully representative of the community. Since it includes mainly the older and less educated members and, in particular, makes no provision for the representation of women, it is not in a position to reflect the varying interests of this changing society. The resultant isolation leads not only to the stifling of community initiative and loss of autonomy on the village level, but also to the weakening of the Tribal Authority itself. Yet good communication between the Tribal Authority and the residents is one of the bases on which grass-roots development efforts depend.

5 Footnotes

1 Wilson M. et al (1952) p.24-45
2 Robertson A.F. (1971)
3 Picard L.A. (1979) p.285
4 Miller R.A. (1970) p.134-142
5 Charton N. (1980) p.137
6 Mair L. (1977); Lloyd P.C. (1967)
7 Picard L.A. (1979) p.290
8 Wilson M. et al (1952)
9 Weinrich A.K.H. (1971) p.1
10 De Jongh M. (1979) p.746
11 Groenewald D.M. (1980) p.89
12 Perry J. (1977) p.3
13 Kuper A. (1971)
14 Hammond-Tooke W.D. (1975)

5 Cultivation — *C. J. de Wet*

1 Introduction – A Perspective on Agriculture in the Ciskei

Agriculture in the Ciskei consists of cultivation and stock-farming under dryland conditions, and in limited areas, under irrigation. For the period 1971/72 to 1977/78, the gross value of agricultural production in the Ciskei is estimated to have risen by twenty-three per cent. However, against current inflation rates during that period, this represented a negative growth rate.[1] Agriculture contributed less than twelve per cent to the gross domestic product of the Ciskei in 1977/78[2] giving an average marketed plus subsistence output of R40 per capita for the estimated 357 000 members of the Ciskei's "farming population".[3]

It is clear that, with the exception of some of the more successful irrigation projects, agriculture is able to provide only a subsidiary form of subsistence. Agriculture is therefore not able to release families from the need to participate in migratory labour. The current situation is rather that it is a family's participation in the migratory wage labour economy that provides it with the money necessary to cultivate. Rural agriculture cannot be seen in isolation from the wider economy.

Yields in the Ciskei fall far below those of the white farming areas nearby: two to four bags of maize per hectare for Ciskeian farmers as against eighteen to twenty-four bags; three to six bags of wheat per hectare as against twenty to twenty-five bags; and a cattle turnover of two per cent per annum at a margin of R18 per head as against a turnover of twenty per cent per annum at R50 per head.[4]

Performance on the irrigation schemes is much better, and Antrobus estimates that on two of the more successful irrigation schemes, viz, those at Keiskammahoek and Tyhefu, "earnings have ranged from R500 to R4 800" per annum.[5] In addition, these schemes provide a limited amount of employment in the surrounding areas. These schemes are not yet, however, cost-effective independent economic ventures, as they operate under outside managerial control and in the case of the Keiskammahoek scheme, with protected markets for the sale of milk. In addition to irrigation projects, there is also a joint venture between the Ciskei Government and a private company

producing pineapples in the Chalumna district.[6]

Ciskeian farmers are assisted by the Ciskei Marketing Board and a network of 124 agricultural co-operatives. The C.M.B. purchases livestock, milk, wheat and fresh vegetables, and buys other items on a consignment basis. The agricultural co-operatives provide farmers with balanced packages of seed, fertilizer and weedkiller on a loan basis. These co-operatives are able to reach about forty or fifty per cent of farmers in the Ciskei.[7] Recently an agricultural credit scheme was established whereby people may obtain access to tractors, as well as to seed, fertilizer and insecticide. With the dryland crop a total failure because of the drought during the 1982/83 season, the loans for that year were waived by the Ciskei Government. The recently formed Ciskei Agricultural Corporation is currently (1984) organizing agricultural services and marketing structures in the Ciskei.

While there are several agricultural schools for scholars, training for agricultural officers is provided by Fort Cox Agricultural College near Middledrift, and the University of Fort Hare at Alice. The Ciskei has a limited number of agricultural officers (an estimated thirty in 1980), working mainly with the agricultural co-operatives.[8]

The differing fortunes and yields of agriculture in black and white areas must be understood largely in terms of the differential allocation of land, funding, education, services and legal protection afforded black and white farmers since 1910.

The major factor influencing the fortunes of black agriculture was the Native Land Act of 1913 and its successor, the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. These laws determined the amount of land which would be made available to the homeland areas. Under current consolidation proposals, the Ciskei will comprise 8 300 sq. km. or 0,7 per cent of greater South Africa, and will have a population density of eighty-seven people per sq. km., as opposed to the rest of greater South Africa's density of twenty-five people per sq. km.[9]

In addition to unequal access to arable land, white and black farmers have not enjoyed equal access to services and assistance. While agricultural departments serving white farmers were functioning before 1910, an agricultural service was only started in the Native Affairs Department in 1929.[10] White farmers have enjoyed access to financial credit, subsidization and protected markets - facilities not shared by their black counterparts until much later.[11] In this regard the Land Bank Act of 1912 and the Co-operatives Act of 1922 assisted white farmers, as did the subsidies on maize, wool and sugar.[12] The Soil Conservation Act of

1946 did not apply to black areas, and it was not until 1946 (in the opinion of the Tomlinson Commission) that agricultural extension services began to be effective in black areas, whereas they had been working for years in white farming areas.[13]

That this differential treatment of black and white agriculture has affected their relative performances, seems fairly clear. Any exploration of agriculture in the homeland areas must take into account the constraints under which it has operated in the past, as well as current constraints and opportunities. These constraints and opportunities may arise out of a homeland area like the Ciskei's position in the wider South African political economy, as well as out of factors operating within the Ciskei, or even within particular communities.

Against this background, this chapter will consider various factors influencing the patterns and effectiveness of cultivation in the Amatola Basin.[14] A brief outline of the basic details of cultivation in the Basin will be followed by a discussion of how access to arable land is obtained, and how this affects cultivation. The principle obstacles to cultivation will then be considered, as well as past and current attempts by external agents at improving the situation. A case study of one village in the Amatola Basin will then show how people are able to overcome some of the obstacles to cultivation through co-operation. In conclusion, various suggestions will be offered towards improving the situation.

2 Dryland Cultivation - A Brief Outline

Agriculture in the Amatola Basin consists of dryland cultivation and stock-farming. In addition a recently established community garden is administered by the Tribal Authority. Except for the community garden, very little of the agricultural product is sold.

Nearly half of the households residing in the Basin have rights to arable land. The average size of these arable allotments is 2,5 morgen (2,14 hectares). Households that do not have land rights may obtain informal access to all or part of another household's fields. Taking these landless cultivating households together with households with land rights that do cultivate, during the 1981/82 season seventy-six per cent of the households currently resident in the Basin, cultivated fields. The degree of access to, and utilization of, arable land in the Amatola Basin is shown in Table 1.

There is an average of 0,27 morgen (0,23 hectares) of arable land available for each resident individual, (i.e. members of the de facto population of 3 830 people). Stock, which includes equines, cattle,

sheep and goats) is owned by two-thirds of the households. Cattle are owned by sixty per cent of the households, while substantially fewer households own sheep and goats. In addition, the majority of households own pigs and poultry.

The relative wealth of cultivating and non-cultivating households in terms of average monthly household income and ownership of cattle is given in Table 2. The figures for average household income include cash income from what limited sale of crops takes place, but do not include calculations of either income in kind or costs of cultivation.

Table 1: Amatola Basin : Land and Cultivation as Indicators of Wealth[15] (1981)

	% of Households: 1981
Landed Cultivating Households	40%
Landed Non-Cultivating Households	7%
Landless Cultivating Households	36%
Landless Non-Cultivating Households	17%

Table 2: Amatola Basin : Household Income and Ownership of Cattle as Indicators of Wealth[16] (1981)

	Average Monthly Household Income	% Households Owning Cattle
Landed Cultivators	R88	71%
Landed Non-Cultivators	R65	64%
Landless Cultivators	R54	56%
Landless Non-Cultivators	R54	39%

The landless non-cultivators are the worst off, as they lack both the funds and the cattle necessary to cultivate.

Each household provides its own labour or obtains help from relatives, but there is a high degree of dependence on labour obtained from outside the household. Ploughing is usually done with cattle, although, where money and terrain allow, use is made of

tractors. Those cultivators who can, use their own cattle or borrow from relatives. Again, there is a high degree of dependence on cattle obtained from outside the household.

Where ploughing is done by tractor, the Ciskei Government subsidises both tractor and driver. Where ploughing is done with cattle, men and schoolboys do the actual ploughing. An adult male will usually hold the ploughshare, while the span of oxen may be led by two men, or schoolboys. Sowing involves walking behind the plough and sowing seed in the open furrow, and may be done by anyone. The furrow is closed by the action of the ploughshare in ploughing the next furrow. Alternatively seed may be mixed with manure in a cultivator, which is pulled by oxen. Hoeing is usually done by women, as is reaping. Little use is made of fertilizer (other than manure), or insecticide.

There appears to be little formal remuneration, in cash or kind, for assistance offered in terms of labour or cattle. Various kinds of informal remuneration exist in terms of reciprocal favours both in agricultural and other matters.

It is not always the case that a household without sufficient labour or cattle obtains them both from the same source, which further underlines the widespread network of co-operation and dependency upon which the majority of households rely in order to cultivate.

Almost every cultivating household grows maize, while more than half the cultivating households grow vegetables (beans, peas, potatoes, pumpkins and melons) as well as maize in their fields.

The major agricultural decisions include the decision as to when to plough, to plant, to hoe and to harvest. These decisions are overwhelmingly taken by the effective heads of household, the majority of whom are women.

Eighty-five percent of households in the Basin have gardens ranging from approximately 250 square metres to more than 1 000 square metres. Nine-tenths of households with gardens work their gardens. The crops most frequently grown are maize, cabbage, potatoes, beans, spinach, onions and tomatoes.

It is difficult to get reliable estimates of yields.[17] The average yield per "acre" (approximately 0,43 hectares) ploughed by cattle only, in 1981, seemed to be two bags of maize **on the cobs.** This average does not, however, take into account the eating of green maize before harvesting. Two bags of cobs amount to roughly 90 kg of stripped maize. Fertilizer (other than manure) and insecticide are

rarely used. Excluding informal costs for labour and cattle, net profit per morgen (0,86 hectares) if converted into cash terms, amounted (in 1981) very roughly to R50 per annum,[18] for maize only. Estimates for other crops were not obtained.

The Basin's two agricultural officers are required to advise farmers about farming practices and to assist them to obtain tractors for ploughing, seed, fertilizer and stock medicine.

3 Access to Arable Land as a Factor Affecting Cultivation

a) The Land Tenure System

The quitrent form of land tenure obtains in the Amatola Basin. Under quitrent, land is not owned outright, but for practical purposes it is held under ownership conditions, subject to a yearly payment which previously amounted to R1,00 per annum for arable allotments and R0,25 per annum for residential sites. Furthermore, the land may not be "alienated or leased without the consent of the Governor" (Proclamation No. 117 of 1931). With the advent of betterment, (see p. 103) the quitrent fee appears to have been changed to R1,00 for a person with a residential site but no land, R1,00 for a person with a residential site and one lot of land, R2,00 for a person with two lots of land and a residential site. According to records in the Middledrift Magistrate's offices, all available arable land (410 allotments averaging 2,5 morgen or 2,14 hectare each) has been allocated in the Amatola Basin.

Lots may not be subdivided or held by females, but must be allocated to one male on the principle that land must pass from father to eldest son, or failing issue, to collateral male kin, i.e. brothers of the deceased, failing which, nephews of the deceased. On the death of a landowner, his widow is entitled "to occupy the land after her husband's death, without actually taking transfer. Only after the death of the widow can the heir take transfer".[19] However, a woman loses her prospective rights to her husband's field in the event of divorce. Nowinile X "lost her field to her son when she divorced", the field going to her son on the death of his father. Similarly, Nosize Y and her husband were divorced. The husband remarried. He then died, and the field is now used by his second wife, and will on her death pass to Nosize's son. If a widow remarries (and has no son) she loses her field. If she has a son, the field becomes his.

Lots may be transferred or sold with the consent of the Administration, and sales occur when quitrent payments become long overdue[20] or if the family wishes to sell. Although it is the policy of the

Administration not to allow a man to have more than one lot, this does occur, either by virtue of inheritance or by "unofficial" sale, whereby effective transfer is taken although the title deed remains unaltered.[21]

Quitrent is a relatively secure form of land tenure in that as long as the rent is paid, it is not necessary to cultivate the field or even to reside in the area in order to retain rights to the field.

Quitrent is seen by the people as providing a greater security of tenure than communal tenure, where "the headmen can take fields from people without any reason". A title-holder will only lose a field if he or she fails to pay rent. As long as rent is paid, the title-holder may for all purposes be an "absconder" (i.e. one who has permanently left the village), and still maintain his or her rights to the field.

One informant's statement may illustrate the situation: "At Village X a man had a field. His eldest son (i.e. the rightful heir) absconded for many years. The old man died, and the younger son (i.e. brother to the absconder) cultivated the field and paid the rent for all the years. Then the son of the absconder came home and saw the field full of maize and told his uncle not to set foot in that field again. The magistrate ruled that the field belonged to the absconder's son. We felt bad about the matter".

Moreover, (it is argued) it would take time and effort to obtain the field of an absconder. One cannot obtain such a field without the permission of his family, although after a reasonable time, it seems that the field may be appropriated if his family cannot be found. Although an individual holds the title to a particular field, it is argued that he cannot dispose of it without the permission of his family, and particularly of his brothers.

Technically, the law is seen as prohibiting people who do not have fields from keeping stock. However, this is not regarded as acceptable, and in the words of an informant "we do not enforce that here, so that the men will be able to rear stock". Moreover, "most of the people with fields have no stock, and they are helped by the people without fields, who plough their fields".

From the viewpoint of a migrant labourer involved in the wider South African political economy, the quitrent system of land tenure provides him with a secure rural base, which he can fall back on if need be. It is not necessary to cultivate the field, or even to live in the village in order to keep his right to the field. A landowner is thus free to participate in the wider wage economy without having

to divide his energies between rural and urban options.

From the viewpoint of agricultural productivity, the quitrent system raises various problems. Fields may lie uncultivated for years, because the people who are at home and may best be able to cultivate those fields, may be unable to gain access to them. Absentee landlords may arrange to have their fields cultivated by tenants, or they may simply let their fields lie fallow. So some fields of absentee landlords have been uncultivated for up to ten years. Fields of landowners who are present in the Amatola Basin may also (and in fact do) lie untouched for several years.

Productive farmers are prevented from gaining access to large enough tracts of land to make a commercial venture of farming. Sharecropping or hiring land are not conducive to making permanent improvements to the land (like fencing or contour-banking) as with sharecropping half of the crop is lost to the landowner, and if the tenant significantly improves the land, through e.g. fencing it, or taking anti-erosion measures, the landlord may well take back his land. Moreover, some landowners simply do not want other people to work their lands, and so they lie empty.

In 1981 the Ciskei Government sent out a directive to the effect that if a landholder did not cultivate his field, the government could take the field and give it to someone else for five years. After five years it would be returned to the original landholder. If he then failed to cultivate it, it could be taken from him permanently, (oral testimony and Tribal Authority records, Amatola Basin). It is not yet clear what the effect of this directive will be on patterns of landholding or cultivation.[22]

b) Informal Access to Arable Land

Nearly half of the occupied homesteads in the Basin have rights to arable land. Households which do not have rights to fields may gain access to arable land by various means. They may:

a) enter into a sharecropping arrangement;
b) hire someone else's land;
c) pay the quitrent fee of a field and have use of it;
d) obtain the use of land as a gift.

Sharecropping involves an arrangement between two households in which typically one supplies the land, and the other supplies everything necessary for its cultivation, i.e. labour, cattle, seed, and tools. The maize reaped is then equally shared, although vegetables grown may be kept by the tenant. It is accepted that green maize will not be eaten before harvesting. Sharecropping seems to be

designed to enable two households to have the benefits of cultivation (as without the tenant's contribution, the landlord would be unable to cultivate), rather than to provide rewards proportional to inputs. For example, one household may provide land, plough, cattle, seed and even a part of the labour force, while the other household provides only a part of the labour force and the product (i.e. the maize) will still be halved. The convention of "**isithathu**" (occuring elsewhere in the Ciskei, whereby the tenant obtains one-third of the crop if his input is proportionately less) does not seem to be employed.

When a tenant **hires** land, he pays R2 for what is termed "an acre". The size of an acre (of which there are usually four or five in a field of 2,5 morgen or 2,14 hectare), is not constant. It is clear that the hiring fee is only nominal, as the fee appears to be constant, regardless of the size or fertility of the acre to be cultivated. Moreover, Mills and Wilson report that in 1950, land was rented in the Keiskammahoek area for "£1 per season for an "ox-acre" . . . Large and small "acres" are recognised, but the price for all remains the same; nor does the price vary according to the fertility of the soil."[123] The price of an "acre" has not increased over thirty years and hiring should be seen as a non-profit-making arrangement whereby land is made available to the landless.

People who have left the village and who wish to keep their fields as security, or people who do not cultivate their fields, may **rent** their fields to others. The tenant then pays the R1 quitrent fee each year, and has free access to the whole field, while the landlord maintains the title, and may reclaim the use of the field whenever he so chooses.

A landless person may be **given the use** of all or part of an allotment which he/she may use free of charge and cultivate in any way he/she wishes. Such free land is usually obtained from a relative.

It is generally acknowledged by the people that it is in the best interest of a landlord to negotiate a sharecropping contract with his tenant, as he (the landlord) then gets half the maize crop for doing nothing, whereas if he hires out a portion of his field, the money will be quickly spent. Conversely, it is seen as in the tenant's interest to push for a hiring contract, as the fee is uneconomically low, and he then has the benefit of the entire crop, as well as the right to eat green maize before harvesting. However, as will be shown, landlords do not always push for a sharecropping contract, but often hire sections of land out, or rent or even give their fields

to landless households, saying that "we must help each other".

Various possible reasons may be advanced for this apparent altruism on the part of landlords, who often are not bound by ties of kinship to their tenants. Firstly, the landlord may need the cash derived from hiring out a part of his field, perhaps to contribute toward the cost of cultivating the rest of it. Secondly, the landlord may prefer the cash to half an uncertain and often low yield derived from sharecropping, particuarly after a period of drought. Thirdly, the tenant may not be willing to sharecrop, given such low and unpredictable yields. Once a field has stood for several seasons, the soil becomes hard, and ploughing with cattle (particularly cattle weakened by recent drought) may not be feasible. So if the landlord wishes to have his field cultivated, and cannot do so himself, he may be obliged to settle for a contract less favourable to himself than sharecropping. Fourthly, the landlord may use such apparent altruism to long-term advantage. Landlords sometimes hire, rent, or even give their land out on the understanding that after a few years the tenant will then enter into a sharecropping arrangement. Longstanding relationships are thus built up, whereby the landlord obtains a moral claim to the tenant's contract and labour, and so is assured of an important source of income in kind. This acts as a form of insurance against the uncertainties of illness and old age, and as a counter to the sporadic and often low income derived from migrant remittances.

Cultivation is an activity which has wider implications than its immediate and often limited economic gain, relating to people's personal dignity and to their standing in the community. The fact that landlords do not always push for the short-term economic gain of sharecropping, indicates that the yields obtained from cultivation are not perceived as significant enough to push for, at the possible cost of the longer term moral and economic security of valuable social networks.

While sharecropping or hiring one's land out has the short-term benefits of increasing output, it has various long-term defects, which are not conducive to sound agricultural development. These land-sharing practices encourage absentee farming, and accordingly there is not sufficiently strong interest from the landlord or security of tenure for the tenant to make long-term improvements,[24] even if the funds should be available. There is also no unified decision-making process, as the inputs and effort of landlord and tenant occur at different stages of the agricultural process. In the case of sharecropping, the fact that each party will only get half of the crop, reduces the incentive to make innovative changes, as the

potential reward is not seen as worth the risk.[25]

However, in a sub-subsistence agricultural economy, where often neither the land nor the funds are available to make significant long-term improvements, the short term benefits of tenant agriculture will probably continue to be exploited.

4 Obstacles to Dryland Cultivation

The fact that landless households are able to gain access to the fields of landholding households indicates that many landholding households are either unwilling or unable to cultivate all of their fields. It is argued here that a number of factors combine in a negative and cumulative fashion so as to impede the full and effective cultivation of arable land. Until these factors are countered, dryland cultivation cannot provide any significant source of income; nor, consequently, lessen the dependence of rural black villagers on sources of cash coming from outside the village, i.e. migrant remittances and pension grants. Although these factors will be discussed only in relation to the Amatola Basin, their effect is similar in Lesotho[26] and the Transkei.[27] These factors include (a) shortage of labour, (b) shortage of draught power, (c) shortage of cash and equipment, (d) inefficient agricultural extension services, (e) lack of market outlets, (f) lack of co-ordinated decision-making, (g) shortage of rain and (h) lack of motivation.

a) Shortage of Labour

Access to the labour necessary to cultivate is affected by the absence of many active adults (mainly males) working as migrant labourers.[28] This mainly affects the ploughing aspect of agriculture, which is the work of men. It seems we are not dealing with an absolute shortage of labour, but rather with a shortage of effective and motivated labour. Ploughing involves the plough being held, and the oxen being led and coaxed along with a stick or whip. The only physically demanding labour in this regard is the holding of the plough, as little boys of six to ten years often lead and coax the oxen. A teenager of say sixteen years is quite capable of holding the plough steady so that it opens a straight and sufficiently deep furrow. Such teenagers are, however, usually at school during the week,[29] and during the weekends, agriculture must compete with ceremonial, social and sporting activities. The effective shortage of male ploughing power is a consequence not only of absent male migrants, but also of the relatively low value which is placed upon agriculture in relation to other activities by those who remain at home.[30]

Hoeing and reaping are largely the work of women. There are usually women at home, but much of their day is taken up with such time-consuming tasks as fetching water and wood, and cooking and keeping house. Again, there is some free time for schoolchildren over weekends to hoe, but then they must forego the weekend social life of the village.

Labour seems to be effectively short, at the level of the cultivating household, which may lack either the labour itself, or the means needed to obtain labour. Additional labour may be obtained by soliciting help from neighbours and kinsmen, by sharecropping land, by two households pooling their labour resources, or by hiring labour.

b) Shortage of Draught Power

The main form of draught power used is cattle (nearly eighty per cent of households ploughed solely with cattle in 1980/81). Although sixty per cent of households own cattle, they do not necessarily own enough cattle or enough sufficiently strong cattle to plough. The shortage of cattle may be overcome by a few households pooling their cattle in a company or by hiring tractors. However, the availability of tractors depends on their state of repair, the accessibility of the agricultural officers (who in 1981 had no form of motorized transport), and upon having the necessary funds. Moreover, the fields of five villages in the Amatola Basin are partly or totally inaccessible to tractors, either because their fields are too steeply sloped, or are too stony for tractors.

c) Shortage of Cash and Equipment

Inaccessibility of equipment constrains a household's ability to cultivate. The Ciskei Government is able to supply seed, fertilizer, fencing and other agricultural equipment at subsidized prices to Ciskeians. At present the existing agricultural co-operative in the Amatola Basin (which requires a joining fee of R25,00) provides only a limited service to its relatively few members. Its effectiveness is limited largely to Komkhulu, which is the central village in the Basin, and which has the highest average household income.[31] Non-members must buy seed and equipment at unsubsidized prices, and those households that cannot afford these higher prices, must do without. In 1980/81 there was as yet no agricultural loan or credit scheme (other than that which shopkeepers might offer to a few farmers) available outside of the co-operative.

d) Inefficient Agricultural Extension Services

Effective extension services are hampered by the fact that the two

extension officers have no form of transport. They are therefore unable to provide an effective link between the people of the Amatola Basin and the Ciskei Department of Agriculture, or to visit households on a regular basis. Accordingly, they are unable to fulfil their intended role of providing people with advice, encouragement and incentive, as well as more effective access to equipment and tractors.

The effectiveness of extension services is also limited by the fact that the Ciskei bureaucracy has not been long established. It therefore has to deal with the problems caused by inexperienced personnel and limited funding, and its effectiveness in the field of agricultural extension is correspondingly limited. The process of obtaining a dipping tank (for which government approval had been gained) in the highland area of the Amatola Basin took more than a year for these reasons.

e) Lack of Market Outlets

The lack of either sufficient or sufficiently regular household incomes aggravates the situation caused by the above problems. People are often unable to hire labour or draught power or to pay for available equipment and services. This lack of income is again aggravated by the lack of any effective outside market link-up which might provide households with an outlet for their product, with an income from their agriculture and with the incentive to commit their labour and resources less to migration and more to agriculture.

f) Lack of Co-ordinated Decision-Making

Most effective heads of household in the Amatola Basin are women, and they make most of the important agricultural decisions, e.g. when and whether to plough, plant, hoe and reap. However, they are dependent on the mens' remittances in order to carry out these decisions, and these remittances may not always be forthcoming at the time when they are needed. Accordingly, a female household head may find herself unable to start or to complete the agricultural cycle, for lack of funds, or she may find herself in potential conflict with her husband who sends money home with the order to cultivate, in a bad year, when she can see that the crops will fail. The husband then comes home to find his field uncultivated, and his wife is answerable to him.

g) Shortage of Rain

The unpredictability of rain also increases the negative effect of all

the above factors. It plays havoc with yields and, accordingly, undermines peoples willingness to commit already scarce resources to agriculture, even after it has rained. A drought of several years hardens the soil while weakening or killing necessary draught animals, and a household with limited labour and stock may not be able to recover from the effects of a drought.

h) Lack of Motivation

All of this raises the question as to whether the "average" rurally-based Ciskeian family (e.g. in Amatola Basin) really wants to cultivate badly enough to try to overcome these obstacles. Many probably do not, because their experience of agriculture does not tell them that it is a worthwhile pursuit. Yields are low, work is hard, services are often sporadic, and there is little, if any, hard cash in return. In these circumstances, many households commit themselves to the apparently more secure and predictable income derived from working in the city. Remittances and energy are used to meet more immediate needs in the first place and are risked on cultivation in the second place, if at all.

Several of these factors inhibiting cultivation arise out of the Ciskei's position in the wider South African political economy. Ciskeians need to work in the cities because their own areas cannot support them, resulting in shortages of labour, funds (as a result of low wages which must support the worker in town and his family in the country), draught power (for lack of funds) and co-ordinated decision- making. Other factors, such as the shortage of equipment and services are, to a large extent, the outcome of the differential access to funds and services enjoyed by black and white agriculture in South Africa over a long period.

The Ciskei Government is a fledgling bureaucracy, short on funds, experienced and skilled personnel, and largely dependent on South Africa for these necessities. Its ability to overcome its agricultural problems will depend largely upon the funding and training it receives from South Africa, as well as the position of its labour force within the wider South African economy.

5 Previous Attempts at Improving Agriculture in the Amatola Basin

During the 1960s, extensive agricultural betterment schemes were implemented throughout the Ciskei by the South African Government. In the Amatola Basin, this involved some villagers having to move their residential sites into already existing residential clusters to make space for the fencing-off of rotational grazing camps. People were financially compensated for the move but it is seen as

something which was imposed upon them against their will, and it is a memory which rankles.

The betterment scheme does not appear to have increased yields. The betterment report of 1959 states that "the existing average would be in the vicinity of 2 to 3,5 bags per morgen".[32] In 1981, yields in one of the highland villages appeared to be fairly similar (see p. 94). The scheme did not affect the demarcation of fields in the Amatola Basin, which were held to be "in good condition, neither exhausted, nor badly eroded."[33]

Its effectiveness in terms of the improvement of grazing and so of stock is more difficult to assess. The betterment report recommended culling of stock[34] and Steyn[35] suggests such culling did take place, although oral testimony suggests that it did not take place in the highland area of the Amatola Basin.

The betterment report states that "the overall condition of the veld is (sic) good" in 1959.[36] Steyn[37], however, states that "the veld condition score for Dohne Lowveld, which comprises 45 per cent of the veld, is 69 per cent below its potential. . . False Thornveld, which makes up the major veld type (49%) is 85,5 per cent below its potential. Generally, the basal cover is very low, and is susceptible to severe soil erosion". However, this deterioration must be seen against the background of severe recent droughts, the fact that "there is no enforcement of rotational grazing"[38] and the fact that the proviso that families without land should not be allowed to keep stock, is not enforced in all parts of the Amatola Basin. Steyn estimates that the Amatola Basin is currently overstocked by 361 per cent.[39]

The decline in the quality of the grazing must at least be partly ascribed to the fact that the people have not accepted all the recommendations of the betterment scheme, such as rotational grazing. This non co-operation stems largely from the fact that the people did not want betterment (and did not necessarily see the need for it) - in spite of the fact that the betterment report claims that "the vote at the meeting accepting the betterment scheme was unanimous and up to date the people appear to have been most co-operative".[40] The reasons for the rejection of betterment in a nearby area, and for the misunderstandings involved, have been discussed elsewhere.[41] Although some people saw the value of rotational grazing, and saw it as an improvement when it was first implemented, the fact that the betterment scheme is seen as having been thrust upon the people, as well as the fact that it was not followed up by either adequate extension services or supervision, has significantly undermined its effectiveness.

Quite a few people see betterment as having left them agriculturally worse off than before, and many villagers remain suspicious of any further attempts at agricultural development.

6 Current Attempts to Improve Agriculture in the Amatola Basin

Since 1978 the Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute (ARDRI) at the University of Fort Hare has been involved in a development project in the Amatola Basin. While not pertaining only to agriculture, the ARDRI project has been responsible for various agricultural innovations and changes. These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.

The Ciskei Government is considering the construction of a dam in the South Valley of the Amatola Basin, that is planned to push back up this valley. It is not yet clear how the dam is planned to affect activity in the Amatola Basin, or whether it will involve the relocation of any homesteads or arable land.

A problem that any development activity in the Amatola Basin will have to take in to account, is the way in which the people perceive their agricultural problems. Apart from the fact that, as in Lesotho, agriculture takes place "within the framework of a lack of expectation",[42] as discussed in the earlier section on obstacles to dryland agriculture, people see their problems as relating to limited access to resources, rather than to the need for advice or expertise. Successful farmers are seen to be successful because they have access to basic resources such as labour, draught power, seed, fences, and water rather than because they are skillful or knowledgeable farmers. People see themselves as limited in their ability to cultivate because they lack these resources. While this perception does accurately reflect many cultivators' economic position, it does underestimate the importance of knowledge and ability. Both of these factors crucially affect production, however limited the resource base may be.

7 Cultivation as a Co-operative Enterprise: A Case Study of Mkhobeni Village

This section will look at one highland village, Mkhobeni. It will argue that many households, both landed and landless, do not by themselves have the necessary resources to cultivate, and that cultivation is in many instances made possible by the sharing of resources. In this way a greater number of landed families are able to cultivate and a greater number of landless familes are able to gain access to arable land. The productive agricultural unit should, accordingly, not be seen as the household, but rather as centred on

the household, with assistance from relatives and friends.

There are eighty-three homesteads in Mkhobeni, of which sixty-four (77%) were occupied, while nineteen (23%) stood empty in 1981. In the majority of empty homesteads, the occupants were living and working in cities in South Africa, returning to Mkhobeni for holidays. However, three homesteads stand permanently empty as their former occupants are said to have "absconded", i.e. they do not return to Mkhobeni.

The resident population of Mkhobeni (i.e. those members of occupied homesteads currently at home) amounts to 348 people (5,4 people per household). The number of members of occupied homesteads currently away amounts to 179 people (2,8 people per household). Thus one-third (34%) of members of occupied homesteads are currently outside Mkhobeni.

There are fifty-one arable allotments (fields of 2,5 morgen each) associated with Mkhobeni.[43] Members of half of the occupied homesteads (50%) and just less than one-quarter of the empty homesteads have rights to fields. Rights to three fields are held by absconders.

During the 1980/81 season, members of twenty-three out of thirty-two (72%) occupied homesteads with land rights cultivated all or part of their fields, while members of fifteen out of thirty-two (47%) landless occupied homesteads cultivated all or part of someone else's land. Of the fields associated with the empty homesteads, six out of seven (87%) were uncultivated. Reasons given for not cultivating included the recent drought, and the fact that the cattle were too thin to plough, the shortage of cattle, and the shortage of labour. (Up to 1982, no tractors were available for ploughing in Mkhobeni.) A total of seventeen out of fifty-one fields (33%) were uncultivated during the 1980/81 season.

The drought does appear to have limited people's ability to cultivate during the 1980/81 season. During the three years 1978/79 - 1980/81, members of only four of the landed occupied homesteads (12%) did not cultivate their fields, while members of nine of the occupied landless homesteads (28%) did not attempt to cultivate. In only three of the nineteen homesteads standing empty in 1981, had their members cultivated any fields during the above three-year period.

Various factors constrain households that did not attempt to cultivate. The average monthly household income in Mkhobeni in 1981 was R56,50.[44] However, incomes vary widely and one-fifth (20%) of cultivating households claimed to have incomes of R10 per

month or less. Average household income combines with various other factors, notably a shortage of cattle and labour to constrain ability to cultivate. Of the thirteen households which did not cultivate for the three years 1978/79 - 1980/81, only two have any oxen and only three have a possibly adequate labour supply, although in all three cases the available male labour either works during the week, or is at school.

During the three cultivating years of 1978/79 to 1980/81, members of fifty-one out of a total of sixty-four occupied homesteads cultivated land. Of these, twenty-three landless households and one landed household gained access to other households' land.

However, to get a more complete picture, we must also include the homesteads that were empty in 1981, but which cultivated through co-operation during the period of 1978/79 to 1980/81, as well as those households in Mdlankomo (a neighbouring village) which gained access to the land of households in Mkhobeni. This situation may be represented as in Table 3(a) and (b).

Table 3(a): Mkhobeni : Means of Gaining Access to Land: All Cases (1978/79 to 1980/81)

Type of Access	Total Cases	Cases of Access from Relatives
Sharecropping	12	6
Hiring	12	5
Renting	3	3
Gift	11	10
TOTAL	38	24

The location of land-providers and land-receivers may be represented as follows:

Table 3(b) Mkhobeni: Location by Village of Land-Providers and Land-Receivers (1978/79 to 1980/81)

Mkhobeni land-receivers from Mkhobeni land-providers	24 cases
Mkhobeni land-receivers from land-providers outside Mkhobeni	8 cases
Outside land-receivers from Mkhobeni land-providers	6 cases
TOTAL	38 cases

As regards sharecropping and hiring, co-operation is equally with kin and non-kin, whereas in the case of renting and gift, co-operation is almost exclusively with kin. While most exchanges (63%) are between Mkhobeni residents, there is a significant degree of

co-operation (37%) with the neighbouring village of Mdlankomo.

The extent to which households co-operate in Mkhobeni in order to obtain the labour and cattle necessary to cultivate is shown in Tables 4(a) and (b).

Table 4(a): Mkhobeni : Sources of Labour for Ploughing and Planting (1978/79-1980/81):

Cultivating households using:	
Solely Own Labour	13
Labour of Relatives	26*
Labour of Non-Relatives	8
Labour of Relatives and Non-Relatives	4
TOTAL CULTIVATING HOUSEHOLDS	51

(* including 4 households obtaining labour from households outside Mkhobeni)

Table 4(b): Mkhobeni : Sources of Cattle for Ploughing (1978/79-1980/81)

Cultivating households using:	
Solely Own Cattle	18
Cattle of Relatives	23*
Cattle of Non-Relatives	9
Cattle of Relatives and Non-Relatives	1
TOTAL CULTIVATING HOUSEHOLDS	51

(*including 3 households obtaining cattle from households outside Mkhobeni)

The full extent of this co-operative enterprise is shown by the fact that only seven cultivating households (14%) supply all their own needs in terms of land, labour and cattle, and that only eleven cultivating households (22%) supply all their own needs in terms of labour and cattle.

The great majority of the relationships of co-operation discussed above are with kinsmen. It may, however, be argued that the distinction between kin and non-kin is not really meaningful in a small village like Mkhobeni or in an isolated section of the Amatola Basin, such as the highland area. Most families, by virtue of living together in the same area, have become related to each other over time, either through expansion of the founding lineages, or through marriage. What may be of significance, is the degree of relatedness between co-operating households.[4 5]

The degree of relatedness between households co-operating in terms of access to land, cattle and labour for ploughing and planting is shown in Tables 5(a), (b) and (c).

Table 5(a): Mkhobeni : Access to Land by Degree of Relatedness (1978/79-1980/81)

Type of Access:	Land obtained from: Close Consanguines	Close Affines	Distant Consanguines	Distant Affines	Non Relatives	Total Cases
Sharecropping	0	2	1	3	6	12
Hiring	0	1	1	3	7	12
Renting	1	0	1	1	0	3
Gift	7	3	0	0	1	11
TOTALS	8	6	3	7	14	38

The possible reasons for landlords not insisting on sharecropping contracts have been discussed earlier in this chapter. It is clear, however, in the majority of cases of access of land by means of gift, co-operation is with close kin. It is this form of access that gives most economic benefit to the tenant, and it is here that it would be expected to find the norms of kinship morality operating, rather than more commercial considerations.

Table 5(b): Mkhobeni : Access to Cattle by Degree of Relatedness (1978/79-1980/81)

(N.B. a household may obtain cattle from more than one source)

Cattle obtained from:

Close Consanguines	Close Affines	Distant Consanguines	Distant Affines	Non Relatives	Total Cases
7	4	6	7	10	34

Table 5(c): Mkhobeni : Access to Labour for Ploughing and Planting by Degree of Relatedness (1978/79-1980/81)

(N.B. a household may obtain labour from more than one source)

Labour obtained from:

Close Consanguines	Close Affines	Distant Consanguines	Distant Affines	Non Relatives	Total Cases
14	5	10	6	14	49

As regards access to cattle, help is received equally from consanguines and affines, as well as from close kin, distant kin and non-relatives. As regards access to labour, more help (although not significantly so) is received from close kin than from distant kin, although significantly more help is received from consanguines than affines.

In order to determine whether consanguinity is indeed a relevant factor in recruiting labour, let us look at the proximity of co-operating households to each other. Households will be regarded as close together if they are within six adjacent homesteads of each other, as being a medium distance apart if they are up to half the length of the village apart, and as far apart if they are further apart than that.[46]

Table 6(a): Mkhobeni : Proximity of Households Receiving Assistance with Cattle (1978/79-1980/81)

Type of Relationship	Near	Medium Distance	Far	Total
Close Consanguines	6	0	1	7
Close Affines	1	3	0	4
Distant Consanguines	6	0	0	6
Distant Affines	2	2	3	7
Unrelated	6	3	1	10
TOTALS	21	8	5	34

In the majority of cases (62%), assistance is received from a nearby household, often from direct neighbours. The majority of cases where assistance is received from consanguines are cases where the households concerned are close to each other, as is the case with unrelated households. In ten of the thirteen cases of co-operation with households living a medium distance or further away from each other, there is a compound relationship, i.e. household A will receive assistance from household B with regard to labour, or access to land, as well as cattle. There appears to be little reciprocal ploughing, and there was evidence of only five ploughing companies in Mkhobeni, where two or more houses pooled their cattle and labour.

Similarly with labour, the majority of cases of assistance (67%) are between households close to each other. Again, this is the case whether assistance is received from consanguines or from unrelated households. In thirteen of the sixteen cases where the co-operating houses are a medium distance or further apart, there is a compound relationship. Again there appears to be little reciprocal assistance

Table 6(b): Mkhobeni : Proximity of Households Receiving Assistance with Labour for Ploughing and Planting (1978/79-1980/81)

Type of Relationship	Near	Medium Distance	Far	Total
Close Consanguines	13	0	1	14
Close Affines	1	3	1	5
Distant Consanguines	8	1	1	10
Distant Affines	2	1	3	6
Unrelated	9	3	2	14
TOTALS	33	8	8	49

with labour, and there was evidence of only seven such cases (including the five ploughing companies mentioned above).

The significant criteria for co-operation and assistance between cultivating households in Mkhobeni appear to be proximity and friendship, rather than kinship ties by themselves. People co-operate primarily with nearby households, and with more distant households if there is a reason, such as a good personal relationship, or the fact that they have worked well together previously. If these are also kinsmen, so much the better.

Many relationships of co-operation are of several years standing and are of a compound nature. Of the forty cultivating households in Mkhobeni which were not self-sufficient in terms of both cattle and labour, twenty-six (65%) received both cattle and labour from the same source.

There appears to be little formal remuneration in cash or kind for assistance offered in terms of labour or cattle. Indeed, relationships which last over time and which are not single-stranded would seem to involve more than a transactional bond between the parties. The transactional aspect of these relationships is perhaps best understood in terms of informal patterns of remuneration, such as hospitality, assistance with domestic chores, lending of money, etc. In a community such as Mkhobeni which has been homogeneous and physically fairly isolated for over 100 years, and which has not been disrupted by new immigrants, relationships of trust are built up. Together with community pressure and the insecurities of unpredictable incomes and fortunes, these relationships of trust and friendship are probably strong enough to lead people to honour their social debts.

8 Conclusion

The average land-holding family in rural Ciskei areas like the Amatola Basin does not command the resources effectively to cultivate what land they do hold. It may, however, be argued that there are people with sufficient resources who are not cultivating because their land-holdings are too small to make their investment in commercial agriculture worthwhile. If those who have land rights are unable to cultivate the land, then surely those who are able to cultivate it, should be given the opportunity to do so.

It is, however, not clear that consolidated arable holdings, whether on a freehold, or any other basis (e.g. a collective) will in fact increase the agricultural viability of the Ciskei. Freehold tracts of up to twelve hectares lie uncultivated in some areas of the Ciskei. White agriculture in South Africa remains heavily dependent upon the provision of state services, markets and subsidies to keep going. The Ciskei government possesses neither the trained manpower, the infrastructure nor the economic resources to provide such services or subsidies to farmers that would be competing with an already established white agricultural control of markets.

In spite of the resources at its disposal, white agriculture is not without its problems. Tapson points to the growing problem of debt among South African farmers.[47] Such debt is likely to become a severe problem in the Ciskei, where both potential farmers and government assets are considerably poorer than their South African counterparts.

The Ciskei government is currently unable to provide the services, infrastructure and subsidies necessary to enable successful commercial farming. All such successful farming in the Ciskei takes place on capital-intensive, managerial-intensive, irrigation-aided schemes, which are funded by the Ciskei government. The fact that only two per cent of the Ciskei land surface is suitable for irrigation,[48] and the cost-structures and managerial inputs involved, mean that such development is possible only on a very limited scale.

Only as the Ciskei develops industrially and so becomes increasingly able to generate employment and income within its own borders, will it become able to supply and fund the infrastructural and institutional base necessary for successful commercial agriculture. This lessened dependence on South Africa will also mean that it will have greater command over the resources at its disposal, making for more stable and predictable financial planning.

Such growth will attract people from the rural areas to the

developing industrial centres in the Ciskei, thereby alleviating the pressure on arable land. This will allow for consolidation of arable holdings to a commercially viable size at the same time as the structural constraints on commerical agriculture become progressively less as a result of economic growth. Commercial agriculture should thus be seen as the culmination of a process of increasing viability of a homeland like the Ciskei. Until such viability has increased (which seems fairly unlikely under present political and economic conditions in the wider South African context), land tenure reform does not seem a viable option. The likely social and economic disruption will not be counterbalanced by adequate agricultural gains.

Agricultural development should rather be seen as a long-term project, related to the improvement of the quality of life of rural communities. As their general quality of life improves, so people will be able to commit more of their resources and energy to agriculture than at present.

Some possible starting points for improving rural communties' standard of living, which could also be of direct benefit to agriculture, are:

a) Improved access to water. This could involve the placing of a few windmills throughout rural residential areas, and the possible subsidization of water tanks for households able to afford them. This would save time spent on fetching water, promote health conditions and make limited irrigation of gardens possible. Such limited irrigation could be made more effective through the introduction of trench gardening.

b) Improved transport facilities. People would have access to a wider range of goods and services, both commercial and agricultural, at more competitive prices. Local markets, as well as social services such as hospitals and secondary schools, would also be more readily accessible.

c) Improved access to credit. The provision of credit facilities, whether for agricultural or other purposes, makes the planning of a household budget easier. People might pledge stock as collateral or might invest in savings clubs, or in Tribal Authority-managed credit organizations, where debts could be repaid by providing labour for Tribal Authority undertakings, such as repairing roads or fences.

d) Improved health services. A healthier community would be better able to study, earn and cultivate.

e) The provision of short, intensive training courses in optimal use of scarce agricultural resources in trench gardening and other techniques of water utilization and in household budget planning.

As these suggestions do not relate only to agriculture, the burden of their cost and organization would not fall only on the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, but would be spread more evenly throughout the Ciskei administration. Their successful implementation will require the Ciskei administration to make a substantial committment to its rural constituency, and to mount this committment as an inter-Departmental undertaking.

The investment by the Ciskei government in the meeting of the basic needs of its rural population should be seen as a long-term investment in the increasing economic viability of future generations. While the agricultural benefits of such a policy may take longer to materialize, the political benefits to the Ciskei leadership would be much more immediate, in the form of increased support and political stability.

9 Footnotes

1 Bauer C. (1983), p.104
2 Ibid, p.104
3 Ciskei Commission Report (1980), p.72
4 Ibid, p.73
5 Antrobus G.G. (1982), p.7
6 Ciskei at Independence (1981), p.125
7 Ciskei Commission Report (1980), p.74
8 Ibid, p.74
9 Ibid, p.19
10 Bowbrick J. (1970), p.7
11 Bowbrick J. (1970) and Wilson F. (1971)
12 Wilson F. (1971), pp.138-9 and Bowbrick J. (1970) p.9
13 Bowbrick J. (1970) p.9
14 Steyn J.G. (1982) has given a comprehensive account of stock-farming in the Amatola Basin. His analysis may briefly be summarized as follows:

While the major part of the Amatola Basin is suited to livestock production (p.75), there is gross overstocking (p.66) and mismanagement, resulting in high stock mortality rates (p.15). The agricultural extension service appears to have made little impact on people's stock-keeping practices (p.60). So for example, there is no enforcement of rotational grazing (p.64a). There is very little sale of livestock as people do not have enough animals to be able to dispose of them. The wool-clip is sold through a local trader. Whereas it was estimated that a household required up to

ten Animal Units to meet several basic needs (unspecified), only 15,4 per cent of stock-owning households or 8,5 per cent of all households in the Amatola Basin had eight or more Animal Units. (p.79). Stock are kraaled nightly (p.63) so that cow's milk contributes to the subsistence of the homestead (p.100). The limited slaughtering of livestock (p.140-141) provides households with an occasional supply of meat. Steyn does not attempt an estimate of the income generated by stock-farming in the Amatola Basin

15 These figures are derived from a one in five sample of households in the Amatola Basin in 1981

16 These figures are derived from the same survey. It is difficult to estimate income derived from agriculture. Quail estimates a per capita income of R40,00 per year from agriculture for the 357 000 rural Ciskeians. It is not clear whether Quail's figure of 357 000 rural Ciskeians includes migrants and others currently out of the rural areas, or not. The average total household size in the Amatola Basin was 7,4 people, and the average number of people currently at home in the Amatola Basin was 5,1 people in 1981 (see Chapter One, p. 7). If Quail's figure includes those currently away from the rural areas, this would raise the average monthly household income in the Amatola Basin by up to R25,00. If Quail's figure includes only those currently at home, this would raise the average monthly household income in the Amatola Basin by up to R17,00. These calculations are for all households, landed and landless, and as such do not give a true indication of what income actual households derive from agriculture
Bembridge, Steyn and Tuswa (1982, p.75) estimate that the net income from crop production in the Amatola Basin for 1980/81 was R68,81 per cultivating household. This figure would raise the average monthly household income of such cultivating households by R5,73. This figure does not include income derived from livestock farming

17 The size of the land cultivated varies. Some people say that a field of two-and-a-half morgen (2,14 hectares) consists of four "acres", others say that it comprises five "acres". Units of measurement likewise vary from a bag (usually 90kg bags) or a sleigh (one informant gave a sleigh as five bags) to a drum (for stripped maize). Several informants could not (or did not want to) remember their yields. Data for yields were obtained from Mkhobeni village only, and do not allow for green maize eaten before harvesting. Bembridge, Steyn and Tuswa (1982, p.73) estimate that maize provided seventy-three per cent of the gross value of crop production

18 The average yield of two bags (180kg.) of maize on the cob per half morgen amounts to roughly 90 kg. of stripped mealies. These mealies are then crushed and used as samp. The price of 90 kg. of samp in stores (allowing for transport) was approximately R31,50 in late 1981. The cost of 10 kg. of maize seed for a half morgen (Early Pearl i.e. small grain seed) was R6,70. In cash terms, the net profit per half morgen per annum amounted to R24,80

19 Mills M.E. and Wilson M. (1952), p.147

20 Ibid, p.147

21 Ibid, p.85
22 De Beer N. (1983, pp.21-22) mentions an existing regulation, instituted by the South African government (Proclamation R188 of 1969, appendix 5 and 10) in terms of which if the holder of a quitrent title does not cultivate for two successive years, the holder's rights may be cancelled. This regulation certainly does not appear to have been applied in the Amatola Basin
23 Mills M.E. and Wilson M. (1952), p.29
24 Williams J.C.C. (1972), p.26
25 Ibid, p.27
26 Murray C.G. (1976) ch.3 and Wallman S.C. (1969), ch.3
27 Westcott G. (1977)
28 An estimated seventy-five per cent of men between the ages of twenty and sixty years were away from the Amatola Basin in mid-1981 (Bekker, De Wet and Manona 1981a, p.12).
29 There were an estimated 1 067 people between the ages of eleven and twenty years resident in the Amatola Basin in 1981.Mqingwana's figures for school pupils at six of the nine schools in the Amatola Basin between the ages of eleven and twenty years is 673 (cf. ch.3). Converted to a total figure for all nine schools, this gives us a total of 903 pupils of between eleven and twenty years of age at school. While these estimates are clearly not entirely accurate, it does suggest that the vast majority of residents in the Amatola Basin between the ages of eleven to twenty years is at school
30 It may be argued that draught power is not strictly speaking necessary as it is possible to plant by hoe. While this has the disadvanges of not breaking up the soil to enable airing or storage of moisture, it would also make further demands on the already busy day of the physically able young women at home. The low evaluation which is placed on agriculture, and which has been recorded elsewhere in the Ciskei (Daniel and Webb, 1980) is another factor counting against planting by hoe
31 Bekker S.B. De Wet C.J. and Manona C.W. (1981a), Appendix C
32 Department of Native Affairs, Union of South Africa (1959), p.4
33 Ibid, p.3
34 Ibid, p.26
35 Steyn J.G. (1982) p.66
36 Department of Native Affairs, Union of South Africa (1959), p.4
37 Steyn J.G. (1982) p.34
38 Ibid, p.64
39 Ibid, p.66
40 Department of Native Affairs, Union of South Africa, p.2
41 De Wet C.J. (1981)
42 Murray C.G. (1981), p.77
43 There are fifty-one arable allotments (fields) associated with Mkhobeni. Rights to these fields are held as follows:

		Households	Fields
occupied households with rights to	1 field	24	24
	2 fields	7	14
	3 fields	1	3
empty households (returning) with rights to:	1 field	3	3
	2 fields	1	2
empty households (absconded) with rights to:	1 field	2	2
absconded family with no remaining homestead in Mkhobeni with rights to:	1 field	1	1
households outside Mkhobeni with rights to:	1 field *	2	2

*which is rented by Mkhobeni residents

44 These figures were obtained from a questionnaire applied to every occupied homestead in Mkhobeni. Unsatisfactory or incomplete responses were investigated further. This was the same questionnaire as was applied in the one in-five sample of the whole of the Amatola Basin and it is not clear why the average income in Mkhobeni should be so much lower, even if allowance for evasive or incomplete responses is made

45 The degree of relatedness has been calculated as follows:

1) a relationship between two households is one of close consanguinity if it is between the household headed by a man (or his widow) and that headed by his father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter (i.e. if his sister or daughter is unmarried).
2) all other relationships of consanguinity will be regarded as distant.
3) a relationship between two households is one of close affinity if it is between the household headed by a man (or his widow) and that headed by his wife's father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter (i.e. if his wife's sister or daughter is unmarried), or that headed by the husband of his sister, daughter or mother (i.e. where his mother is married to a man who is not his father)
4) all other relationships of affinity between households will be regarded as distant

Widows have been identified with their husbands' households for the purpose of calculating the nature of the relationship between households. On marriage a woman becomes socially and economically identified with her husband's household, and unless she remarries or leaves for other reasons, this identification persists even after her husband has died

46 Although this classification of households in terms of their relative proximity to each other may appear somewhat arbitrary, it has attempted to take the distribution of homesteads on the ground, as well as the physical features of the village, into account

47 Tapson D. (1984), p.5

48 Ciskei Commission Report (1980), p.72

6 Institutional Health Care Delivery and Community Health — *R. J. Fincham*

1 Introduction

The study of health and health care in Southern Africa is many dimensional, with considerable variation in both the levels of health and the extent of health care available to different communities. In the present chapter the concern is with levels of health and services available to homeland communities such as that of the Ciskei. In particular, the Amatola communities are considered in order to highlight problems and prospects of health care in homeland environments.

By way of introducing the material, a cursory look is taken at the disease patterns which afflict various socio-economic communities in South Africa. It is argued that white South Africans suffer from diseases of affluence, as do a proportion of urban blacks in the common area, while the majority of blacks in the common area and the homelands are plagued by infectious diseases coupled with malnutrition. The question arises as to how successfully health services in the homelands - the particular concern of this chapter - are meeting the task of curbing infectious diseases and combating malnutrition. To attempt an answer to the above question, some measure of community health in the present case is essential, and nutritional conditions, especially among young children, will be used as a surrogate measure of the level of health. Concentrating on the nutritional status of a community's youth to portray health conditions is vindicated by the knowledge that it is their level of health which provides a sound impression of the future human potential of the community.

Another issue to consider as a backdrop to the empirical work, is that of the structure of the health care system. The homeland system is considered briefly so that possible shortfalls in the system can be highlighted and suggestions made for improving it. In this way, the chapter will seek to portray not only aspects of health in a homeland environment, but also how the delivery of health care does or can influence levels of health.

The actual study and evaluation of the nutritional status of Amatola children will include a discussion of the incidence of malnutrition,

possible causal factors for nutritional status, the impact of the existing health services on the incidence of malnutrition, and possible intervention strategies which may be employed to ameliorate unsatisfactory conditions where necessary.

2 Health and Disease in South Africa

A great deal of evidence collected in the various regions of the world suggests that two fairly distinct cycles of disease patterns can be discerned on a global scale. Industrial and post-industrial societies are more prone to high incidences of chronic and degenerative diseases, while in agrarian societies, infectious and parasitic diseases together with malnutrition, predominate. These two cycles are depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Infectious and Chronic Disease Models



Source: Pyle (1979, p.20)

While certainly not restricted to the elderly, the degenerative and chronic diseases consisting of "new growths" in the form of carcinomas (cancer) and cardiovascular degeneration are associated with the process of ageing. Certain kinds of degenerative diseases can be caused indirectly by more affluent styles of living in an industrialized society. Additional factors leading to chronic diseases include stress, air pollution, diet, and excessive consumption of alcohol and tobacco. Infectious and parasitic diseases, on the other hand, are endemic in as much as two-thirds of the Third World's population, although they are also prevalent among the poor of the industrialized nations.[1,2,3] Micro-organisms which depend on the human host for survival are responsible for many of these illnesses which include cholera, measles, infectious hepatitis, malaria, sleeping sickness, tuberculosis and a host of intestinal diseases. If a person is malnourished, these diseases take on more serious proportions, causing a greater breakdown of disease resistance and increased rates of morbidity and mortality.[4,5,6]

In South Africa, the two cycles both appear to be well established along largely racial lines. Whites fall prey to the diseases of affluence and longevity, while the blacks are subject largely to infectious and parasitic diseases, along with malnutrition. The incidence of disease mortality for these two groups (whites and blacks) in South Africa is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 : Causes of Mortality in South Africa : Blacks and Whites



Source: After Dick & Bourne. (1978)

While infectious and parasitic diseases account for almost a quarter of all mortality in blacks, the comparable figure for whites is only twenty per cent. On the other hand, neoplasms (cancers) and circulatory diseases (especially ischaemic heart disease), responsible for a further twenty per cent of black mortality, account for over two-thirds of mortality in the white group.

The sharp contrast between the disease incidence of the two groups is very marked. However, the situation is more complex than the two pie charts suggest. Urban blacks in established metropolitan areas are increasingly taking on a pattern of disease which mimics that of whites. Improving socio-economic conditions mean that basic food requirements are met, but diets are not necessarily conducive to dealing with the more sedentary life style or its associated stresses. Yet other urban blacks, especially those in squatter camps, continue to suffer from the ravages of infectious and parasitic disease. In the rural and urban homeland environments the diseases of poverty continue to plague the population. Closer settlements established to house people repatriated from white South Africa (often referred to as the "common area") as a result of government policy are other at-risk environments in the homelands. There is usually little employment opportunity in these settlements and no agricultural activity is undertaken either.

A hospital-based study undertaken in 1975 in the Transkei and the Ciskei indicates that the incidence of diseases of the circulatory system and neoplasms (cancerous growths) and classed as degenerative or chronic was low, while that of infectious and parasitic diseases along with malnutrition was high.[7] Over eight and a half thousand patients were seen from twelve hospitals and two factors emerged very strongly. Over sixty per cent of male patients and forty per cent of female patients were under ten years of age. In excess of sixty per cent of diseases fell into three classes (according to the international classification of disease categories), namely digestive, communicable and respiratory. Closer analysis reveals these to be infectious and parasitic diseases associated with agrarian cultures, as depicted in Figure 1.

Numerous other studies done in homeland areas confirm the general trend established in the above survey. The Ciskei Commission Report[8] came to the conclusion that infant mortality was high and malnutrition widespread with rural areas more disadvantaged than urban areas. Work undertaken by Thomas in the Keiskammahoek area[9,10] suggests that, according to accepted measures for calculating present nutritional states, fourteen per cent of very young children and up to sixty-eight per cent of older children aged 7 to 8 years of age were undernourished. Rural children were found to be

worse off than their urban counterparts. Even within the rural homeland context, health conditions vary on a micro-level depending on the nature of the community under study. Access to employment and financial resources are important constituents for better health levels. Thomas suggests that poverty, together with social dislocation at the household level caused by migrancy and desertion of households by breadwinners, are key factors responsible for households with malnourished children and other health problems.

A 1982 study of a closer settlement called Tsweletswele near Mdantsane revealed that forty-three per cent of young children suffered from malnutrition; while ten per cent of the children were suffering from frank kwashiorkor.[11] While rural areas may be less favourably placed as regards the health of their people, clearly the closer settlements are zones of severe problems within homeland environments.

3 The Structure of Homeland Health Services

The per capita expenditure by the public sector on health in the Ciskei is approximately R17, or one-third of that spent in white South Africa,[12] reflecting the budgetary constraints as a whole within the territory. The money is used to finance a service structured specifically for homeland environments.[13] The structure of the service is depicted in Figure 3. The largest regional hospital in the Ciskei, the Cecilia Makiwane Hospital, is located at Mdantsane. This hospital provides the most sophisticated services within the Ciskei; but, although the more than 200 000 urban inhabitants benefit from ready access to the hospital, its geographical location, peripheral to the rest of the Ciskei, is a great disadvantage. In terms of rural population concentration, the central reaches of the Ciskei have the greatest numbers of inhabitants[14] and, therefore, these inhabitants and those in the northern areas have relatively poor access to the hospital.

Four regional hospitals located at Peddie, Keiskammahoek, Alice and Mt. Coke represent the second tier of services available. In all cases, hospital facilities are heavily used and there is much evidence to suggest that they fail to provide for all those patients who could make use of them. Distance, in particular, is a crucial variable which restricts the access of potential patients to hospital services. Only those within walking distance, those who are able to catch a bus or who can afford expensive transport by taxi, or those who have time to catch a train (to Lovedale Hospital in Alice or to Cecilia Makiwane Hospital in Mdantsane) make use of the facilities. In a study undertaken in the Alice area,[15] it was found that forty per cent of all patients to the Lovedale Hospital came from within a radius

of five filometres from the hospital and fifty-six per cent from within a ten kilometre radius; eighty-five per cent of all patients were no further than twenty kilometres from the hospital, a distance which, however difficult, is still possible to walk on foot in a day. The origin of patients coming to the hospital in July 1978 is depicted in Figure 4. On the assumption that a twenty kilometre radius around a hospital represents the tributary area of the majority of the hospitals' patients, it is possible to calculate the approximate number of rural inhabitants that do not have access to hospital services, and fall outside such radii. If the hospital to be built at Sada is included, then approximately thirty per cent of rural people have very limited or no access to hospital services.[16]

Figure 3: Structure of Homeland Health Services



Source: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, (1976, p.649)

Since the road network in rural areas is often inadequate, improvements in the transportation network would promote access to hospitals, provided hospital transport is available to take people to hospital when necessary. Funding for infrastructural improvements is, however, limited and is likely to remain so. As a result, most people seeking medical care in rural areas have to make use of clinic facilities - the primary level of service offered (as shown in Figure 3). The research done around Alice suggests that people will go greater distances for better levels of medical care. In the study of villagers' attitudes to medical care in the area surrounding Alice, it was found that over fifty per cent of the sample, on first becoming ill, went straight to a hospital. Only one-fifth went to the nearest

Figure 4: Place of Origin of Patients to Lovedale Hospital (July 1978)



Source: Engelbrecht et al (1978, p.6)

available clinic, while the rest either frequented traditional practitioners, private doctors and chemists or did not seek any medical help at all. The influence of clinics does appear to be restricted in its geographical extent. Furthermore, the attitude and degree of commitment of the clinic staff also influence attendance at clinics; as well as the impact of the clinic within the community on matters such as family planning and health education. The clinics must therefore be viewed as an important part of the health care structure, since they provide the means of providing services down to the local community level.

A serious problem affecting the efficient functioning of the various tiers of the health system is the poor infrastructural development. Many communities, especially those in the rural areas, can only be reached by gravel roads which tend to deteriorate markedly unless continually serviced by the roads department. Since such maintenance is sporadic at best, hospital vehicles which convey people from village clinics to hospitals and also take hospital teams into rural areas, soon succumb to the tortuous road conditions. Vehicle failure and accidents are commonplace occurrances and village communities can find themselves cut off from institutional services for long periods of time. During the survey done at Tsweletswele, hospital records showed that the community had not been visited for a period of eight weeks on one occasion because all hospital vehicles had broken down.

The following factors emerge from the discussion so far. Firstly, infectious and parasitic diseases along with malnutrition, seem to characterise the black communities in South Africa as opposed to degenerative and chronic illnesses, or the illnesses of affluence, which predominate in the white communities. However, a distinction can be made between the urban and homeland black communities with conditions being less satisfactory in the homeland communities. Here, the diseases of poverty appear to be endemic. Secondly, the institutionalised structure of the homeland or independent state health care system seems, in theory, to be adequate. In practice access to facilities is restricted. Public transport is minimal and since people often have to make the journey to facilities on foot, a strong distance decay function is evident. Roads tend to be poorly developed, especially to more remote communities in the homeland environment, so that hospital services to these communities often break down and the communities have to fall back on their own resources.

It is against this background that health levels in the Amatola Basin, as measured specifically by the nutritional status of the children, is analysed in the following sections.

4 Health Conditions in the Amatola Basin

A. Health and Nutritional Conditions in the Basin

The Basin has a central clinic located at Komkhulu. If the clinic is unable to treat a serious case, that case in theory is referred to the regional hospital, St Matthew's, which is situated just outside Keiskammahoek, a distance of about thirty kilometres.

Discussions with the matron at St Matthew's show that a team of two sisters visit the clinic once a month. A doctor is supposed to make a monthly call, but according to the matron, staff shortages preclude such a visit. Furthermore, the lack of vehicles and the high rate of vehicle failure means that the ambulance service from St Matthew's to the clinic is poor. In bad weather hospital vehicles do not even attempt the journey into the Basin, no matter how urgent the need of the Basin communities. In such emergencies the residents of the Basin have to rely on relatives or taxis to transport them to the hospital.

The Komkhulu Clinic, in common with facilities of its kind, provides antenatal care, child care, domiciliary visits and aids for minor ailments. Records are kept for all patients visiting the clinic. The child care programme for children under the age of two years appears to be well implemented and most children in this age category are seen on a regular basis by the clinic staff. According to the clinic sisters, a key factor influencing the nutritional status of the young children is that of drought. During periods of no rain, crop yields fall off considerably or are non-existent and stock lose what little condition they may have had. During the period of extreme food scarcity a sharp increase in the number of kwashiorkor cases occurs, especially if household finances do not allow for purchases of food. The amount of rain may be equally important in dictating the availability of suitably clean drinking water. Stone[17] has shown that in Tsweletswele (the Chalumna/Hamburg area of the Ciskei), ninety per cent of the water for human consumption comes from sources shared with domestic animals. Polluted water, exacerbated by no recharge from rainwater, is likely to promote gastro-enteritis and other infectious diseases which, in combination with malnutrition, increase mortality among the young.

Table 1 provides a record of Amatola children with malnutrition from January 1977 to October 1981. The number of cases increases substantially in 1979 and 1981. Although adequate rains fell in October and November of 1979, the period prior to it and thereafter was dry. The number of malnutrition cases does at first appear to be related to the period of limited rainfall. Figure 5 explores the

Table 1: St Matthew's Hospital Nutrition Clinic: Record of Amatola Basin Children on Supplementary Feed and at Risk to Malnutrition (January 1977 to October 1981)

Month	Year	No. of Children	Year	No. of Children	Year	No. of Children	Year	No. of Children	Year	No. of Children
Jan.	1977	12	1978	18	1979	50	1980	No trnsp*	1981	No trnsp*
Feb.		13		19		60		"		"
March		23		22		66		"		42
April		23		20		76		"		22
May		23		26		82		105		35
June		23		20		55		100		21
July		13		19		61		No trnsp*		50
Aug.		27		28		68		94		22
Sept.		No trnsp*		27		86		116		31
Oct.		21		31		90		108		41
Nov.		12		38		100		79		
Dec.		23		38		82		54		

* No transport

Figure 5 : Relation Between Amount of Rainfall and Number of Malnourished Children (1977 - 1981)



Source: St Matthew's Hospital, Keiskammahoek

relationships between rainfall and the number of malnourished children. The high incidence of malnutrition is reflected in a correspondingly low rainfall. Erratic but higher rainfall in 1981 corresponds to a decrease in the number of malnourished children. The relationship between rainfall, harvest and the availability of clean drinking water and nutritional status is complex, and other factors may also play their part. However, the data do suggest that water availability is an important influence, either directly or indirectly, on the nutritional status of children in rural homeland communities.

B Dietary Patterns

Incomes are low in the Basin so that children are brought up in a spartan environment. An analysis of the food most often consumed in the household, (Figures 6 and 7), testifies to the availability of a very limited range of basic foodstuffs. A delicate balance also must exist between sufficient and insufficient food in the household. Mealiemeal is the staple family food in the Basin and is supplemented by flour and samp which are items usually purchased from cash incomes and migrant remittances. During periods of crop failure even the mealiemeal is bought. Bought mealiemeal is very refined when compared with the home grown and ground product. The essential roughage and minerals are therefore removed from the diet at a period when these are most needed. Meat is consumed in very limited quantities so that the average adult diet is high in carbohydrates and low in protein. Figure 7 also suggests that essential vegetables are available to very few households, so that vitamin deficiency from a diet low in vegetables is likely. Soups, tea and coffee and sugar make up the remainder of a limited diet. Paraffin is used as a source of energy for cooking and most households use wood for heating. As the price of paraffin increases, so wood becomes more crucial as a source of energy for cooking as well as heating of the home. Drought and attendant poor harvests may well bring on kwashiorkor and additional hardship for the household. Other factors will play a vital role in dictating whether the child remains healthy or not during periods of scarce community resources. If the mother is home and fit and breastfeeding her baby, the child may be nutritionally sound even during periods of food scarcity. Children left in the care of unsuitable guardians while the parents have to migrate in search of work opportunities outside the Basin may not be so fortunate.

Access to clinic and hospital services may also help in times of need. In this respect those people in Komkhulu may be thought to be at an advantage since the clinic is in their village: their children may be better off than those in remote villages within the Basin.

Figure 6 : Food Consumed During the Last Evening Meal (July 1981)



Source: Bekker et al (1981, p.34)

Figure 7 : Shopping Basket : "Bought During the Past 14 Days" (July 1981)



Source: Bekker et al (1981a, p.34)

C An Assessment of Health Problems in the Basin

In terms of the present study, three statements are made as the basis for analyzing health problems in the Basin.

1 On the assumption that the St Matthew's Hospital Nutrition Clinic records reflect nutritional conditions of children in the

Basin as a whole, the present nutritional status of the children should be satisfactory, but their long-term nutritional status, poor.

2 Nutritional status may vary from the central village of Komkhulu outwards to the more remote villages of the Basin. The contention to be tested here is that the clinic can have a positive impact on the level of health of inhabitants in its immediate surroundings through educational programmes and activities, as well as its more ready access to those in close proximity.

3 Nutritional status of the Basin's children will depend on socio-economic conditions within individual households.

To test the above issues a nutritional survey as outlined below was undertaken. A team of qualified sisters undertook the fieldwork for the survey which consisted of taking a series of body measurements of all children under five years of age and comparing these with a set of international norms which indicated the nutritional status of the children. Present nutrition is measured using the age dependent weight-for-age measures: a child who falls below the third percentile of weight-for-age on the National Center for Health Statistics Percentiles (NCHS); or in other words, has failed to obtain eighty per cent of his/her expected weight-for-age, is regarded as being at risk to malnutrition. Such a child is considered to be suffering from wasting, a process occurring because of energy deficits and inadequate protein intake.[18, 19] Long-term nutrition is measured by using the height-for-age measure: a child who falls below the third percentile of height-for-age or the NCHS norm, or ninety per cent of expected height-for-age, is regarded as being stunted. Stunting is a result of a child growing up in an environment of food scarcity over a long period of time.

In addition to these anthropometric measurements, a series of questions was asked about socio-economic conditions in each household surveyed. These included finding out whether the mothers and fathers were permanently at home or were migrants; who looked after the child most of the time; whether or not the child was breast fed, and for how long in the case of those fed; and whether clinic and hospital facilities were utilized.

In all, a total of 181 questionnaires were completed, supplying anthropometric measurements of 225 children, of which 117 or fifty-two per cent were male, and 108 or forty-eight per cent were female. The socio-economic status of the households of the 181 respondents was analyzed along with the anthropometric measurements. These

children came from five of the thirteen villages in the Basin and are regarded as being representative of Basin conditions as a whole.

D Nutritional Status of Children in the Amatola Basin

Tables 2 and 3 indicate the results of the assessment of the nutritional status of the children.

Table 2: Present Nutritional Status of Surveyed Children: Number and Percentage of Children below 3rd Percentile Weight for Age, NCHS Norms (November 1981)

Percentile	No of Children	% of Children
<3	29	13
3-25	80	36
25-50	60	27
>50	54	24
TOTAL	223	100

Table 3: Long Term Nutritional Status of Surveyed Children: Number and Percentage of Children below 3rd Percentile Height for Age NCHS Norms (November 1981)

Percentile	Children Aged 0 to 24 mnths No. of Child.	% of Child.	Children Aged 24 to 72 mnths No. of Child.	% of Child.
< 3	35	32	62	56
3-25	36	33	11	10
25-50	15	14	3	3
>50	22	21	34	31
TOTAL	108	100	110	100

The present nutritional status, as indicated in Table 2, is satisfactory if one adopts the criteria of Brown and Brown,[20] who suggest that when more than fifteen per cent of children in a community fall below the third percentile a serious problem exists. Whereas thirteen per cent of the children are at risk to wasting, approximately one-third of children under the age of two are stunted and the figure rises to nearly sixty per cent for the children aged three to five years. Clearly, the long-term nutritional conditions indicate that, overall, these Basin children grow up in environments of food scarcity. Various factors, such as ample subsistence foods because of adequate rains, or household income through the sale of stock and migrant remittances, may account for the satisfactory present nutritional status of the

children. Stunting, on the other hand, emphasises the problems of poor communities, where environmental problems (drought) and socio-economic difficulties (insufficient income through lack of migrant remittances, for example) can quickly and radically affect nutritional and health conditions.

It was postulated that the central village of Komkhulu may have better nourished children since the clinic and other Basin infrastructure is concentrated here. Table 4 shows the present nutritional status of the children broken down by village. Komkhulu does have the lowest percentage of children under the third percentile and the greatest percentage above the 50th percentile. These differences from the other villages are statistically significant (p 0,5), as shown by simple chi-squared analysis. Table 4 shows that the other villages, in order of distance from Komkhulu, have children with similar nutrition. If the clinic has an influence on child nutrition, it is limited to the immediate precincts of the clinic.

Table 4: Present Nutritional Status of Children by Village (November 1981)

Village	Present Nutritional Status of Children (Weight for Age)									
	<3P		3-25		25-50P		>50P		TOTAL	
	No.	Row %	No.	Row %	No.	Row %	No.	Row %	No.	Row %
Komkhulu	1	3	13	32	8	21	17	44	39	100
Matinese	9	16	18	33	15	27	13	24	55	100
Mdeni	6	20	12	40	8	28	4	13	30	100
Mkobeni	6	12	15	31	16	33	12	24	49	100
Dish	7	14	22	44	13	26	8	16	50	100
TOTAL	29	13	80	36	60	27	54	24	223	100

If one considers the wider role of the clinic in health care, then one finds from the survey results that ninety-three per cent of all respondents claimed that children under their care attended the clinic on a regular basis or were seen by clinic staff who make domiciliary calls to all villages. However, the problem of distance precludes many clinic services permeating more remote regions of the Basin. The clinic has facilities for the delivery of babies and these are well used by mothers of Komkhulu and the nearby villages of Mdeni and Matinise (less than two km. from Komkhulu): thirty-seven per cent, twenty-nine per cent and fifty-seven per cent respectively of all children surveyed in these villages were born at the clinic. On the other hand, the two villages remote from the clinic, Mkhobeni and Dish had only seven per cent and twenty per cent respectively of children born, delivered at the clinic. Altogether seventy-seven (46%) of respondents stated that children under their care had been

delivered in a hospital. The number of births at St Matthew's hospital at Keiskammahoek (15% of all deliveries) and at the Lovedale Hospital at Alice (30% of deliveries) point to many mothers "leap frogging" the clinic facilities, in favour of hospitals, for the delivery of their children. Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain whether or not the survival rate of children born at hospitals was higher than that of children born at clinics. The policy of the clinic staff is to transfer, if possible, potentially difficult births to the hospitals, so that children born at the clinic should not necessarily be worse off than hospital-born children.

The influence of the clinic may be more important in the area of health and nutritional education. If this is so, then attitudes towards child health, for example, in the issue of breast feeding, may be more positive in Komkhulu than elsewhere in the Basin. Table 5 shows the average number of months that babies are breastfed in the different villages.

Table 5: Attitudes to Breastfeeding (November 1981)

	No. of Responses		Average No. of Months Child on Breast
	23	Komkhulu	16,2
	18	Mdeni	17,2
	22	Mkhobeni	16,1
	36	Matinise	18,7
	30	Dish	18,5
TOTAL	129		Average 17,3

No significant difference exists between villages in the length of time children are breastfed. The length of time that mothers breastfeed, rather than reflecting the clinics' attempts to promote breastfeeding in favour of bottlefeeding, is probably a result of cultural attitudes to feeding and the inherent knowledge of mothers that breastfeeding is good for their children.

In another area of clinic service, the dispensing of contraceptives to mothers, more mothers use contraceptives in Komkhulu than do mothers in other villages. The injection - whose merits are debatable because of the side effects reported by many users - is the contraceptive method most widely used. Two-thirds of Komkhulu mothers used the injection, representing eighty-seven per cent of all contraceptive users. Few contraceptive users are found in the more

remote villages such as Dish, where six per cent of mothers use clinic-dispensed contraceptives. Clearly, in the area of contraception proximity to the clinic has had an impact on a health-related issue.

E Nutritional Status and Household Socio-Economic Conditions

These features of household conditions are considered briefly in this section to provide some insight into the types of condition which may influence nutritional status. The first factor is that of the role of the parents in the household - whether they are at home and employed or not, whether they are migrants and living away from their child(ren) and whether they have deserted the family and no longer contribute to the affairs of the household. Second is that of the impact that cultivating lands may have: do families that cultivate subsistence crops have better nourished children than those families who are landless or who do not cultivate for some reason or other? Thirdly, the influence of family cash income and its relation to the nutritional status of the children is examined.

Table 6 presents the nutritional status of children, according to the roles of mothers and fathers in the households. While the majority of children are found in homes in which the mother is home but unemployed, the nutritional status of those children does not vary markedly from those in which the mother is home and employed, a migrant, has deserted the family, or "other" (e.g. has died). Similarly, the majority of children have migrant fathers - only a very few of whom have actually deserted their households - and this group of children does not seem to vary markedly in their nutritional status from children in any of the other categories. Whether parents are home, working away or have deserted the household does not appear to alter dramatically the nutritional status of children - grandparents or other community relatives step in to look after the child as well as can be expected, given the resources available to them.

Table 7, comparing the nutritional status of children from homes which cultivate crops such as maize on a regular basis and those which do not, shows that crop cultivation does not play a major role in nutritional status. In percentage terms, as many children fall under the critical third percentile in households which cultivate, as they do in those which do not cultivate.

Table 8, assessing family income and nutritional status, is the most important of the three in this section. There appears to be some correlation between income and nutritional status, with significantly better nutritional conditions being registered among the children who come from higher income families. Data were available for only 103

Table 6: Mothers' and Fathers' Status in the Home and Nutritional Status of Children (November 1981)

Parents' Role in Household	Present Nutritional Status of Children (Weight for Age)									
	<3P		3-25		25-50		>50		Row Total	
	No	Row %	No	Row %	No	Row %	No	Row %	No	Row %
(i) Mother										
Home and employed	2	13	6	37	4	25	4	25	16	100
Home and unemployed	17	12	49	33	45	31	35	24	146	100
Migrant/ deserted	6	14	17	40	7	16	13	30	43	100
Other	4	22	8	45	4	22	2	11	18	100
TOTAL	29	13	80	36	60	27	54	24	223	
(ii) Father										
Home and employed	1	6	6	36	5	29	5	29	17	100
Home and unemployed	1	6	6	38	5	31	4	25	16	100
Migrant/ deserted	23	14	55	34	47	29	37	23	162	100
Other	4	14	13	46	3	11	8	29	28	100
TOTAL	29	13	80	36	60	27	54	24	223	

Table 7: The Cultivation of Crops and Nutritional Status of Children (November 1981)

Whether Households Cultivated 1980/81	Present Nutritional Status of Children (Weight for age)									
	< 3P		3-25		25-50		>50		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Yes	18	13	57	41	35	25	30	21	140	100
No	10	13	22	29	24	31	21	27	77	100
TOTAL	28	13	79	36	59	27	51	24	221	100

children but it is sufficient to show that the children under the third percentile are found in households with incomes of less than R100 per month. If one assumes that children below the third percentile are at high risk to malnutrition and that those falling between the third and twenty-fifth percentiles are mildly malnourished, then almost half (47%) of children in households earning less than R50 are inadequately nourished; fifty per cent fall into these categories where monthly household income is between R51 to R100; thirty-nine per cent of children from households earning more than R101 monthly, fall into these two lower percentile categories. Thirty-nine per cent represents a significantly lower percentage (significance level, 0,5) of cases in these two categories, when household income exceeds R100 per month. Family income does, therefore, appear to be important to sound nutritional status.

Table 8: Family Cash Income and Nutritional Status of Children (November 1981)

Income (in Rands)	Present Nutritional Status of Children (Weight for age)									
	< 3P		3-25P		25-50P		> 50P		Total	
	No	Row %	No	Row %	No	Row %	No	Row %	No	Row %
0-50	4	9	17	38	14	31	10	22	45	100
51-100	6	20	9	30	7	23	8	27	30	100
> 101	-	-	11	37	5	18	12	43	28	100
TOTAL	10	10	37	36	26	25	30	29	103	100

F Pulling the Threads Together : An Assessment of the Survey Results

In Section C, three statements were used as a basis for presenting the survey results. The analysis of the survey results suggest:

1. The present nutritional status of the Basin children at the time of the survey was satisfactory. Long-term nutrition was however, much poorer indicating that children of the Basin are brought up in an environment of food scarcity.

2. The presence of the clinic does seem to have a positive impact on certain aspects of community health-related issues, e.g. nutritional status and family planning. While the impact is not dramatic, it does suggest that state-funded services are a necessity in resource-poor areas.

3. The overriding factor which dictates nutritional condition is the level of household income. Malnutrition is a disease of poverty and where families manage to raise the level of their income, the level of child nutrition is also improved.

5 Conclusion : The Role of Intervention in the Amatola Basin

The glaring lack of adequate infrastructure in the Basin suggests that it is here that intervention must concentrate, in order to affect nutrition and health conditions positively, in the long-term. An improved road network, for example, can help to move seriously ill people from the Basin to the clinic at Komkhulu and, if necessary, to hospitals outside the Basin. The clinic itself is unable to cover all the needs of the Basin people and satellite clinics at the Basin may prove beneficial. Since funds for such expansion are likely to be extremely limited, an alternative strategy may be to draw more fully on community resources: a village health-worker approach could dramatically increase the penetration of health services down to the village level.

With regard to the village health-worker concept, the fact that mothers and community members are able to maintain satisfactory nutritional levels amongst children can be used as a positive factor. Women, a major community resource, can be trained to use already hard-pressed resources even more efficiently. On visits to the Basin one came across families who were using green vegetables, such as cabbage, in combination with maize to provide nutritious family meals. Other households with similar resources were wont to cook the maize on its own - a much less nutritious meal. The diffusion of nutrition and hygiene information to less informed community members can be undertaken by innovative community members adequately motivated and brought into the ambient of the health services.

These infrastructural improvements cannot by themselves totally preclude malnutrition from the Basin. Institutional aid is necessary in the form of appropriate agricultural extension services and co-operation with communities. Agricultural potential must be more fully realised for those who do, and under the right circumstances would, cultivate the land. Even more fundamental than such institutional intervention, is that which will see families increasing the overall cash household income. To do so requires a serious reappraisal of overall rural development strategies and the problems which force family members to migrate in search of opportunities elsewhere in order to channel money back to their Basin homes.

6 Footnotes

1 Pyle G.F. (1979)
2 Pyle G.F. (1978)
3 Giggs J.A. (1979)
4 Puffer R.R. and Serrano C.V. (1973)
5 Kielmann A.A. et al (1977)
6 King M. et al (1978)
7 Rose E. and Daynes G. (1975)
8 Ciskei Commission Report (1980) p.30-31
9 Thomas T. (1980)
10 Thomas G.C. (1981) p.553
11 Bekker S.B. et al (1983) p.77
12 South African Institute of Race Relations (1981) p.316
13 Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa (1976)
14 Page D. (1974) Figure 1a, p.58
15 Fincham R.J. et al (1978) p.5
16 Calculated from Figure 1, Population Distribution in Page (1976) p.58
17 Stone A.W. (1984) p.6
18 Waterlow J.C. and Payne P.R. (1975); Truswell A.S. (1981)
19 The N.C.H.S. scales are an internationally accepted set of measurements, applied by the United States health authorities
20 Brown J.E. and Brown R.C. (1979) p.11

7 The Ardri-Gencor Rural Development Project in the Amatola Basin 1979–1983 — *S.B. Bekker*

During 1978 the General Mining Corporation of South Africa (GENCOR) commissioned the Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute at the University of Fort Hare (ARDRI) to undertake an extended rural development project in the Ciskei. After an attempt to locate the project elsewhere[1], ARDRI launched it in the Amatola Basin in July of 1979. At the time of writing this chapter (1984), the GENCOR development grant had expired[2] while ARDRI project initiatives in the Basin continued. Permission to construct a permanent ARDRI office in Komkhulu, had been obtained though construction had yet to commence.

The aim of this chapter is to attempt a broad assessment of the impact of project activities on members of the Amatola Basin community. To monitor the development of such a project in a comprehensive way is not at present possible. Not only has an extraordinary drought ravaged the Basin during 1982 but project initiatives continue and substantially more time is needed before a satisfactory evaluation can be made. This general assessment will be made on the basis of two independent criteria: first, a rural development strategy can fruitfully be understood and assessed as a relationship between a government, an intervening agency and a rural community; secondly, such a strategy's impact can be analysed in terms of changes within a rural community of productive activities (such as cultivation and cottage industries), of public consumption (such as health care, transport, and education), and of organisation (such as local government and marketing arrangements).

1 The Aims of the Project

Based on available documentation and information[3], it would seem that the general objective of the project was to promote rain-fed (rather than irrigated) cultivation in the Amatola Basin. This was to be done by way of a "people-orientated programme" that would spread project inputs over the community at large, and would not therefore simply identify needs for the provision of additional infrastructure. In short, the project aimed to stimulate grass-roots development, "from the bottom up".

There were, implicitly at least, two main justifications for this approach. During the 1970s, the Ciskei government had adopted a rural development policy that aimed to provide substantial capital and managerial expertise to a carefully selected number of promising rural areas. In these areas, the intention was that modern large-scale agricultural practices would ensure economically viable forms of production.[4] In practice, these capital-intensive agricultural schemes have met, at best, with moderate success with regard to both viable production and a demonstration effect in the eyes of rural households.[5] They have also required sophisticated and costly methods of irrigation. In view of the fact that capital for developmental investment remains in short supply and, more importantly, that land which is potentially irrigable amounts to a mere two percent, whereas land that can be cultivated by using rain amounts to fifteen percent, of the Ciskei as a whole, a project focussed upon this latter type of land appeared necessary.[6]

The second justification - validating the community-oriented grass-roots approach - is accepted by many rural development analysts.[7] Simply put, the argument states that planning and managerial inputs from the outside will be viewed with distrust by insiders and will exacerbate passive and unco-operative attitudes unless insiders are continually involved in planning, management and the production process as a whole. In addition, the argument continues, insiders often have knowledge of local conditions which outsiders may well ignore. Local conditions, moreover, are of particular relevance to projects involving family-based units of cultivation - in this case, individual Amatola Basin households.

The choice of the Amatola Basin as the location of the project reflects these two justifications. Both rainfall and soil quality are relatively high in the Basin, and ARDRI at the University of Fort Hare is situated close to the region, thereby facilitating liaison.

It is relevant to record that from the start of the ARDRI initiative, the objective of the project, and project aims flowing from this objective, suffered from ambiguity and lack of specification. In 1978, GENCOR requested from ARDRI a project plan "based on agriculture as the only meaningful industry in the area".[8] ARDRI, on the other hand, emphasized the community participation dimension of an integrated rural development approach.[9] This lack of consensus[10] between commissioning and development agency led to further ambiguity at the level of project aims. In particular, whether ARDRI should play a research or implementation role became an issue of salience, and led to disagreements over who should play project management roles in the different sub-projects.[11] Though the commissioning and development agencies were represented,

together with Ciskei state officials, on a Project Steering Committee (**PSC**) which held regular meetings,[12] these ambiguities concerning the very nature of the project persisted.

In the light of this situation, an analysis of the strategy followed by ARDRI becomes important. ARDRI obtained formal permission from the Ciskei Cabinet and the Tribal Authority in the Basin to launch the project. The agency subsequently appointed a project manager and community worker in the Basin, and maintained a staff of three at the University of Fort Hare. During the initial stages of the project, moreover, a Project Management Committee (**PMC**) was created. This body was constituted by, and remained answerable to, the Tribal Authority and included one man and one woman elected by each of the thirteen Basin villages. Its role entails assisting the Tribal Authority to assess and to ratify project initiatives and to recommend new initiatives.[13]

The formal strategy comprises three stages. The first which has been completed, aimed to gather and compile information about the Amatola Basin. Eight separate research projects were commissioned. They covered the following fields of inquiry: soils; climate; geology; vegetation; land use; grazing and browsing; fieldcrop, animal and horticultural production; and the socio-economic situation of residents. The second phase, which is being implemented at present, comprises the land use and agricultural extension programmes. The final phase which aims to implement programmes flowing from the first two phases, had, as of the beginning of 1984, yet to be started.[14] It is worth noting that project sponsorship has effectively expired before this third phase of the project has made much headway.

2 Project Interventions[15]

Since project aims were not specified at the commencement of the project, they will be identified through an analysis of those new sets of activities initiated by the project. These sets of activities will be classified as interventions relating to production, public consumption, and organisation.

Six distinct interventions have aimed at stimulating production within the Amatola Basin. Two of the six - the development of small cottage industries run by women and producing garments and drapery, and the development of a communal garden under irrigation producing vegetables which are then sold on local markets - have been organised and developed most clearly by Amatola residents themselves.

The cottage industries were established after discussions between

the project community worker and a number of the womens' groups active in Basin villages. A major aim of these activities is to supplement participants' household cash incomes. As a result, the endemic problem of finding and maintaining reliable market outlets is particularly severe since the issue of demand was only faced after the cottage industries had been started. A recent contract to supply local children with school uniforms has partially alleviated this situation.

The communal garden was launched after discussions between ARDRI, the Tribal Authority and the PMC. A weir was constructed on the Amatola River, furrows dug, and the garden laid out and fenced off. Three paid local employees, a supervisor and two workers, attend to the running of the garden in which men and women from surrounding villages grow vegetables. Each cultivator has the right to retain a fixed portion of their produce and the rest is sold locally. The gross income from the sale of vegetables accrues to a community development fund over which the Tribal Authority exercises authority.

The capital costs of this project and, until 1983 when sponsorship expired, the wages of the three employees were covered by ARDRI. As of 1983, on condition that the Ciskei government ratifies this additional item on the Tribal Authority's proposed budget, the Authority will take over the labour costs of the communal garden. This had not taken place at the end of 1983.

Though book-keeping problems, unsatisfactory attempts to incorporate a school-feeding scheme, and a shortfall on the annual current account continue to be experienced by the project, local participants, the Tribal Authority and ARDRI all retain optimism and enthusiasm about its beneficial role and potential viability.

Two further interventions are aimed directly at the stimulation of rain-fed cultivation in the Basin. Both rely heavily on the introduction of external (ARDRI) management and expertise. The first, which can be viewed as an agricultural extension initiative, comprises the laying out and management of five demonstration and trial plots in different parts of the Basin. Both summer and winter crops - maize, vegetables, and potatoes; and winter wheat - are produced. Local paid labour is employed and owners of the land used receive that part of the relatively high yields which is not required for research purposes. Three of the plots have recently been taken over from ARDRI by another external agency managing similar plots in other regions of rural Ciskei.

The second intervention took shape after ARDRI approached twenty

Komkhulu landholders who together owned a single block of arable land measuring some fifty hectare. Fences and trees within the block were removed; state tractors were employed to plough, fertilize, and plant the block under maize; and individual landholders accepted responsibility for weeding and harvesting their individual landholdings. In 1982/83, the Tribal Authority, rather than individual landholders, obtained from the Ciskei Agricultural Promotion Loan Fund an annual loan, which was administered by ARDRI, to cover the costs of seed, ploughing and fertilizer.

During the 1981/82 and 1982/83 seasons, drought conditions and serious deficiencies in state delivery of tractors and other agricultural services resulted in minimal harvests. In neither year was maize marketed in a coherent fashion; costs for the first year were borne by ARDRI and for the second by the Ciskei drought relief fund. As a result, both the Tribal Authority and a number of land-holders have expressed reservations about the continuation of the enterprise.

The last two production interventions relate directly to ARDRI's identification of market outlets. Basin sheepfarmers have sold wool through the main local trading store for a number of years. ARDRI approached the major wool trading corporation in the Eastern Cape and thereby established an improved institutional procedure for the sale of wool produced in the Basin.[16]

The second intervention is similar. ARDRI has, over the past few years, undertaken research into yields from, and the marketing of, perfume-yielding plants. One species, known as **khakibos**, grows naturally in the Amatola Basin and ARDRI organised the collection of substantial amounts of this plant by residents who were paid on a piece-work basis for this short-term manual task which can be repeated, at best, seasonally.

Project interventions aimed at improving public consumption in the Amatola Basin have focussed upon improvements in the Basin's infrastructure. Three have taken place, each of which has improved the delivery of Ciskei state services to the Basin.

After gaining permission from village committees, ARDRI is implementing a comprehensive programme of fencing off arable and grazing lands. Local workers are employed and costs of labour and material are borne by the Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry. A dipping tank has been established in the isolated Highland region of the Basin. Some labour was supplied free by men of the highland villages, and capital and other labour costs were borne by the same Department.

The third intervention was aimed at improvements in the system of transportation. An additional weekly bus service has been introduced, linking the South Valley of the Basin to Middledrift and Alice. In addition, two scooters have been provided for the agricultural extension officers resident in the Basin. Both improvements resulted from direct ARDRI representations to the relevant state departments in Zwelitsha.

A fourth initiative, aimed at improvements in Basin infrastructure, is being planned. ARDRI commissioned an independent agency to undertake a hydrological survey of the Basin and plans to introduce, with state support, a more efficient supply of clean water to isolated villages. Pumps, reticulation pipes, and storage dams will be employed to this end.

Interventions aimed at an improvement of the organisational capabilities within the Basin are more difficult to itemise. The creation of the PMC, the involvement of women's groups in cottage industries, and the various new or renewed linkages between state departments and the Basin community are examples. In particular, ARDRI persuaded the Department of Agriculture and Forestry to appoint a second agricultural extension officer in the Basin. One official is responsible for stock-farming activities and the other for cultivation.

3 Assessment

This overview of the differing interventions in the Amatola Basin community by the project agency establishes two facts. The separate goals which emerge from these experiments are disparate, manifesting no visible trend toward an integrated and coherent strategy. This is due, in all probability, to continuing ambiguity over the main objective of the intervention. The approach has remained essentially eclectic, most goals being chosen on the basis of uncoordinated research results and, therefore, turning out to be short-term.

In the second place, all interventions - with the possible exception of public transport - do seem to address, directly or indirectly, the issue of production. The separate goals of these interventions relate either to improvements in agricultural infrastructure or, cottage industries aside, to improvements in agricultural production.

The only clearly visible long-term strand in this eclectic strategy is that of an improvement in the system of agricultural extension. The primarily technical nature of this long-term goal, moreover, is

illustrated by the demonstration and trial plots, by the external managerial inputs into the large-scale maize cultivation enterprise, and by the rationalisation of the duties of local agricultural extension officers. Concisely stated, the Amatola Basin project, to date, has accepted improvements in agricultural production - rain-fed cultivation in particular - as its primary task and, to this end, has relied upon a continuing supply of technical expertise, onto which a number of short-term, specific and disparate goals have been grafted.

As a result of the primary focus on agricultural production, the project did not consider as fundamental a number of issues of public consumption which have been identified in this book: basic needs critical to a dependent community which is largely young and female. The environments of nutrition, health care, and education - understood in terms both of the state delivery of services and of community consciousness - are arguably the most important issues confronting most Amatola households.

The espousal by ARDRI of a rural development strategy "from the bottom up" immediately raises the issue of maintaining adequate management structures. In implementing this strategy in the field of agricultural production, ARDRI found itself increasingly taking over managerial roles without a formalised programme aimed at transferring these roles to resident organisations. The proposed establishment of a permanent agency office in the Basin attests to this. This lack of a formalised management programme is apparent in ARDRI's continual negotiations with the Tribal Authority. Not only is this body weak and ineffective (as was shown in Chapter 4) but the constitution of the PMC, the only ARDRI managerial intervention, as a committee responsible to, and dependent upon, this Authority, weakened the effect of this intervention. The fact that the future of the PMC is under question[17] underlines the weakness. It would seem that the long term managerial implication of the various project initiatives, a central issue to debates between proponents of alternative models of agricultural production,[18] have not been planned adequately.

It has become clear that the project strategy implicitly aimed to improve commercial agriculture. Its identification of two specific market outlets and of credit facilities makes this aim manifest. The Amatola Basin however, and the whole of the rural Ciskei for that matter, can be characterised as being lacking in agricultural markets during the past 100 years - for more than sufficient food has been produced commercially in the white agricultural sector - and as largely dependent upon industrially-processed staple foodstuffs processed in the white industrial sector. In such a situation, an

agricultural development strategy that is not highly sensitive to market structures and demand for commercial products, will have minimal influence on potential producers. It would seem that a long-term marketing strategy for Basin producers (cultivators, in particular), once again a central issue to proponents of alternative models of agricultural production, could have been given more attention.

In conclusion, the project, to date, does not seem to have paid attention to comprehensive strategies aimed at developing managerial expertise within the community, or to the securing of markets to stimulate demand for agricultural commoditites. On the other hand, the series of technical agricultural inputs, and the new and renewed linkages between the Ciskei government and the Amatola community, if sustainable, will probably have piece-meal beneficial consequences in the community.

The primacy of agricultural production within the strategy derived from the initial aim set by GENCOR, and the lack of consensus on the project objective, coupled with lack of definition regarding ARDRI's role as research or implementation (management) agency, all lessened the impact of project initiatives. As a result, projects of a productive nature, undertaken during periods of drought, were less than successful, and projects of a public consumption nature, arguably as fundamental to the community as productive activities, tended to be of low priority. State delivery of services, moreover, was generally erratic and of low quality.

Finally, what of the role of the sponsoring agency itself? One school of thought points to sponsors' self-interest in financing development projects[19], a smaller school to their enlightened self-interest.[20] It would be difficult indeed to argue that a South African mining house would derive direct benefits - with reference to their employees, for instance - from the Amatola Basin project. It appears more feasible to interpret self-interest indirectly in this case, rooted in the realisation that rural areas in the Ciskei are deeply impoverished and, if they remain so, may well become increasingly serious threats to the stability and credibility of the South African political economy.

To assess the extent to which this self-interest is enlightened would be premature since the project is barely five years of age. This assessment does, however, suggest that agencies that undertake sponsorship of such projects should commit themselves to periods of longer than five years, and should refrain from suggesting or insisting upon simple indicators of production in the highly complex field of development in rural communities.

4 Footnotes

1 Bekker S.B. and De Wet C.J. (1982) p.1.
2 Contributions for agricultural development were ended. Smaller grants for community development in the Basin continued. Burger P.J. (1983) Appendix A
3 See Bekker S.B. and De Wet C.J. (1982) and Burger P.J. (1983)
4 Ciskei Commission Report (1980) pp.71-76
5 See Daniel J.B.McI. (1981)
6 Ciskei Commission Report (1980) p.72
7 For example, see **AFRICA**, vol 52, no.3; Harriss J.G. (ed.) (1982)
8 Burger P.J. (1983) p.3
9 Bekker S.B., and De Wet C.J. (1982) p.1
10 This lack of consensus is made explicit in Burger P.J. (1983) p.227:

"There is little doubt that the decision (by GENCOR) to prematurely end sponsorship was precipitated to a considerable extent by conflicting interpretations of the original objectives and nature of the project between GENCOR and ARDRI"

11 Ibid, p.256
12 Ibid, p.295
13 Ibid, Appendix C
14 Ibid, p.250
15 Evidence used in this section was collected during field-work in 1981-1983. Most data are corroborated in Burger P.J. (1983)
16 Die Boere Korporasie Bpk.
17 Burger P.J. (1983)
18 Bates R.H. (1981); Hart J.K. (1982) and Heyer J. et al (1981)
19 Harriss J.G. (1982); Hart J.K. (1982) and Heyer J. et al (1981)
20 Sampson A. (1981)

Conclusion

The residents of the Amatola Basin are not able to derive a livelihood from the present distribution of resources and opportunities available in the Basin. Yields and sales from agriculture do not remotely approach subsistence level, infrastructural development and income opportunities allow for limited employment in the Basin; most able-bodied adults live and work elsewhere. Dependence upon participation in the wider South African economy is pervasive and deep. Basin residents are unable to exercise meaningful control over their socio-economic environment.

In fact, as shown in this monograph, constraints upon processes that would lead to improved life chances and living conditions are widespread, both internal and external to the community and cumulative in their effect. They manifest themselves at all levels of administration and government, within the commissioning and implementing project agencies themselves and, as portrayed in the history of the Basin, in the consciousness of the residents. The present structural situation in the Amatola Basin can best be described as a low-level equilibrium trap.[1]

Opportunities available within the community, as illustrated by voluntary women's groups, a measure of supplementary subsistence agriculture and informal sector activities, are contained within this structural equilibrium. Of themselves, they will not change the process of increasing dependence and decreasing local production. Except by outmigration, residents do not seem able to improve their circumstances by themselves.

During the last 130 years there have been several interventions designed to influence the local economy of the Amatola Basin, and to meet identified basic needs of residents. These interventions were initiated by state departments and culminated in the implementation of the South African Government's betterment policy in the 1960s. In the 1980s a new intervention was launched for the first time by a private sector corporation employing a development agency at the University of Fort Hare. The involvement of outsiders and their development strategies in the affairs of Basin residents is a common occurrence, viewed by many of the residents as being of doubtful worth.

Is it therefore feasible to propose once again that an external

agency should intervene in areas such as the Amatola Basin? The structural conditions pertaining in the Amatola Basin seem effectively to prevent escape from the equilibrium trap discussed above. These conditions apply in most of rural Ciskei and, in all probability, in all other homelands. Unless it is able to overcome these structural conditions, a new intervention is unlikely to be any more successful than its predecessors.

On the other hand, the necessity of meeting the basic needs of health and nutrition, education and welfare in rural areas remains a matter of priority if people's life-chances are not to deteriorate markedly. A new strategy of intervention must take account of these needs, as well as of the structural limitations within which it will have to operate.

In the short term, within the confines of the equilibrium trap, rural residents' needs have to be met largely from Ciskei resources and capital. Services should be aimed at enabling households to satisfy their basic needs more adequately, to obtain cash through employment, and to produce at least some food for themselves. In this regard, the improvement of the life chances of the young in rural areas, particularly with regard to health and education, should rank as a priority. Such a strategy should, wherever possible, allow for community participation and initiative.

The potential of such a strategy to realise its aims is, however, critically limited by the Ciskei's lack of independent or adequate funding and of trained personnel, as well as by its inability to generate sufficient industrial growth to attract people away from the heavily populated rural areas. A basic needs strategy, while essential, is likely to achieve only limited success as long as the Ciskei's economic dependence on South Africa is not substantially diminished or until South Africa pours substantially more money into Ciskei coffers. Under present economic conditions, neither alternative seems very likely to materialize.

In the longer term, breaking out of the equilibrium trap requires the development of successful commercial farming, as well as other forms of production. This could be done by a parallel strategy of large-scale commercial farming and peasant farming, whereby the former, through nucleus-outgrower projects, could act as a catalyst for the latter. The intention would be (as e.g. at Tyhefu) to create a successful peasant class that becomes increasingly self-sufficient, thereby lessening the Ciskei government's financial burden of subsidizing rural areas.

The unlikelihood of successful private commercial farming in the

Ciskei under present conditions has been argued in Chapter Five. This unlikelihood derives from the Ciskei's inability to achieve sufficient industrial development to generate the financial and infrastructural resources needed to support successful agriculture, and to attract sufficient numbers of people away from the rural areas so as to enable viable consolidation of arable holdings.

Such successful commercial agriculture as currently takes place in the Ciskei does so under external management, with Ciskei funding, and with privileged access to markets and services. Successful commercial agriculture, and its ability to generate successful peasant farming through nucleus-outgrower projects will thus be possible only to the extent that the Ciskei is able to afford and sustain such intervention. In the long run, the viability of commercial agriculture is dependent on the Ciskei's ability to generate industrial development and employment within its own borders.

In the meantime, what remains for homelands such as the Ciskei is to use what limited resources they have as effectively as possible to meet basic needs, to general industrial growth and to develop commercial agriculture as best they can. This requires an improvement in the efficiency of such a homeland's institutions at both central and local levels. This can be achieved through a greater devolution of authority to the local level, and through the provision of training for officials in the development of managerial and administrative skills. In the short-term, such training may have to be provided by outside agencies.

The Amatola Basin Rural Development Project which began in 1979 can be seen as one strand in the process proposed above. The project embodies goals and activities compatible with both the short- and longer-term strategies. In terms of its achievements, it is in a position to continue negotiating with the Ciskei government and its departments. The achievements flowing from the project can, moreover, be diffused through appropriate agencies so that some impact can be made on the scale of the development problem in other black rural areas.

The identification and analysis of constraints and resources discussed in this monograph will, hopefully, serve as an input into the rural development enterprise. The Amatola Basin community's experiences of rural development may provide governments and development agencies with the sort of information that may help them to learn from previous mistakes, and so to provide more enabling circumstances for people to improve themselves. One of mankind's saving graces is the capacity to learn from experience, and is to the benefit of the powerful, as well as of the poor.

Postscript

Almost one year has elapsed between the completion of this work and its presentation for publication (in June 1985). During this period a number of changes have taken place, which, either directly or indirectly, may have an effect upon the lives of the people of the Amatola Basin. They are simply listed for the benefit of the reader:

1) The Ciskei Government's modification of income tax laws operating in the Ciskei.
2) The Ciskei Government's initiation of a land reform programme, intended to make for an increasing commercialisation of land.
3) The Ciskei Government's announcement of a budget of R592 million for the financial year 1985/86.
4) The Ciskei Government's construction of the multi-million rand Gida Hospital at Keiskammahoek, which will replace St Matthew's Hospital as the hospital which will serve patients from the Amatola Basin.
5) Continuation of the Amatola Basin Development Project. Although the project's source of private funding has effectively been terminated, it has recently opened a training centre at Komkhulu in the Amatola Basin, at which people are trained in farming, carpentry, metalwork, broiler keeping and sewing, and has also built a spring to make water more readily available to people in the higher-lying villages.

Bibliography

Africa (1982) Vol. 52, No. 3 (Issue on Zimbabwe)

Antrobus, G.G. (1982) 'Irrigation Farming', in South African Outlook, Jan. 1982 (edition on Ciskei), pp.6-7

Bates, R.H. (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley, University of California Press

Bauer, C. (1983) 'Ciskeian Agriculture: a preliminary economic analysis', in Africa Insight, Vol. 13(2), pp.104-105

Beinart, W. (1982) The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930. Johannesburg: Ravan Press

Bekker, S.B., Black, P.A. and Roux, A.D. (1982) Some Development Issues in Ciskei. Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University. (Development Studies Working Paper No.10)

Bekker, S.B., De Wet, C.J. and Manona, C.W. (1981a) A Socio-Economic Survey of the Amatola Basin - Interim Report. Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University. (Development Studies Working Paper No.2)

Bekker, S.B., De Wet, C.J. and Manona, C.W. (1981b) The Socio-Economic Situation in the Amatola Basin. Alice: Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute, University of Fort Hare. (Report No 11/81)

Bekker, S.B. and De Wet, C.J. (1982) Some Human and Structural Constraints on Rural Development. (The Amatola Basin : a Ciskeian Case Study). Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, (Development Studies Working Paper No.5)

Bekker, S.B., Fincham, R.J., Manona, C.W. and Whisson, M.G. (1983) Tsweletswele: Problems and Prospects for Development in a Peri-Urban Closer Settlement in Ciskei. Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University. (Development Studies Working Paper No.13)

Bembridge, T.J., Steyn, G.J. and Tuswa, N. (1982) Present Utilization of Land: Field Crops of the Amatola Basin. Alice: Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute, University of Fort Hare. (Report No. 7/81)

Bowbrick, J. (1970) 'Agricultural Problems of African Resettlement', in The Black Sash, September 1970, pp.6-13

Brookes, E.H. (1974) White Rule in South Africa 1830-1910. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press

Brown, J.E. and Brown, R.C. (1979) Finding the Causes of Child Malnutrition. Georgia: Task Force on World Hunger, Presbyterian Church

Burger, P. J. (compiler 1983) The Amatola Basin Rural Development Project: Interim Report. Alice: Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute, University of Fort Hare. (Report No. 5/83)

Bundy, C. (1979) The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry. London: Heinemann

Charton, N. (ed. 1980) Ciskei: Economics and Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland. London: Croom Helm

Ciskei Commission. (1980) The Quail Report. Pretoria: Conference Associates

Crause, H.L. et al (1982) The Ciskei: Its Welfare and Social Services. Port Elizabeth: University of Port Elizabeth

Daniel, J.B. McI. (1981) 'Agricultural Development in the Ciskei: Review and Assessment', in The South African Geographical Journal Vol. 63 No. 1 pp.3-23

Daniel, J.B.McI. and Webb, N.L. (1980) 'The Image of Agriculture in Two Ciskeian Rural Communities', in Charton, N. (ed. 1980) Ciskei: Economics and Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland. London: Croom Helm, pp.48-58

Davenport, T.R.H. (1980) South Africa: A Modern History. Johannesburg: Macmillan

Davenport, T.R.H. and Hunt, K.S. (eds. 1974) The Right to the Land: Documents on South African History. Cape Town: David Philip

De Beer, N.J. (1977) Verslag: Gaika-Mbo Stamowerheid. Unpublished Report

De Beer, N.J. (1983) 'Grondbesitstelsels in die Ciskei en die Implikasies daarvan op Landbou-Ontwikkeling', in South African Journal of Ethnology, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp.19-26

De Jongh, M. (1979) Interaction and Transaction. Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Rhodes University

De Wet, C.J. (1981) 'Betterment and Trust in a Rural Ciskei Village', in Social Dynamics Vol. 6 No. 2, pp.24-35

De Wet, C.J. (1982) 'Dryland Agriculture', in South African Outlook, Jan. 1982 (edition on Ciskei), pp.7-9

De Wet, C.J. and McAllister, P.A. (1983) Rural Communities in Transition. Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University. (Development Studies Working Paper No.16)

Dick, B. and Bourne, D. (1978) Mortality in South Africa Part 1 1929-1970. Cape Town: SALDRU/SAMST Conference Paper on the Economics of Health Care in Southern Africa, University of Cape Town

Du Preez, C.C. and Botha, F.J.P. (1981) Soils of the Amatola Basin. Alice: Agricultural and Rural Development Research Insitute, University of Fort Hare. (Report No. 3/81)

Du Toit, A.E. (1954) 'The Cape Frontier: A Study of Native Policy with Special Reference to the Years 1847-1866' in Archives Year Book for S.A. History. Published by authority of the Minister of Education, Arts and Science

Engelbrecht, H., Fincham, R.J. and Selvan, D. (1978) Health Facilities and Socio-Economic Aspects of Disease in the Ciskei Region. Cape Town: SALDRU/SAMST Conference Paper on the Economics of Health Care in Southern Africa, University of Cape Town

Giggs, J.A. (1979) 'Human Health Problems in Urban Areas', in Herbert, D.T. and Smith, D.M. (ed. 1979) Social Problems and the City. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.84-116

Groenewald, D.M. (1980) 'The Administrative System in the Ciskei', in Charton, N. (ed. 1980) Ciskei: Economics and Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland. London: Croom Helm, pp.82-96

Hammond-Tooke, W.D. (1975) Command or Consensus. Cape Town: David Philip

Harriss, J.G. (ed. 1982) Rural Development: Theories of Peasant Economy and Agrarian Change. London: Hutchison

Hart, J.K. (1982) The Political Economy of West African Agriculture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Hartshorne, K. (1981) 'The Unfinished Business: Education for South Africa's Black People', in Optima Vol. 30 No. 1, pp.16-35

Heyer, J., Roberts P. and Willams, G. (eds. 1981) Rural Development in Tropical Africa. London: McMillan

Hobart Houghton, D. and Walton, E.M. (1952) The Economy of a Native Reserve: (Keiskammahoek Rural Survey Vol. 2). Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter

Horrell, M. (1983) African Education. Some Origins and Development until 1953 Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations

Hunter, M. (1961) Reaction to Conquest : Effects of Contact with Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa. London: Oxford University Press

Institute of Development Studies (1981)'Is Development Dead?' IDS Bulletin, (University of Sussex), Vol. 12 No.1

Kielmann, A.A. et al (1977) The Navangwal Nutrition Study Report to the World Bank. Baltimore: School of Hygiene and Public Health, Johns Hopkins University

King, M., King, F. and Martodipoero, S. (1978) Primary Health Care: a Manual for Health Workers. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kuper, A. (1971) 'The Kgalagari Lekgota', in Richards, A. and Kuper, A. (eds. 1971) Councils in Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.80-99

Lacey, M. (1981) Working for Boroko. Johannesburg: Ravan Press

Legassick, M. (1977) 'Gold,Agriculture and Secondary Industry in

London: Longmans
Wallman, S.C. (1969) Take Out Hunger: Two Case Studies of Rural Development in Basutoland. London: Athlone Press
Waterlow, J.C. and Payne, P.R. (1975) 'The Protein Gap', in Nature No. 258, pp.113-117
Weinrich, A.K.H. (1971) Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia. London: Heinemann
Welsh, D. (1971) The Roots of Segregation 1845-1910. Cape Town: Oxford University Press
Westcott, G. (1977) 'Obstacles to Agricultural Development in the Transkei', in Wilson, F., Kooy, A. and Hendrie, D. (eds. 1977) Farm Labour in South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip, pp. 139-153
Williams, J.C.C. (1972) Lesotho : Land Tenure and Economic Development. Pretoria: Communications of the Africa Institute, Vol. 19
Wilson, F. (1971) 'Farming 1866-1966', in Wilson, M. and Thompson, L. (eds. 1971) Oxford History of South Africa, (Vol. 2), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 104-171
Wilson, M. (1971) 'The Growth of Peasant Communities', in Wilson, M. and Thompson, L. (eds. 1971) Oxford History of South Africa, (Vol. 2), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 49-103
Wilson, M., Kaplan, S., Maki, T. and Walton, E.M. (1952) Social Structure. (Keiskammahoek Rural Survey Vol. 3), Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter
Wilson, M. and Thompson, L. (eds. 1971) Oxford History of South Africa, (Vol.2), Oxford: Clarendon Press
Wolpe, H. (1972) Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid', in Economy and Society, Vol. 1 No. 4 pp.425-456

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES (CAPE TOWN)

Research was carried out at the Government Archives in Cape Town. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner (BAC) files for the King William's Town Magistracy have not been inventoried, and in some cases two different files are marked by the same number. Where asterisks appear, this means that there is more than one file with the same number. The following is a list of records consulted:

AG:	1652.
AGR:	72, 109, 164, 412, 621, 629, 638, 598.

BAC:	1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*, 6*, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37*, 38*, 39, 40*, 41*, 42, 43, 44*. This series also includes a few unnumbered box-files.
BK:	22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 65, 66, 67, 68, 76, 89, 91, 92, 100, 101, 102, 140, 428, 433.
CCP:	1/2/1/29, 1/2/1/53, 2/2/3/2, 3/1/1/50, 4/1/2/1/1, 4/1/2/2/1-4/1/2/2/5, 4/11/1, 4/11/2, 4/11/3-4/11/6, 4/15/1-4/15/3, 4/17/1-4/17/3, 7/2/4/1, 7/4/2/2, 8/4/1, 11/1/1, 11/1/3, 11/1/5, 11/1/12, 11/1/15, 11/1/18, 11/1/21, 11/1/24, 11/1/27, 11/1/30, 11/1/33, 11/1/36, 11/1/39, 11/1/42, 11/1/47, 11/1/52, 11/1/58.
CO:	2055, 8764.
GH:	Annexures: Vols. 8, 10, 12.
LND:	1/11, 1/12, 1/13, 1/100, 1/139, 1/156, 1/173, 1/177, 1/315, 1/344, 1/373, 1/400, 1/618, 1/667, 1/723.
1/MFK:	110.
MOH:	204
MTD:	1/MTD1, 1/MTD2, 1/MTD3, 1/MTD4, 1/MTD5, 1/MTD6, 1/MTD7, 1/MTD8, 1/MTD9.
NA:	150, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 178, 180, 181, 183, 193, 199, 200, 201, 202, 205, 206, 207, 231, 246, 248, 295, 335, 441, 442, 443, 446, 466, 470, 495, 497, 513, 524, 533, 546, 562, 741, 742, 750.
PAE:	123, 213.
PAO:	1/24.
PAS:	4/182.
PAW:	115.
PWD:	1/2/101, 2/1/125.
QRR:	123-6, 127-131, 132-136, 308, 316, 9, 10.
SGE:	2/122, 2/226, 2/227, 2/303, 2/407, 2/670.
SRP:	1/2/11, 1/2/49-1/2/51, 1/2/53, 1/2/55.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Union of South Africa (1931) Government Proclamation No. 117 of 1931

Union of South Africa, Department of Native Affairs (1959), Reclamation and Resettlement Report for Amatola Basin (Ebenezer Mhlambiso) Location, Middledrift District (File Number: N.A. (60) N2/11/3/11)

Republic of South Africa (1976) Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa

Republic of South Africa (1980) Government Gazette, 19 December 1980

Republic of South Africa, Bureau for Economic Research: Cooperation and Development (BENSO) (1981) The Republic of Ciskei.

Ciskei, Department of Foreign Affairs (1981) Ciskei at Independence.

Ciskei (1980 and 1981) Legislative Assembly Debates Vol 13 (1980) and Vol 16 (1981)

Index

This multi-disciplinary case-study considers the opportunities and constraints confronting the members of a rural Ciskeian community in their attempts to improve their economic and social conditions. The possibility of such improvement is seen to be tied up with the community's relationship with its wider administrative, political and economic setting, viz. the Ciskei and South Africa.

The relative poverty of the Amatola Basin community reflects its position of political and economic dependency. This dependency is compounded by the fact that the Ciskei is itself dependent on South Africa for a substantial portion of its budget, as well as for much of its administrative capacity. The economic, infrastructural and political poverty of the Amatola Basin community is thus duplicated at the level of the Ciskei government.

This study considers the circumstances of the Amatola Basin community through a detailed examination of its history, current socio-economic situation, educational institutions, form of local government, agricultural practices, health and health services, as well as through an evaluation of a development project implemented in the community. In the conclusion, the findings of the case-study are applied to a discussion of the problems and prospects of rural development in the Ciskei, although the issues raised are also applicable to other homelands.

This detailed case-study of a black rural community incorporates perspectives from the disciplines of anthropology, development studies, education, geography and history. It will be of value to social scientists interested in South Africa, as well as those concerned with issues of development. Its unity as a case-study should make it a useful teaching text at undergraduate level at universities.

Shuter & Shooter
in association with
Institute of Social and Economic Research
RHODES UNIVERSITY

ISBN 0-86985-848-3